09.15.11
Posted in Bill Gates, Cablegate, Intellectual Monopoly, Microsoft at 5:47 am by Dr. Roy Schestowitz
Summary: How Microsoft and Bill Gates are seen by US diplomats who try to shame Kazakhstan into accepting laws that would harm the population
THE FOLLOWING triplet of Cablegate cables shows what we already knew — that in a cumulative transmission we can learn about US pressure for Kazakhstan to change its laws until they better align with US laws (think DMCA). The same shame game is being used to pressure just about any country to become more of a colony and Microsoft does its role through a company called Samgau, with Bill Gates getting personally involved despite having claimed that he moved on.
Kazakhstan Kazakhstan was going to move to ODF (which has no patent-imposed limitations) after Microsoft had lobbied there.
VZCZCXYZ0009
RR RUEHWEB
DE RUEHTA #0584/01 0790430
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 190430Z MAR 08
FM AMEMBASSY ASTANA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 2069
UNCLAS ASTANA 000584
SIPDIS
SENSITIVE
SIPDIS
STATE FOR SCA/CEN (O'MARA) and EB/TPP/IBE (JBOGER)
STATE PASS USTR FOR JCHOE-GROVES
COMMERCE FOR ITA/MAC/OIPR (CPETERS)
E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: ETRD [Foreign Trade], KIPR [Intellectual Property Rights],
ECON [Economic Conditions], KZ [Kazakhstan]
SUBJECT: KAZAKHSTAN: SPECIAL 301
REF: (A) STATE 09475 (B) 06 ASTANA 009 (C) 07 ASTANA 0454
-------
SUMMARY
-------
¶1. (SBU) Over the past year, the Government of Kazakhstan (GOK) has
continued to demonstrate a commitment to the development and
modernization of its IPR protection regime. Despite an increase in
the domestic production of pirated CD's and DVD's in Kazakhstan's
two largest cities, the GOK, and more specifically the IPR Committee
of the Ministry of Justice, continues to move forward in meeting
international standards and addressing the concerns of the
international community for the enhanced protection of IPR on the
legislative, judicial, and enforcement fronts. Facing a continuing
challenge to stem the flow of pirated goods from Russia and China,
the GOK has also proposed legislation to further empower customs
officials to seize counterfeit materials before they enter the
country. Although criminal sentencing remains at low levels, and
the lack of a public perception of the seriousness of IPR violations
is problematic, ongoing educational programs and proposed
legislative changes set to come to parliament for ratification in
late spring 2008 are expected to significantly improve the IPR
environment. Therefore, post recommends continuing Kazakhstan's
exclusion from the Special 301 Watch List. End Summary.
--------------------------------------------- ----
ENFORCEMENT INCREASES, BUT CRIMINAL SENTENCES LAG
--------------------------------------------- ----
¶2. (SBU) IPR enforcement efforts continue to increase, and the
numbers of convictions for administrative and criminal offenses grew
in the last year. According to combined 2007 statistics released by
the Ministry of Justice IPR Committee, and the Procurator General,
-- 1971 IPR-related raids were conducted. As a result of these
raids, 1418 entities (organizations and individuals) were charged
with administrative penalties;
-- 2670 administrative cases were initiated;
-- 20,250,755 KZT ($168,056) was collected in administrative fines
(compared to 14,385,725 KZT, or $116,013 in 2006);
-- 229,979 counterfeit copies valued at 132,369,884 KZT ($1,098,505)
with unlicensed or illegal trademarks were confiscated (compared to
121 million KZT, or $975,806, in 2006); and
-- 658 criminal cases were initiated (compared to 268 in 2006).
¶3. (SBU) Of the 658 criminal cases initiated in 2007, 447 were sent
to courts. Of these, 108 people were convicted under Part 1 of
Article 184 of the Criminal Code, one person was convicted under
Part 2, and 54 under Part 3. (NOTE: Parts 1-3 of Article 184
represent, in order, increasing categories of severity in both the
level of the offense and severity of punishment, based on amount of
damage, scale of the offense, repetition of the violation, etc. End
note.) Penalties for those convicted of violations of Article 184
vary. They include fines ranging from 100 to 700 times the Monthly
Calculation Unit (one Monthly Calculation Unit is currently set to
1,168 tenge, or $9.60), the confiscation of 5 to 10 months' wages,
community service of 100 to 240 hours, or imprisonment from 2 to 5
years and the possible confiscation of property.
¶4. (SBU) Despite the relatively high number of criminal
convictions, no data has been made available regarding sentencing.
According to an official at the General Prosecutor's Office, this
most likely indicates that no individuals have been incarcerated,
and that the criminal sentences were either reduced to
administrative penalties, or suspended. (Comment: The lack of jail
sentences remains of concern, indicating a continued perception
within the courts that copyright infringement alone, in the absence
of other criminal violations, does not merit incarceration. End
Comment.)
----------------------------
NEW AND CONTINUED CHALLENGES
----------------------------
¶5. (SBU) Outside of Kazakhstan's two largest cities (Almaty and
Astana), the vast majority of pirated media available originates in
Russia and China. Russia -- with its many railway links to northern
Kazakhstan -- presents a particular challenge for Kazakhstani
authorities. As noted by the IIPA, customs officials continue to
lack the ex officio authority required to seize counterfeit
materials at the borders, when they are discovered.
¶6. (SBU) According to private industry representatives, 2007 has
witnessed an increase in the availability and sales, particularly in
Almaty and Astana, of domestically produced counterfeit CD's and
DVD's. This is largely due to the increasing availability of
pirating technology and the willingness of small-time media pirates
to engage the police in the "cat and mouse" game of street sales.
Industry representatives assert that local police charged with
enforcing the prohibition of street sales are often unmotivated and
indifferent to the presence of such vendors, if not directly paid to
ignore them.
¶7. (SBU) The pursuit of rulings against IPR violators in civil
courts remains problematic because of legal norms carried over from
Soviet times. According to the Prosecutor General's office and
private industry representatives, this is particularly so when
licensed copyright holders attempt to sue vendors of pirated
material for damages. Under current IPR legislation, plaintiffs are
subjected to an unnecessarily heavy burden of proof, whereby they
are required to demonstrate a direct contractual link to the artist
or author whose pirated material is being illegally sold. (Note: An
example would be a direct contract between a performer and record
store. End note.) If a licensed copyright holder or distributor can
not substantiate this direct linkage, they can not, in the eyes of
the court, demonstrate financial damages caused by illegal sales.
In addition, civil claims must also be brought in a court in the
region where the infringement is alleged to have occurred. Regional
courts tend to lack regular exposure to -- and knowledge of -- this
relatively new and complex area of law, which has historically
inhibited the successful prosecution of violations.
------------------------
OPTICAL MEDIA PROTECTION
------------------------
¶8. (SBU) Two plants in Kazakhstan produce optical discs. One
specializes in films and music, the other in software. Both plants
have source identification codes (SID's) issued by the IFPI
(International Federation of the Phonographic Industry) and, as IIPA
notes, provide samples of their products for use as forensic
evidence.
----------------------------
SOFTWARE INDUSTRY ENGAGEMENT
----------------------------
¶9. (SBU) According to local Microsoft representatives, all newly
procured government computers have licensed software. While some
older government computers may still be loaded with unlicensed
software, overall the Microsoft representative expressed strong
satisfaction with the government procurement situation. Most
recently, Microsoft founder Bill Gates and the CEO of Samgau
(Kazakhstan's state-owned technology and innovation holding company)
signed an MOU on plans for future cooperation in the development of
educational technologies, as well as collaboration in IPR protection
and enforcement. Microsoft is recognized for its successful
engagement in defense of IPR in Russia; its enhanced partnership
with the GOK is expected to improve IPR protective capacity in
Kazakhstan, with a particularly heavy focus on the prevention of
internet-related piracy.
¶10. (SBU) Despite the positive relations developing between
Microsoft and the GOK, Microsoft representatives recommend that
Kazakhstan be placed on the Special 301 Watch List. Recent findings
from Microsoft-funded research indicated that levels of privately
used pirated (or unlicensed) software remains extremely high.
According to their data, 92.9 percent of privately owned PC's in
Kazakhstan utilize of illegally obtained software. (Note: Their data
also indicated that the overwhelming majority of respondents
believed piracy rates would decrease if the prices of commercially
available software were to be lowered. This opinion was also shared
by the General Prosecutor's Office. End note.)
--------------------------------------------- -----
SCHEDULED AND ENACTED IPR LEGISLATIVE IMPROVEMENTS
--------------------------------------------- -----
¶11. (SBU) During the reporting period, Kazakhstan continued to
pursue legislative changes that strengthen the government's hand in
protecting intellectual property rights. The legal basis for
preventing and prosecuting IPR violations remains the "Law on
Amending Legislative Acts of the Republic of Kazakhstan on the
Issues of Intellectual Property", which entered into force on
November 26, 2005. This law amended the country's Criminal Code,
Criminal Procedure Code, Civil Code, Administrative Code, and the
Copyright Law as they pertain to the protection of intellectual
property (ref B). Amendments to the Patent Law were ratified in
2007, significantly simplifying the patent system (as compared with
the old Soviet two-stage system) and bringing it into closer
conformity with international standards.
¶12. (SBU) Proposed amendments to the Copyright Law, Law on Trade
Marks, Law on Licensing, and Customs Code are currently being
evaluated by independent experts. Proposed amendments to the
Copyright Law have been praised by private industry representatives
in as much as they directly address the weaknesses hindering
copyright enforcement in civil courts (see para 7 above). New
amendments will relieve IPR holders of the heavy burden of proof,
and will facilitate effective law enforcement. In accordance with
WIPO requirements, the draft amendments also detail the use of
technical means for the protection of copyrights, specifically
prohibiting the removal of any types of technical or coded copyright
protection technologies. The IPR Committee is confident that the
proposed amendments to the Licensing Law stipulating mandatory
licensing for the commercial reproduction of any copyright protected
audio and visual recordings meet WTO requirements. These amendments
are scheduled to come before Parliament in late May-early June
2008.
¶13. (SBU) Amendments to Customs Legislation granting ex officio
authority to customs agents are scheduled to come before Parliament
in November 2008. These amendments will grant customs agents the
authority to more readily seize counterfeit goods at the border,
which has long been recommended by the International Intellectual
Property Alliance (IIPA.)
-------------------------------------
IIPA REPORTING AND CONCERNS ADDRESSED
-------------------------------------
¶14. (SBU) Over the last several years, IIPA reporting has
consistently reiterated several concerns regarding the development
and efficacy of IPR protective measures in Kazakhstan. They have
also, however, continued to report several significant inaccuracies.
¶15. (SBU) The IIPA report states that "only the Ministry of Justice
(Copyright Office) and not the police can bring charges for
[administrative violations]" and recommends "that the existing
police authority be broadened to include administrative violations
as well." Article 620 of the Administrative Violations Code
specifically provides such powers to the police.
¶16. (SBU) The IIPA's assertion that the 2004 statutes only provide
for a 50-year term of copyright protection is inaccurate, as the
November 2005 amendments specifically provide for the extension of
copyright protection to 70 years, in keeping with international
standards.
¶17. (SBU) The IIPA repeats another error from its 2006 and 2007
reports, overstating the minimum damages threshold for criminal
prosecution. IIPA misinterprets what it calls "the key amendment"
in the November 2005 legislation. i.e., the change to Article 184 of
the Criminal Code, which repealed the undefined "huge damage"
threshold for criminal cases and replaced it with a threshold of 100
Monthly Calculation Units (MCU's). The IIPA incorrectly reported
that one MCU is the equivalent of 36,495 tenge ($304), when in fact
it is currently set to just 1,168 tenge ($9.60). Thus, the IIPA
overstates the all-important minimum damages threshold for criminal
prosecution by a factor of more than thirty.
¶18. (SBU) The IIPA cites Kazakhstan's need to establish a legal
basis for the confiscation and destruction of equipment used in the
criminal manufacture of pirated goods. The IPR Committee continues
to assure post that a combination of statutes in the Criminal Code
and the Criminal Procedure Code constitutes an adequate provision
for the confiscation of such equipment. Moreover, the IPR Committee
has stated that such confiscations are routinely carried out and do
not require a court order. A court order is necessary only to
destroy such equipment -- a procedural requirement which the IPR
Committee defends as necessary to preserve potentially material
evidence. It should also be noted that the abovementioned proposed
amendments to the Copyright Law will require judges, in the event of
a conviction, to make a ruling regarding the named piracy equipment.
This provision is expected to increase occasions in which
confiscated equipment will be destroyed.
-------
COMMENT
-------
¶19. (SBU) Kazakhstan's continued progress on and commitment to IPR
protection merits its continued exclusion from the Special 301 Watch
List. The efforts of the IPR Committee within the Ministry of
Justice are expected to bear fruit in 2008 in the ratification of
amendments to numerous IPR-related laws. Post takes growing private
sector participation in the enforcement of IPR as a very positive
indicator of progress. At this stage, acknowledging Kazakhstan's
significant achievements while stressing to the GOK that they must
continue to enhance their IPR efforts is a better approach to
facilitate further U.S.-Kazakhstani IPR cooperation and achieve
results on the grounds than returning Kazakhstan to Watch List
status. End Comment.
ORDWAY
Another earlier transmission:
VZCZCXYZ0002
RR RUEHWEB
DE RUEHTA #0555/01 0790307
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 190307Z MAR 08
FM AMEMBASSY ASTANA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 2042
UNCLAS ASTANA 000555
SIPDIS
SENSITIVE
SIPDIS
STATE FOR SCA/CEN (O'MARA) and EB/TPP/IBE (JBOGER)
STATE PASS USTR FOR JCHOE-GROVES
COMMERCE FOR ITA/MAC/OIPR (CPETERS)
E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: ETRD [Foreign Trade], KIPR [Intellectual Property Rights],
ECON [Economic Conditions], KZ [Kazakhstan]
SUBJECT: KAZAKHSTAN: SPECIAL 301
REF: (A) STATE 09475 (B) 06 ASTANA 009 (C) 07 ASTANA 0454
-------
SUMMARY
-------
¶1. (SBU) Over the past year, the Government of Kazakhstan (GOK) has
continued to demonstrate a commitment to the development and
modernization of its IPR protection regime. Despite an increase in
the domestic production of pirated CD's and DVD's in Kazakhstan's
two largest cities, the GOK, and more specifically the IPR Committee
of the Ministry of Justice, continues to move forward in meeting
international standards and addressing the concerns of the
international community for the enhanced protection of IPR on the
legislative, judicial, and enforcement fronts. Facing a continuing
challenge to stem the flow of pirated goods from Russia and China,
the GOK has also proposed legislation to further empower customs
officials to seize counterfeit materials before they enter the
country. Although criminal sentencing remains at low levels, and
the lack of a public perception of the seriousness of IPR violations
is problematic, ongoing educational programs and proposed
legislative changes set to come to parliament for ratification in
late spring 2008 are expected to significantly improve the IPR
environment. Therefore, post recommends continuing Kazakhstan's
exclusion from the Special 301 Watch List. End Summary.
--------------------------------------------- ----
ENFORCEMENT INCREASES, BUT CRIMINAL SENTENCES LAG
--------------------------------------------- ----
¶2. (SBU) IPR enforcement efforts continue to increase, and the
numbers of convictions for administrative and criminal offenses grew
in the last year. According to combined 2007 statistics released by
the Ministry of Justice IPR Committee, and the Procurator General,
-- 1971 IPR-related raids were conducted. As a result of these
raids, 1418 entities (organizations and individuals) were charged
with administrative penalties;
-- 2670 administrative cases were initiated;
-- 20,250,755 KZT ($168,056) was collected in administrative fines
(compared to 14,385,725 KZT, or $116,013 in 2006);
-- 229,979 counterfeit copies valued at 132,369,884 KZT ($1,098,505)
with unlicensed or illegal trademarks were confiscated (compared to
121 million KZT, or $975,806, in 2006); and
-- 658 criminal cases were initiated (compared to 268 in 2006).
¶3. (SBU) Of the 658 criminal cases initiated in 2007, 447 were sent
to courts. Of these, 108 people were convicted under Part 1 of
Article 184 of the Criminal Code, one person was convicted under
Part 2, and 54 under Part 3. (NOTE: Parts 1-3 of Article 184
represent, in order, increasing categories of severity in both the
level of the offense and severity of punishment, based on amount of
damage, scale of the offense, repetition of the violation, etc. End
note.) Penalties for those convicted of violations of Article 184
vary. They include fines ranging from 100 to 700 times the Monthly
Calculation Unit (one Monthly Calculation Unit is currently set to
1,168 tenge, or $9.60), the confiscation of 5 to 10 months' wages,
community service of 100 to 240 hours, or imprisonment from 2 to 5
years and the possible confiscation of property.
¶4. (SBU) Despite the relatively high number of criminal
convictions, no data has been made available regarding sentencing.
According to an official at the General Prosecutor's Office, this
most likely indicates that no individuals have been incarcerated,
and that the criminal sentences were either reduced to
administrative penalties, or suspended. (Comment: The lack of jail
sentences remains of concern, indicating a continued perception
within the courts that copyright infringement alone, in the absence
of other criminal violations, does not merit incarceration. End
Comment.)
----------------------------
NEW AND CONTINUED CHALLENGES
----------------------------
¶5. (SBU) Outside of Kazakhstan's two largest cities (Almaty and
Astana), the vast majority of pirated media available originates in
Russia and China. Russia -- with its many railway links to northern
Kazakhstan -- presents a particular challenge for Kazakhstani
authorities. As noted by the IIPA, customs officials continue to
lack the ex officio authority required to seize counterfeit
materials at the borders, when they are discovered.
¶6. (SBU) According to private industry representatives, 2007 has
witnessed an increase in the availability and sales, particularly in
Almaty and Astana, of domestically produced counterfeit CD's and
DVD's. This is largely due to the increasing availability of
pirating technology and the willingness of small-time media pirates
to engage the police in the "cat and mouse" game of street sales.
Industry representatives assert that local police charged with
enforcing the prohibition of street sales are often unmotivated and
indifferent to the presence of such vendors, if not directly paid to
ignore them.
¶7. (SBU) The pursuit of rulings against IPR violators in civil
courts remains problematic because of legal norms carried over from
Soviet times. According to the Prosecutor General's office and
private industry representatives, this is particularly so when
licensed copyright holders attempt to sue vendors of pirated
material for damages. Under current IPR legislation, plaintiffs are
subjected to an unnecessarily heavy burden of proof, whereby they
are required to demonstrate a direct contractual link to the artist
or author whose pirated material is being illegally sold. (Note: An
example would be a direct contract between a performer and record
store. End note.) If a licensed copyright holder or distributor can
not substantiate this direct linkage, they can not, in the eyes of
the court, demonstrate financial damages caused by illegal sales.
In addition, civil claims must also be brought in a court in the
region where the infringement is alleged to have occurred. Regional
courts tend to lack regular exposure to -- and knowledge of -- this
relatively new and complex area of law, which has historically
inhibited the successful prosecution of violations.
------------------------
OPTICAL MEDIA PROTECTION
------------------------
¶8. (SBU) Two plants in Kazakhstan produce optical discs. One
specializes in films and music, the other in software. Both plants
have source identification codes (SID's) issued by the IFPI
(International Federation of the Phonographic Industry) and, as IIPA
notes, provide samples of their products for use as forensic
evidence.
----------------------------
SOFTWARE INDUSTRY ENGAGEMENT
----------------------------
¶9. (SBU) According to local Microsoft representatives, all newly
procured government computers have licensed software. While some
older government computers may still be loaded with unlicensed
software, overall the Microsoft representative expressed strong
satisfaction with the government procurement situation. Most
recently, Microsoft founder Bill Gates and the CEO of Samgau
(Kazakhstan's state-owned technology and innovation holding company)
signed an MOU on plans for future cooperation in the development of
educational technologies, as well as collaboration in IPR protection
and enforcement. Microsoft is recognized for its successful
engagement in defense of IPR in Russia; its enhanced partnership
with the GOK is expected to improve IPR protective capacity in
Kazakhstan, with a particularly heavy focus on the prevention of
internet-related piracy.
¶10. (SBU) Despite the positive relations developing between
Microsoft and the GOK, Microsoft representatives recommend that
Kazakhstan be placed on the Special 301 Watch List. Recent findings
from Microsoft-funded research indicated that levels of privately
used pirated (or unlicensed) software remains extremely high.
According to their data, 92.9 percent of privately owned PC's in
Kazakhstan utilize of illegally obtained software. (Note: Their data
also indicated that the overwhelming majority of respondents
believed piracy rates would decrease if the prices of commercially
available software were to be lowered. This opinion was also shared
by the General Prosecutor's Office. End note.)
--------------------------------------------- -----
SCHEDULED AND ENACTED IPR LEGISLATIVE IMPROVEMENTS
--------------------------------------------- -----
¶11. (SBU) During the reporting period, Kazakhstan continued to
pursue legislative changes that strengthen the government's hand in
protecting intellectual property rights. The legal basis for
preventing and prosecuting IPR violations remains the "Law on
Amending Legislative Acts of the Republic of Kazakhstan on the
Issues of Intellectual Property", which entered into force on
November 26, 2005. This law amended the country's Criminal Code,
Criminal Procedure Code, Civil Code, Administrative Code, and the
Copyright Law as they pertain to the protection of intellectual
property (ref B). Amendments to the Patent Law were ratified in
2007, significantly simplifying the patent system (as compared with
the old Soviet two-stage system) and bringing it into closer
conformity with international standards.
¶12. (SBU) Proposed amendments to the Copyright Law, Law on Trade
Marks, Law on Licensing, and Customs Code are currently being
evaluated by independent experts. Proposed amendments to the
Copyright Law have been praised by private industry representatives
in as much as they directly address the weaknesses hindering
copyright enforcement in civil courts (see para 7 above). New
amendments will relieve IPR holders of the heavy burden of proof,
and will facilitate effective law enforcement. In accordance with
WIPO requirements, the draft amendments also detail the use of
technical means for the protection of copyrights, specifically
prohibiting the removal of any types of technical or coded copyright
protection technologies. The IPR Committee is confident that the
proposed amendments to the Licensing Law stipulating mandatory
licensing for the commercial reproduction of any copyright protected
audio and visual recordings meet WTO requirements. These amendments
are scheduled to come before Parliament in late May-early June
2008.
¶13. (SBU) Amendments to Customs Legislation granting ex officio
authority to customs agents are scheduled to come before Parliament
in November 2008. These amendments will grant customs agents the
authority to more readily seize counterfeit goods at the border,
which has long been recommended by the International Intellectual
Property Alliance (IIPA.)
-------------------------------------
IIPA REPORTING AND CONCERNS ADDRESSED
-------------------------------------
¶14. (SBU) Over the last several years, IIPA reporting has
consistently reiterated several concerns regarding the development
and efficacy of IPR protective measures in Kazakhstan. They have
also, however, continued to report several significant inaccuracies.
¶15. (SBU) The IIPA report states that "only the Ministry of Justice
(Copyright Office) and not the police can bring charges for
[administrative violations]" and recommends "that the existing
police authority be broadened to include administrative violations
as well." Article 620 of the Administrative Violations Code
specifically provides such powers to the police.
¶16. (SBU) The IIPA's assertion that the 2004 statutes only provide
for a 50-year term of copyright protection is inaccurate, as the
November 2005 amendments specifically provide for the extension of
copyright protection to 70 years, in keeping with international
standards.
¶17. (SBU) The IIPA repeats another error from its 2006 and 2007
reports, overstating the minimum damages threshold for criminal
prosecution. IIPA misinterprets what it calls "the key amendment"
in the November 2005 legislation. i.e., the change to Article 184 of
the Criminal Code, which repealed the undefined "huge damage"
threshold for criminal cases and replaced it with a threshold of 100
Monthly Calculation Units (MCU's). The IIPA incorrectly reported
that one MCU is the equivalent of 36,495 tenge ($304), when in fact
it is currently set to just 1,168 tenge ($9.60). Thus, the IIPA
overstates the all-important minimum damages threshold for criminal
prosecution by a factor of more than thirty.
¶18. (SBU) The IIPA cites Kazakhstan's need to establish a legal
basis for the confiscation and destruction of equipment used in the
criminal manufacture of pirated goods. The IPR Committee continues
to assure post that a combination of statutes in the Criminal Code
and the Criminal Procedure Code constitutes an adequate provision
for the confiscation of such equipment. Moreover, the IPR Committee
has stated that such confiscations are routinely carried out and do
not require a court order. A court order is necessary only to
destroy such equipment -- a procedural requirement which the IPR
Committee defends as necessary to preserve potentially material
evidence. It should also be noted that the abovementioned proposed
amendments to the Copyright Law will require judges, in the event of
a conviction, to make a ruling regarding the named piracy equipment.
This provision is expected to increase occasions in which
confiscated equipment will be destroyed.
-------
COMMENT
-------
¶19. (SBU) Kazakhstan's continued progress on and commitment to IPR
protection merits its continued exclusion from the Special 301 Watch
List. The efforts of the IPR Committee within the Ministry of
Justice are expected to bear fruit in 2008 in the ratification of
amendments to numerous IPR-related laws. Post takes growing private
sector participation in the enforcement of IPR as a very positive
indicator of progress. At this stage, acknowledging Kazakhstan's
significant achievements while stressing to the GOK that they must
continue to enhance their IPR efforts is a better approach to
facilitate further U.S.-Kazakhstani IPR cooperation and achieve
results on the grounds than returning Kazakhstan to Watch List
status. End Comment.
ORDWAY
And the final transmission from a couple of days earlier was as follows:
VZCZCXYZ0008
RR RUEHWEB
DE RUEHTA #0525/01 0771133
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 171133Z MAR 08 ZDK
FM AMEMBASSY ASTANA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 2019
UNCLAS ASTANA 000525
SIPDIS
SENSITIVE
SIPDIS
STATE FOR SCA/CEN (O'MARA) and EB/TPP/IBE (JBOGER)
STATE PASS USTR FOR JCHOE-GROVES
COMMERCE FOR ITA/MAC/OIPR (CPETERS)
E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: ETRD [Foreign Trade], KIPR [Intellectual Property Rights],
ECON [Economic Conditions], KZ [Kazakhstan]
SUBJECT: KAZAKHSTAN: SPECIAL 301
REF: (A) STATE 09475 (B) 06 ASTANA 009 (C) 07 ASTANA 0454
-------
SUMMARY
-------
¶1. (SBU) Over the past year, the Government of Kazakhstan (GOK) has
continued to demonstrate a commitment to the development and
modernization of its IPR protection regime. Despite an increase in
the domestic production of pirated CD's and DVD's in Kazakhstan's
two largest cities, the GOK, and more specifically the IPR Committee
of the Ministry of Justice, continues to move forward in meeting
international standards and addressing the concerns of the
international community for the enhanced protection of IPR on the
legislative, judicial, and enforcement fronts. Facing a continuing
challenge to stem the flow of pirated goods from Russia and China,
the GOK has also proposed legislation to further empower customs
officials to seize counterfeit materials before they enter the
country. Although criminal sentencing remains at low levels, and
the lack of a public perception of the seriousness of IPR violations
is problematic, ongoing educational programs and proposed
legislative changes set to come to parliament for ratification in
late spring 2008 are expected to significantly improve the IPR
environment. Therefore, post recommends continuing Kazakhstan's
exclusion from the Special 301 Watch List. End Summary.
--------------------------------------------- ----
ENFORCEMENT INCREASES, BUT CRIMINAL SENTENCES LAG
--------------------------------------------- ----
¶2. (SBU) IPR enforcement efforts continue to increase, and the
numbers of convictions for administrative and criminal offenses grew
in the last year. According to combined 2007 statistics released by
the Ministry of Justice IPR Committee, and the Procurator General,
-- 1971 IPR-related raids were conducted. As a result of these
raids, 1418 entities (organizations and individuals) were charged
with administrative penalties;
-- 2670 administrative cases were initiated;
-- 20,250,755 KZT ($168,056) was collected in administrative fines
(compared to 14,385,725 KZT, or $116,013 in 2006);
-- 229,979 counterfeit copies valued at 132,369,884 KZT ($1,098,505)
with unlicensed or illegal trademarks were confiscated (compared to
121 million KZT, or $975,806, in 2006); and
-- 658 criminal cases were initiated (compared to 268 in 2006).
¶3. (SBU) Of the 658 criminal cases initiated in 2007, 447 were sent
to courts. Of these, 108 people were convicted under Part 1 of
Article 184 of the Criminal Code, one person was convicted under
Part 2, and 54 under Part 3. (NOTE: Parts 1-3 of Article 184
represent, in order, increasing categories of severity in both the
level of the offense and severity of punishment, based on amount of
damage, scale of the offense, repetition of the violation, etc. End
note.) Penalties for those convicted of violations of Article 184
vary. They include fines ranging from 100 to 700 times the Monthly
Calculation Unit (one Monthly Calculation Unit is currently set to
1,168 tenge, or $9.60), the confiscation of 5 to 10 months' wages,
community service of 100 to 240 hours, or imprisonment from 2 to 5
years and the possible confiscation of property.
¶4. (SBU) Despite the relatively high number of criminal
convictions, no data has been made available regarding sentencing.
According to an official at the General Prosecutor's Office, this
most likely indicates that no individuals have been incarcerated,
and that the criminal sentences were either reduced to
administrative penalties, or suspended. (Comment: The lack of jail
sentences remains of concern, indicating a continued perception
within the courts that copyright infringement alone, in the absence
of other criminal violations, does not merit incarceration. End
Comment.)
----------------------------
NEW AND CONTINUED CHALLENGES
----------------------------
¶5. (SBU) Outside of Kazakhstan's two largest cities (Almaty and
Astana), the vast majority of pirated media available originates in
Russia and China. Russia -- with its many railway links to northern
Kazakhstan -- presents a particular challenge for Kazakhstani
authorities. As noted by the IIPA, customs officials continue to
lack the ex officio authority required to seize counterfeit
materials at the borders, when they are discovered.
¶6. (SBU) According to private industry representatives, 2007 has
witnessed an increase in the availability and sales, particularly in
Almaty and Astana, of domestically produced counterfeit CD's and
DVD's. This is largely due to the increasing availability of
pirating technology and the willingness of small-time media pirates
to engage the police in the "cat and mouse" game of street sales.
Industry representatives assert that local police charged with
enforcing the prohibition of street sales are often unmotivated and
indifferent to the presence of such vendors, if not directly paid to
ignore them.
¶7. (SBU) The pursuit of rulings against IPR violators in civil
courts remains problematic because of legal norms carried over from
Soviet times. According to the Prosecutor General's office and
private industry representatives, this is particularly so when
licensed copyright holders attempt to sue vendors of pirated
material for damages. Under current IPR legislation, plaintiffs are
subjected to an unnecessarily heavy burden of proof, whereby they
are required to demonstrate a direct contractual link to the artist
or author whose pirated material is being illegally sold. (Note: An
example would be a direct contract between a performer and record
store. End note.) If a licensed copyright holder or distributor can
not substantiate this direct linkage, they can not, in the eyes of
the court, demonstrate financial damages caused by illegal sales.
In addition, civil claims must also be brought in a court in the
region where the infringement is alleged to have occurred. Regional
courts tend to lack regular exposure to -- and knowledge of -- this
relatively new and complex area of law, which has historically
inhibited the successful prosecution of violations.
------------------------
OPTICAL MEDIA PROTECTION
------------------------
¶8. (SBU) Two plants in Kazakhstan produce optical discs. One
specializes in films and music, the other in software. Both plants
have source identification codes (SID's) issued by the IFPI
(International Federation of the Phonographic Industry) and, as IIPA
notes, provide samples of their products for use as forensic
evidence.
----------------------------
SOFTWARE INDUSTRY ENGAGEMENT
----------------------------
¶9. (SBU) According to local Microsoft representatives, all newly
procured government computers have licensed software. While some
older government computers may still be loaded with unlicensed
software, overall the Microsoft representative expressed strong
satisfaction with the government procurement situation. Most
recently, Microsoft founder Bill Gates and the CEO of Samgau
(Kazakhstan's state-owned technology and innovation holding company)
signed an MOU on plans for future cooperation in the development of
educational technologies, as well as collaboration in IPR protection
and enforcement. Microsoft is recognized for its successful
engagement in defense of IPR in Russia; its enhanced partnership
with the GOK is expected to improve IPR protective capacity in
Kazakhstan, with a particularly heavy focus on the prevention of
internet-related piracy.
¶10. (SBU) Despite the positive relations developing between
Microsoft and the GOK, Microsoft representatives recommend that
Kazakhstan be placed on the Special 301 Watch List. Recent findings
from Microsoft-funded research indicated that levels of privately
used pirated (or unlicensed) software remains extremely high.
According to their data, 92.9 percent of privately owned PC's in
Kazakhstan utilize of illegally obtained software. (Note: Their data
also indicated that the overwhelming majority of respondents
believed piracy rates would decrease if the prices of commercially
available software were to be lowered. This opinion was also shared
by the General Prosecutor's Office. End note.)
--------------------------------------------- -----
SCHEDULED AND ENACTED IPR LEGISLATIVE IMPROVEMENTS
--------------------------------------------- -----
¶11. (SBU) During the reporting period, Kazakhstan continued to
pursue legislative changes that strengthen the government's hand in
protecting intellectual property rights. The legal basis for
preventing and prosecuting IPR violations remains the "Law on
Amending Legislative Acts of the Republic of Kazakhstan on the
Issues of Intellectual Property", which entered into force on
November 26, 2005. This law amended the country's Criminal Code,
Criminal Procedure Code, Civil Code, Administrative Code, and the
Copyright Law as they pertain to the protection of intellectual
property (ref B). Amendments to the Patent Law were ratified in
2007, significantly simplifying the patent system (as compared with
the old Soviet two-stage system) and bringing it into closer
conformity with international standards.
¶12. (SBU) Proposed amendments to the Copyright Law, Law on Trade
Marks, Law on Licensing, and Customs Code are currently being
evaluated by independent experts. Proposed amendments to the
Copyright Law have been praised by private industry representatives
in as much as they directly address the weaknesses hindering
copyright enforcement in civil courts (see para 7 above). New
amendments will relieve IPR holders of the heavy burden of proof,
and will facilitate effective law enforcement. In accordance with
WIPO requirements, the draft amendments also detail the use of
technical means for the protection of copyrights, specifically
prohibiting the removal of any types of technical or coded copyright
protection technologies. The IPR Committee is confident that the
proposed amendments to the Licensing Law stipulating mandatory
licensing for the commercial reproduction of any copyright protected
audio and visual recordings meet WTO requirements. These amendments
are scheduled to come before Parliament in late May-early June
2008.
¶13. (SBU) Amendments to Customs Legislation granting ex officio
authority to customs agents are scheduled to come before Parliament
in November 2008. These amendments will grant customs agents the
authority to more readily seize counterfeit goods at the border,
which has long been recommended by the International Intellectual
Property Alliance (IIPA.)
-------------------------------------
IIPA REPORTING AND CONCERNS ADDRESSED
-------------------------------------
¶14. (SBU) Over the last several years, IIPA reporting has
consistently reiterated several concerns regarding the development
and efficacy of IPR protective measures in Kazakhstan. They have
also, however, continued to report several significant inaccuracies.
¶15. (SBU) The IIPA report states that "only the Ministry of Justice
(Copyright Office) and not the police can bring charges for
[administrative violations]" and recommends "that the existing
police authority be broadened to include administrative violations
as well." Article 620 of the Administrative Violations Code
specifically provides such powers to the police.
¶16. (SBU) The IIPA's assertion that the 2004 statutes only provide
for a 50-year term of copyright protection is inaccurate, as the
November 2005 amendments specifically provide for the extension of
copyright protection to 70 years, in keeping with international
standards.
¶17. (SBU) The IIPA repeats another error from its 2006 and 2007
reports, overstating the minimum damages threshold for criminal
prosecution. IIPA misinterprets what it calls "the key amendment"
in the November 2005 legislation. i.e., the change to Article 184 of
the Criminal Code, which repealed the undefined "huge damage"
threshold for criminal cases and replaced it with a threshold of 100
Monthly Calculation Units (MCU's). The IIPA incorrectly reported
that one MCU is the equivalent of 36,495 tenge ($304), when in fact
it is currently set to just 1,168 tenge ($9.60). Thus, the IIPA
overstates the all-important minimum damages threshold for criminal
prosecution by a factor of more than thirty.
¶18. (SBU) The IIPA cites Kazakhstan's need to establish a legal
basis for the confiscation and destruction of equipment used in the
criminal manufacture of pirated goods. The IPR Committee continues
to assure post that a combination of statutes in the Criminal Code
and the Criminal Procedure Code constitutes an adequate provision
for the confiscation of such equipment. Moreover, the IPR Committee
has stated that such confiscations are routinely carried out and do
not require a court order. A court order is necessary only to
destroy such equipment -- a procedural requirement which the IPR
Committee defends as necessary to preserve potentially material
evidence. It should also be noted that the abovementioned proposed
amendments to the Copyright Law will require judges, in the event of
a conviction, to make a ruling regarding the named piracy equipment.
This provision is expected to increase occasions in which
confiscated equipment will be destroyed.
-------
COMMENT
-------
¶19. (SBU) Kazakhstan's continued progress on and commitment to IPR
protection merits its continued exclusion from the Special 301 Watch
List. The efforts of the IPR Committee within the Ministry of
Justice are expected to bear fruit in 2008 in the ratification of
amendments to numerous IPR-related laws. Post takes growing private
sector participation in the enforcement of IPR as a very positive
indicator of progress. At this stage, acknowledging Kazakhstan's
significant achievements while stressing to the GOK that they must
continue to enhance their IPR efforts is a better approach to
facilitate further U.S.-Kazakhstani IPR cooperation and achieve
results on the grounds than returning Kazakhstan to Watch List
status. End Comment.
ORDWAY
Many other countries receive the same treatment. It’s imperialistic. █
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Posted in Asia, Bill Gates, Cablegate, Microsoft at 5:29 am by Dr. Roy Schestowitz
Summary: A look at a Jakarta cable and the role Bill Gates played after he had left daytime duties at Microsoft
LAST week we showed diplomatic cables where Bill Gates got named as a participant in Asian leaders conferences/panels. In the following Cablegate cable we see this too. It also ends with: “Bill Gates spoke to 2,000 assembled government officials and students at a Presidential Lecture organized by the Kadin Secretariat. During the event, Gates recognized a student group from Institut Teknologi Bandung (ITB) as the national of a Microsoft sponsored innovation competition and also announced that Universitas Pelita Harapan has been named the fifth Indonesian university that will host a Microsoft innovation center.”
Here is the cable:
VZCZCXRO1610
PP RUEHCHI RUEHCN RUEHDT RUEHHM
DE RUEHJA #0932 1330854
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 120854Z MAY 08
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 8969
RUEHPH/CDC ATLANTA GA
INFO RUEAUSA/DEPT OF HHS WASHINGTON DC
RUEAWJB/DOJ WASHDC
RUEHRC/USDA FAS WASHDC
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC
RUEHZS/ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN NATIONS
RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA 7779
UNCLAS JAKARTA 000932
SIPDIS
SENSITIVE
DEPT FOR EAP/MTS, G/AIAG, L/DL, EAP/EX, EB/CIP AND OES/IHA
USAID FOR ANE/CLEMENTS AND GH/CARROLL
DEPT ALSO PASS TO HHS/WSTEIGER/MSTLOUIS AND HHS/NIH
GENEVA FOR WHO/HOHMAN
USDA/FAS/OSTA BRANT, ROSENBLUM
USDA/APHIS ANNELLI
E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: TBIO [Biological and Medical Science], EAGR [Agriculture and Forestry],
KFLU [Avian and Pandemic Influenza Activities],
ECPS [Communications and Postal Systems],
AMGT [Management Operations], PGOV [Internal Governmental Affairs], ID [Indonesia]
SUBJECT: Bill Gates Attends Government Leaders Forum Asia
¶1. (U) During the May 8-9 Microsoft Government Leaders Forum (GLF)
in Jakarta, Bill Gates praised President Yudhoyono for personally
leading Indonesia's national committee on information technology and
for setting ambitious goals. Gates said that while not all of
Indonesia's goals in information technology will likely be
achievable in current timeframes, having lofty goals in itself is a
best practice as it serves as a driver towards achievement.
Yudhoyono highlighted the USAID/MCC-supported E-Procurement system
as an example of Indonesia's effort to promote electronic governance
in order to streamline processes and improve transparency. Over 200
government leaders and private sector participants from other Asian
countries attended the forum that focused on education, health and
economic development.
¶2. (SBU) During the forum, Microsoft President Director for
Indonesia Tony Chen told Embassy staff that hosting the GLF
Conference in Jakarta was a boon to both Microsoft Indonesia and to
the Indonesian government. He thanked Embassy staff for assistance,
emphasizing the important role Ambassador Hume played in allaying
Microsoft leadership's security concerns. Hume's trip to Redmond,
Washington was one of the important factors in Microsoft's decision
to hold the forum in Jakarta.
¶3.(SBU) On the sides of the forum, a Gates Foundation official
queried Embassy staff on latest developments in avian influenza
sample sharing and on recent Ministry of Health actions barring
NAMRU-2 from receiving samples. He noted that Indonesian media had
mischaracterized the Gates Foundation's interest in avian influenza
assistance to Indonesia. The Gates Foundation was interested in
working on new vaccine development technologies that would
ultimately eliminate chronic global vaccine shortages years from
now. The Foundation was not planning on specific assistance to
Indonesia to develop an avian influenza vaccine.
¶4. (SBU) On May 9, Bill Gates spoke to 2,000 assembled government
officials and students at a Presidential Lecture organized by the
Kadin Secretariat. During the event, Gates recognized a student
group from Institut Teknologi Bandung (ITB) as the national of a
Microsoft sponsored innovation competition and also announced that
Universitas Pelita Harapan has been named the fifth Indonesian
university that will host a Microsoft innovation center.
HEFFERN
Gotta help Microsoft lock-in while he’s at it. █
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Posted in Bill Gates, Cablegate at 5:02 am by Dr. Roy Schestowitz
Summary: A “C O N F I D E N T I A L” Cablegate cable contains a controversial statement from Bill Gates
“Olmert [...] said that Bill Gates had told him that all real technical innovations in today’s world originate in either the U.S. or Israel.”
Is this really the simplistic way Bill Gates perceives the world? The same Gates who bashed Europe as the source of wars? Surely a lot of people would beg to differ. Here is the cable in question:
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 TEL AVIV 001470
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/12/2016
TAGS: PREL [External Political Relations], PGOV [Internal Governmental Affairs],
PTER [Terrorists and Terrorism], PARM [Arms Controls and Disarmament],
KPAL [Palestinian Affairs], KWBG [West Bank and Gaza], IR [Iran],
IS [Israel], U.S.-ISRAEL RELATIONS, ISRAELI-PALESTINIAN AFFAIRS
SUBJECT: SENATOR LIEBERMAN AND ISRAELI A/PM OLMERT DISCUSS
THE CONVERGENCE PLAN
Classified By: Ambassador Richard H. Jones; Reasons: 1.4 (B and D).
¶1. (C) Summary: On April 11 -- the day that the Cabinet
elected him Acting Prime Minister -- a confident and relaxed
Ehud Olmert met with Senator Joseph Lieberman and the
Ambassador. Olmert outlined his "convergence plan," with
which he hopes to create defensible security borders,
minimize Israeli-Palestinian contact, relocate 80,000
settlers, and separate Israelis from 95 percent of the
Palestinians and 90 percent of the West Bank within the next
four years. Olmert expressed hope that his plan to set
Israel's borders will be coordinated with and supported by
the United States. He maintained that such steps will be
necessary due to a lack of a Palestinian partner needed to
make progress on the Roadmap. On other issues, Olmert 1)
stressed the need for tough UN sanctions against Iran, 2)
analyzed the outcome of the Knesset elections, 3) expressed
his intention to form a new government including parties from
across the political spectrum by the end of the month, and 4)
presented a rosy picture of the Israeli economy. Senator
Lieberman's legislative assistant Frederick Downey and
military escort LTC Edward Fortunato, as well as GOI foreign
affairs adviser Shalom Tourgeman, PM military aide MG Gadi
Shamni, and MFA Congressional liaison Eyal Sela also
participated in the meeting. End summary.
-------------------------------------
Olmert Discusses the Convergence Plan
-------------------------------------
¶2. (C) After expressing admiration for the manner in which
Olmert has handled the difficult period following PM Sharon's
illness and welcoming his upcoming visit to Washington,
Senator Lieberman asked Olmert about his "convergence" plan
to relocate settlers from isolated parts of the West Bank
into settlement blocs. In Olmert's assessment, Israel
"cannot live with the Palestinians more or less as we live
now" and avoid the outbreak of another Intifada. Although he
saw the Roadmap (negotiations) as the best way forward, with
no Palestinian partners his answer is to set "defensible
security borders" that minimize Israeli-Palestinian contact,
and separate Israelis from 95 percent of Palestinians who
will be left with 90 percent of the West Bank. Such a step
entails the relocation of 80,000 settlers from isolated areas
to existing or newly built sections in the major settlement
blocs.
¶3. (C) Olmert described his timeline as two years to try
negotiations, plan, prepare, and consult with the USG,
followed by two years to implement the move of the settlers.
He termed the effort a "huge, major, dramatic undertaking ...
unprecedented in the State of Israel," cautioning that its
scale and Israel's emotional attachment to what it calls
"Judea and Samaria" would result in much controversy.
Senator Lieberman called the plan achievable and courageous.
-------------------------------
Olmert's Views of the U.S. Role
-------------------------------
¶4. (C) Olmert repeatedly stressed that he hopes to carry out
convergence with the full understanding and support of the
United States. He claimed that the plan is consistent with
the President's letter of April 14, 2004. Senator Lieberman
sought clarification of what this support might entail. As a
start, Olmert urged Congress to pass legislation prohibiting
assistance to Hamas in order to send a clear message that
there will be no assistance without a change in Hamas policy.
Senator Lieberman replied that both the USG and EU were
moving in the right direction on the assistance issue.
¶5. (C) Olmert also expressed a desire that consultations with
Washington will result "in an agreement with the United
States that these (the convergence borders) are the final
lines." He expected that the USG will assist Israel in
obtaining European acceptance for the border, a possibility
he said was more likely with leaders such as German
Chancellor Angela Merkel. Olmert repeatedly praised
President Bush, saying that he believes that the President's
commitment to fight terror is a moral -- and not just a
political -- decision. "In the end of the day," added
Olmert, "this is what brings us closer together as nations,
as people, and as leaders."
¶6. (C) Olmert claimed that convergence would also realize a
Palestinian dream by creating a contiguous area free of
Israelis -- except for moves by security forces as needed --
as a basis for a Palestinian state. He cautioned that
conflicts with the Palestinians would continue at a lower
level until they realize that a return to the 1967 borders
"will never happen" and are prepared for a permanent peace.
--------------------------------------------- -
Gaza-West Bank Link and Palestinian Employment
--------------------------------------------- -
¶7. (C) Senator Lieberman asked about links between Gaza and
the West Bank, as well as about the future of Palestinian
workers in Israel. Olmert suggested that Israel has several
ideas for a Gaza-West Bank link, but would not offer them
without receiving concrete concessions in return. He said
that the frequent closings of crossing points make it
impractical for the 25,000 Palestinians currently employed in
Israel to retain their jobs, adding that he preferred in
principle that they work in the Palestinian areas. He
suggested options such as industrial parks located along the
barrier route, but acknowledged that this idea is also
impractical without partners on the Palestinian side.
--------------------------------------------- ------
Lack of Roadmap Partner Makes Convergence Necessary
--------------------------------------------- ------
¶8. (C) Olmert called the Roadmap a reasonable framework for
resolving the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, but lamented the
lack of a Palestinian partner. He assessed the chances of
the Palestinians taking necessary steps to restart
negotiations as "nonexistent" and questioned their ability to
do so even if Hamas collapses. He complained that President
Mahmud Abbas remains reluctant to take concrete action,
noting that he had spoken with Abbas by phone a few days
earlier. When asked by Senator Lieberman what steps Abbas
could take, Olmert replied he should disarm the terrorist
organizations. Olmert suggested that the USG and GOI might
agree on benchmarks that the Palestinians must meet to avoid
unilateral Israeli moves, but added that there is "no use
waiting forever." He expressed a clear intention to proceed
with the convergence plan during the term of the current U.S.
administration.
¶9. (C) Olmert noted that the Israeli Cabinet had earlier in
the day decided to boycott the PA's "terrorist government."
He added that Abbas would be treated separately as the
elected President; Tourgeman later told the Ambassador that
Abbas would be excluded from the boycott of the PA but that
GOI officials would not meet with him as they had nothing to
discuss. Tourgeman noted that the exception for Abbas was
personal rather than for the Presidency as an organization.
The GOI could not exclude the possibility that some of the
Presidency's employees might have contact with Hamas.
-------------------------------
Iran: Olmert Urges UN Sanctions
-------------------------------
¶10. (C) Senator Lieberman requested Olmert's views on the
Iranian nuclear program. Olmert called Russian and French
ideas on joint enrichment "a surrender to Iranian
aggression." He urged the USG to take a "much more
aggressive position in the United Nations," claiming that
effective sanctions are the only opportunity to stop Iran
short of military action. Stressing that Iran is an
international -- not just an Israeli -- problem, Olmert said
he intends to raise the issue with the President in
Washington.
--------------------------------------------- --------
Olmert Seeks Broad Domestic Coalition by End of April
--------------------------------------------- --------
¶11. (C) Senator Lieberman asked Olmert to analyze the outcome
of the Knesset elections. Olmert said that voters had sent
two clear messages: 1) they were opposed to the policies and
personalities of Likud, while at the same time distrustful of
Labor's ability to lead; and 2) they wanted Kadima to win,
but with a limited mandate to keep the party from becoming
"too ambitious." Olmert claimed that Likud leader Bibi
Netanyahu was harmed by his right-wing views and by what
Olmert described as the irresponsible manner in which he had
split with PM Sharon. At the same time, Labor had lost seats
despite the collapse of Likud and Kadima's last-minute
formation. He attributed Kadima's smaller-than-expected
victory to pre-election polling, which led some voters to
switch to the pensioners party to help it over the threshold
for entry into the Knesset without affecting Kadima's
expected majority.
¶12. (C) Olmert claimed that he is not personally involved in
the details of coalition negotiations, which are being
handled by his advisers. He predicted "the usual bargains"
during coalition talks, adding that he wants parties from
both sides of the political spectrum in his coalition. His
goal is to avoid over-reliance on either Labor or the
right-wing parties. Nevertheless, Olmert stressed the
important role that a right-wing party or parties could play
for the coalition in reducing anxiety over the convergence
plan and building bridges to the settlers. He expressed his
intention to form the new government by the end of April and
have it functioning in early May.
--------------------------------
Rosy Outlook for Israeli Economy
--------------------------------
¶13. (C) Olmert presented a glowing assessment of the Israeli
economy, predicting growth of 4.3 percent this year and a
reduction in the unemployment rate from current levels of 8.8
or 8.9 percent. He gave former Finance Minister Netanyahu
credit for adopting policies to facilitate growth, but
claimed that his hubris and doctrinaire belief in free
markets had blinded him to the need to provide relief for
under-privileged members of society. Olmert also gave credit
to PM Sharon for creating an "environment of good-will to
Israel and confidence," making the country a more secure
location for business. Olmert proudly noted that Intel,
Microsoft, and IBM have all invested recently in Israel and
said that Bill Gates had told him that all real technical
innovations in today's world originate in either the U.S. or
Israel.
¶14. (U) This cable was cleared by Senator Lieberman.
********************************************* ********************
Visit Embassy Tel Aviv's Classified Website:
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/nea/telaviv
You can also access this site through the State Department's
Classified SIPRNET website.
********************************************* ********************
JONES
On we go with Cablegate research. This one was a sensitive one. █
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Posted in Asia, Bill Gates, Microsoft at 4:42 am by Dr. Roy Schestowitz
Summary: How Bill Gates lobbied for Microsoft in 2008 (when he claimed to have moved on to a charitable foundation)
BACK at the beginning of 2008, "Microsoft 'Bought' Dubai Away from GNU/Linux" following a visit from Bill Gates. Later on we saw this reinforced and then we saw people being sent to court/jail. Over three years after the act we discover that, based on the following Cablegate cable, Bill Gates did some clever lobbying even after his alleged departure from Microsoft. According to this, “Bill Gates would visit Dubai on January 27, 2008 to meet with with Mohammed bin Rashid Al Maktoum (Vice-President and Prime Minister of the UAE and Ruler of Dubai) and members of the MbRF staff to discuss integration between Microsoft and the MbRF [Mohammad Bin Rashid Foundation] Programs.” Here is the cable:
VZCZCXRO5272
PP RUEHBC RUEHDIR RUEHKUK RUEHROV
DE RUEHDE #0614/01 3051111
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 011111Z NOV 07
FM AMCONSUL DUBAI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5732
INFO RUEHAD/AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI PRIORITY 2751
RUEHEE/ARAB LEAGUE COLLECTIVE
RUEHZM/GCC C COLLECTIVE
RUEHDE/AMCONSUL DUBAI 8877
Hide header
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 DUBAI 000614
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
DEPT FOR NEA/ARPI BAGWELL AND MASILKO
E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/1/2017
TAGS: PREL [External Political Relations],
PGOV [Internal Governmental Affairs], PHUM [Human Rights], AE [United Arab Emirates]
SUBJECT: FURTHER DETAILS ON ANNOUNCED AND UNANNOUNCED, PLANS FOR
MOHAMMED BIN RASHID FOUNDATION
REF: A) DUBAI 601 B) DUABI 425 C) ABU DHABI 949 D) DUBAI 363
DUBAI 00000614 001.2 OF 002
CLASSIFIED BY: Paul Sutphin, Consul General, Exec, Dept of
State.
REASON: 1.4 (b), (d)
Classified 1.4 b & d by Consul General Paul Sutphin
¶1. (U) This is an action cable; see para 12.
¶2. (SBU) Summary. During a November 1 meeting in the newly
established offices of the Mohammad Bin Rashid Foundation
(MbRF), Nabil Alyousuf (Director General of the Dubai Executive
Office and defacto managing director of the newly established
MbRF) and Dr. Yasar Jarrar (Executive Dean of the Dubai School
of Government) elaborated on several of the fifteen (Reftel A)
recently announced programs under the auspices of the MbRF, as
well as a number of initiatives in the offing that have not been
publicly discussed, including a number of joint programs with US
universities. Jarrar will be in Washington, DC, Monday, Nov. 4
and then in Boston Nov. 5-8; Alyousuf will be in Boston November
8 and is unlikely to go to DC beforehand. They asked for USG
assistance in a number of areas (see para 12), most immediately
in contacts for the Washington office of the Gates Foundation.
End Summary.
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Announced Programs with US Connections
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
¶3. (U) Referencing the US's Teach for America model, Jarrar
elaborated on the MbrF's announced "Pioneers" Program: an
educational initiative focused on providing financial assistance
to the top 10% of graduate students at select Arab universities
in return for their commitment to teach for an as-yet
unspecified period of time in their home country/community.
Jarrar pointed to the nascent "Teach for All" partnership
between the US program and its counterpart UK program (Teach
First) and mentioned that adding the Pioneers Program would be a
logical extension into the Arab world.
¶4. (U) Continuing on educational programs, the announced
Leadership Program is being modeled after the US's Eisenhower
Fellowships Program. Under this initiative, two or three
individuals would be selected from each Arab country to go to
the UAE in order to participate in two to three months of
leadership training, likely at the Dubai School of Government.
The program is currently envisioned as a three way partnership
between the Dubai School of Government, the Aspen Institute and
the London School of Business.
¶5. (SBU) The MbRF has signed an agreement with the Harvard
Business School Press (HBSP) that will allow the MbRF the rights
to translate all HBSP-owned titles into Arabic and then
subsidize printing and distribution of the texts throughout the
Arab world. Translation rights to other authors' publications
through HBSP will be negotiated on a case-by-case basis.
¶6. (SBU) Under its announced translation program, the MbRF also
hopes to expand Western awareness of Arab literature and legacy
by translating Arabic texts (both popular press releases, such
as the recently translated "Girls of Riyadh", and more formal
literature) and working with Western publisher's to produce and
promote these works. Jarrar said he would appreciate USG
assistance in identifying likely publishing partners in the US.
(See action request, para 12.)
¶7. (SBU) Focusing on entrepreneurship, the MbRF's announced
Business Incubator Program will work with the top regional
business schools to develop curriculums focusing on
entrepreneurial skills and creating incubators that allow
students to test out their entrepreneurial concepts. In a
second tier, the MbRF plans to select the best new ideas, and
bring those innovators to Dubai and provide further resources
for developing and testing the concepts. For concepts that have
passed the second round of screening, the MbRF wants to develop
joint venture relationships with top corporate innovators (3m,
Philips, Google, Microsoft were among those named) that would at
the minimum allow MbRF-sponsored entrepreneur's access to the
corporate labs (on fellowships) or ideally allow for full joint
venture development of the projects. Jarrar requested possible
USG assistance in facilitating corporate contacts. (See action
request, para 12.)
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
DUBAI 00000614 002.2 OF 002
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Unannounced, but Ambitious, Plans for Joint Initiatives with US
Universities and Businesses
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
¶8. (C) As yet unannounced, Jarrar revealed an imminent agreement
between the MbRF and Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT)
Sloan School of Management establishing a Dubai-based branch of
the renowned MBA program. The first year would see the launch
of an executive training program, followed the next year by the
matriculation of 40 students in a standard MBA curriculum.
Jarrar envisions the school eventually maintaining around 100
active students. Farther down the road, the MbRF is also
looking to create a similar, undergraduate, joint venture
between the American University of Dubai and a world class US
journalism school (preliminary discussions are currently
underway with the Columbia School of Journalism in New York).
¶9. (C) In ongoing discussions with Harvard, Jarrar is hoping to
convince the Harvard Business School (HBS) to place one of its
Research Centers in Dubai (Jarrar noted HBS has research centers
in 5 locations world-wide, including Paris, Hong Kong and Buenos
Aires. These centers focus on researching local businesses and
developing the case studies that form the core of the HBS
curriculum).
¶10. (SBU) A firm advocate of development via technology, the
MbRF intends to partner with US hi-tech giants such as Intel,
Microsoft and others to further the utilization of online
programs for teacher training throughout the Arab world (thus
bringing best-practices training directly to instructors without
expensive and lengthy overhead and development issues). Jarrar
indicated that initial conversations with Intel have commenced
and that Bill Gates would visit Dubai on January 27, 2008 to
meet with with Mohammed bin Rashid Al Maktoum (Vice-President
and Prime Minister of the UAE and Ruler of Dubai) and members of
the MbRF staff to discuss integration between Microsoft and the
MbRF Programs.
¶11. (SBU) In a similar vein, Alyousuf noted the MbRF has a
longer-term plan to develop a "traveling museum" focused on the
civilizations of the region and their contributions to humanity
through out the ages. The MbRF would like to work with US
museums in developing the concept and possibly a partnership for
the traveling museum. We agreed to try to facilitate contacts
with the Smithsonian on this initiative. (See action request,
para 12)
¶12. (SBU) ACTION REQUESTS: Most immediately, Jarrar asked for
USG assistance in contacting and possibly meeting the leadership
of the Gates Foundation office in Washington DC (both indicated
a senior management meeting with the Gates Foundation in Seattle
would be premature and expressed a desire for a lower level,
preliminary meeting in DC as a precursor to subsequent
Seattle-based conversations). Jarrar asked for a name and
contact information for the Washington office. Given the
impending travel by Jarrar, Post (1) requests appropriate
Department contacts pass this information directly to him at
HYPERLINK
"BLOCKED::mailto:yasar.jarrar@dsg.ae"yasar.ja rrar@dsg.ae; or
call him on his mobile phone at 971-50-640-7281. (2) Jarrar
expressed openness to possible further consultations with the
USG during his visit to Washington, noting he was in direct
contact with S/P; he said he would welcome direct outreach from
any of the offices with which he met on his previous visit to
Washington with Minister of Cabinet Affairs (and MbRF Chairman)
Mohammed Gergawi.
Medium-term action requests:
-- Possible contacts for English to Arabic publishing partners.
-- SG assistance in facilitating corporate contacts for the
business incubator program.
-- Appropriate initial contacts at the Smithsonian for the
Traveling Museum concept.
SUTPHIN
We have more examples of such lobbying. █
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Posted in America, Bill Gates, Cablegate at 4:25 am by Dr. Roy Schestowitz
Summary: Interesting cable about Hugo Chávez and some politicians in his country
IMPERIALISM with patents is a subject this site covers extensively. There is also a fair deal of coverage about financial sanctions and the role Microsoft plays in them. In one Cablegate cable that we found this morning we see a president trying to get “assistance in arranging a meeting with Bill Gates.” World Bank/IMF are the next points in the list. Without delving again into the background of all this (in relation to Microsoft and Bill’s instrument of control), we’ll just descend into the following cable which mentioned why Luis Tascón Gutiérrez got expelled.
VZCZCXRO5067
PP RUEHAG RUEHROV
DE RUEHCV #0227/01 0531735
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 221735Z FEB 08
FM AMEMBASSY CARACAS
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0643
INFO RUCNMEM/EU MEMBER STATES COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHWH/WESTERN HEMISPHERIC AFFAIRS DIPL POSTS PRIORITY
RUMIAAA/HQ USSOUTHCOM MIAMI FL PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 CARACAS 000227
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
HQSOUTHCOM ALSO FOR POLAD
DEPARTMENT PASS TO AID/OTI (RPORTER)
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/21/2018
TAGS: PGOV [Internal Governmental Affairs],
PREL [External Political Relations], KDEM [Democratization],
VE [Venezuela]
SUBJECT: PSUV FOUNDING CONGRESS: DELAYS AND AN EXPULSION
CARACAS 00000227 001.2 OF 002
Classified By: POLITICAL COUNSELOR ROBERT RICHARD DOWNES,
REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D)
¶1. (C) Summary. President Chavez publicly declared after his
constitutional referendum defeat that shoring up his
political base will be one of his highest priorities. Since
then, he has focused considerable personal attention on
launching his proposed single, pro-government party, the
United Socialist Party of Venezuela (PSUV). Some 1600 PSUV
delegates are trying to forge party statutes and select party
leaders at an ongoing, and much-delayed, founding congress.
According to current planning, PSUV leaders hope to register
the new party with electoral authorities by March, well
before state and local elections tentatively slated for
November. The ham-handed expulsion of a National Assembly
deputy from the party is highlighting the extent to which
this ostensibly grassroots party is being steered by Chavez
and a small, powerful group of core supporters. It has also
revealed and exacerbated cleavages within Chavismo. The PSUV
is fast establishing that it values party discipline over
other considerations and does not welcome dissent. The PSUV
continues to enjoy extensive government support, including
free air time and advertising space in government-owned media
outlets. End Summary.
-------------------------------
The Much-Delayed Party Congress
-------------------------------
¶2. (SBU) President Chavez spoke January 19 to over 1600
elected PSUV delegates to open the party congress of his
proposed single, pro-government party, the United Socialist
Party of Venezuela (PSUV). The PSUV founding congress has
been tasked with establishing party regulations and a
political platform. President Chavez postponed the congress
a number of times in 2007 before declaring that it should be
held soon after the December 2007 constitutional referendum.
The PSUV founding congress, divided into some 50 work
committees, has been holding weekend sessions since January
19 both in Caracas and other Venezuelan cities. Critics
accuse BRV officials of using government resources to sustain
the PSUV congress and of exploiting government-owned media to
promote the PSUV.
¶3. (SBU) Chavez spoke for five hours to the PSUV congress on
February 16, urging party delegates to embrace unity and to
set aside individual ambitions. In addition, Chavez exhorted
party members to elicit greater local participation in PSUV
"battalion" meetings. Chavez also reportedly tasked the PSUV
delegates with selecting party leaders and establishing
criteria for selecting gubernatorial and mayoral candidates.
Party leaders told the local media that they expect the PSUV
founding congress to conclude in early March and to register
as a political party with the National Electoral Council
(CNE) around the same time.
¶4. (C) While ostensibly a party being forged "from below,"
the formation of the PSUV appears to be closely supervised
from above by a small, powerful group of Chavez supporters
who make up the PSUV Support Committee, successor to the
larger PSUV Promotion Commission. Chavez designated former
Vice President Jorge Rodriguez to lead the Support
Committee's efforts. Miranda State Governor Diosdado
Cabello, former Vice President Jose Vicente Rangel, and
National Assembly Deputy Dario Vivas are also reportedly
playing a key role. The Support Committee meets with and
answers to the Venezuelan president.
----------------------
Expulsion of NA Deputy
----------------------
¶5. (SBU) Former VP Jorge Rodriguez and Miranda State Governor
Diosdado Cabello announced on Venezuelan state television
February 16 that the PSUV founding congress unanimously voted
to expel National Assembly Deputy Luis Tascon from the party.
Days before in the National Assembly, Tascon accused
recently appointed Tax Authority (SENIAT) Director Jose David
Cabello, brother of Diosdado, of purchasing some 200 cars and
microbuses at grossly inflated prices when Jose David Cabello
was at the Ministry of Infrastructure in 2004. The PSUV
voting bloc in the National Assembly also expelled Tascon
from its parliamentary group on February 21.
¶6. (SBU) Diosdado Cabello denied the corruption accusation
against his brother and in a press release accused Tascon of
being an "instrument of the (U.S.) empire." Cabello added
CARACAS 00000227 002.2 OF 002
that Tascon had spent a month "in the offices of Bill Gates"
and suggested that while there a chip was injected into
Tascon's blood. Cabello also produced a purported written
request by Tascon for a diplomatic passport for a banker that
Cabello said is associated with narcotrafficking. National
Assembly President Cilia Flores reportedly tried to dismiss
the NA Comptroller Commission chairman who received Tascon's
complaint, but failed.
¶7. (C) Hard-line Chavistas such as National Assembly Deputies
Iris Varela and Carlos Escarra have publicly defended Tascon.
Varela questioned how someone could be expelled from a party
that is not yet formally established. Escarra noted that
Tascon should have the right to defend himself and questioned
the manner in which he was reportedly expelled from the PSUV
by simple acclamation at the February 15 founding congress
meeting. Numerous Chavistas have posted op-eds on the
pro-government "apporea.org" website accusing PSUV leaders of
imposing excessive party discipline at the expense of
democracy.
-----------------------
PSUV: Multiple Currents
-----------------------
¶8. (C) Intra-PSUV squabbling appears to reflect increasingly
visible divisions within Chavismo. NA Deputy Carlos Escarra
told the media that there are three currents within the PSUV
occupying the left, center, and right of the pro-Chavez
spectrum. Miranda State Governor Cabello publicly accused
Tascon of being part of the "false left"; Tascon accused the
Miranda governor of being part of the "endogenous right."
¶9. (C) Podemos leaders told the Ambassador February 19 that
within the National Assembly, Escarra, Foreign Minister
Nicolas Maduro (and presumably now his common-law wife and
National Assembly President Cilia Flores), and former Army
major Francisco Ameliach lead three separate informal groups.
Other insiders report that there are a few dozen
"renovation" legislators trying to force the National
Assembly leadership to share power -- and perks -- more
broadly.
-------
Comment
-------
¶10. (C) The PSUV's Stalinesque expulsion of NA Deputy Tascon
is a noteworthy example of growing cleavages within Chavismo
as well as the Bolivarian revolution's capacity to eat its
own. It also could not have happened to a "nicer guy" -
Tascon is widely known for posting on his website the names
and national identity numbers of all the persons who signed
the recall petition against President Chavez. Chavez
supporters subsequently used the "Tascon" list to deny
government jobs, contracts, services and benefits to
signatories.
¶11. (C) Tascon's ouster from the PSUV recalls the stripping
of NA Deputy Francisco Ameliach of his PSUV coordinating role
within the National Assembly in August 2007. Ameliach was
disciplined after he suggested publicly that if the PSUV was
not ready for 2008 state and local elections, Chavez' former
political party, the Fifth Republic Movement (MVR), should be
"dusted off" to compete at the polls. Notwithstanding
Chavez' claim that he is trying to build a genuinely popular
party from the ground up, the PSUV is earning a reputation
for doctrinaire and factional politics rather than for
fostering grassroots democracy and cooperation within the
Chavista base.
DUDDY
The second cable is:
VZCZCXRO7524
OO RUEHPA
DE RUEHCO #0408/01 1932156
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 112156Z JUL 08 ZDS
FM AMEMBASSY COTONOU
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0418
INFO RUEHZK/ECOWAS COLLECTIVE
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON 0354
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS 1282
RUEHLMC/MILLENNIUM CHALLENGE CORP
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 COTONOU 000408
C O R R E C T E D C O P Y - (FIXED FORMATTING ERRORS)
SIPDIS
DEPARTMENT FOR AF/W:DBANKS/ESPRUILL
DEPARTMENT PLEASE PASS TO USAID AND PEACE CORPS
PARIS FOR BKANEDA
NSC FOR BPITTMAN
MCC FOR JBLOOM
E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/11/2018
TAGS: OVIP [Visits and Travel of Prominent Individuals and Leaders],
EAID [Foreign Economic Assistance], EAGR [Agriculture and Forestry],
PGOV [Internal Governmental Affairs], PREL [External Political Relations],
PINR [Intelligence], EFIN [Financial and Monetary Affairs], LY [Libya], BN [Benin]
SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR PRESIDENT YAYI'S TRIP TO THE U.S.,
JULY 15-21, 2008
REF: A. BROWN/BANKS E-MAIL OF 7/9/2008
B. COTONOU 396
C. COTONOU 349
D. COTONOU 348
E. COTONOU 262
F. COTONOU 255
COTONOU 00000408 001.4 OF 002
Classified By: Ambassador Gayleatha B. Brown. Reasons 1.4 (b&d).
¶1. (SBU) Summary: Benin,s President Boni Yayi travels to
Washington, D.C., July 15-21, 2008, primarily for talks with
the World Bank and the IMF and to seek assistance for plans
to energize the country,s agricultural sector and to
follow-up on earlier requests for food aid. His request for
meetings with USG officials is linked to several issues of
concern, including a growing problem in the agriculture
sector, implementation of the MCA Compact, and efforts to
curb corruption. Yayi also wishes an opportunity to
demonstrate strong US/Benin ties as he continues to struggle
at home to achieve economic growth and good governance
objectives. A successful visit to Washington would raise his
political capital at home where a stalemate in the National
Assembly is blocking essential legislation and on the African
continent where he hopes to strengthen his position as a
regional player in the wake of hosting the 10th CEN-SAD
Summit. End summary.
¶2. (U) President Boni Yayi of Benin will meet with World Bank
and IMF officials during his July 15-21, 2008 visit to
Washington, D.C. In addition, he has requested appointments
with President Bush, Secretary Rice, Director of Foreign
Assistance Fore, Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC) CEO
Danilovich, and Peace Corps Director Tschetter. His
delegation includes: Pascal Irenee Koupaki, Minister of
State for Economic Forecasting, Development and the
Evaluation of Public Action; Roger Dovonou, Minister of
Agriculture, Animal Husbandry, and Fishing; and S. Lawani,
Minister of Finance.
//STALEMATE AT HOME//
¶3. (U) The strong political coalition that secured President
Yayi,s election in March 2006 is crumbling. Although Yayi
won a majority of the communes in the April 2008 municipal
elections, his desire to create a single list of candidates
from his Force Cowry for an Emerging Benin (FCBE) movement
drove a number of National Assembly deputies from his
governing coalition. Those deputies and others from
opposition parties now hold a majority in the National
Assembly, blocking key Government of Benin (GOB)-sponsored
legislation. This includes the new penal and civil codes
that are instrumental to the implementation of USG-funded
projects such as the Women,s Justice and Empowerment
Initiative (WJEI).
¶4. (U) The anti-corruption fight also has stalled. The GOB
has had little success in its pursuit of high-profile
corruption cases against alleged corrupt, former government
officials. For example, the Supreme Court recently ordered
the release without bond of Sefou Fagbohoun, a powerful
opposition party leader whose case had long lingered with no
action. The GOB had accused Fagbohoun of embezzlement and
mismanagement of the privatized gas parastatal SONACOP. He
promptly took his place in the National Assembly, a position
won from a jail cell and where he now has parliamentary
immunity. Yayi,s efforts earlier to convince the parliament
to lift immunity in another case also failed.
¶5. (U) In addition, President Yayi is under pressure over
rising consumer prices. Workers peacefully protested on July
10 against the high cost of living related to food prices.
To make matters worse, the GOB is running short of funds used
to subsidize prices of key commodities to the consumers (Ref
F). President Yayi organized a June 24 briefing for donors
on the problem, explaining that GOB efforts to reduce the
prices of foodstuffs and construction materials, through
subsidies and cuts in import duties and VAT, have cost the
GOB FCFA 48,248,478,989 (approximately USD 114,877,331.)
//LIBYA LEAVES BENIN WITH A WHOPPING CEN-SAD BILL//
¶6.(C) To make matters worse, Libya did not keep a promise to
provide substantial funding to help defray GOB expenses for
the recent 10th CEN-SAD summit in Cotonou, according to
President Yayi. He told the Ambassador on July 3 that
instead of the expected USD 10 million contribution from
Libya, the GOB received only USD 3 million, most of which
went to pay the Libyan delegation's living and lodging
COTONOU 00000408 002.4 OF 002
expenses (including Mr. Khadaffi's tent). The Chief of Staff
at the Finance Ministry confirmed that Libya's contribution
totaled FCFA 1,255,675,958 or approximately USD 3 million.
Moreover, to facilitate Libyan financed, private-sector
construction of 69 luxury villas for the CEN-SAD summit, the
GOB recouped prime land near the Cotonou airport from private
owners and gave generous tax breaks for the project. Yayi
said that of the promised 69 villas, the Libyans only built
¶40. The Foreign Minister told the Ambassador that contrary
to Khadaffi's wishes, Benin did not press Khadaffi's
controversial position on African unity (Ref D) at the recent
AU meeting in Egypt - a testimony, he said, to Benin's
independence.
//GOB ISSUES FOR DISCUSSION IN WASHINGTON//
¶7. (SBU) Per Ref A, MFA Americas Acting Director told post
that President Yayi,s issues for discussion with USG
officials include:
USG:
- agricultural development; food crisis; transformation of
the Cotton industry; OPIC
- international cooperation: CEN-SAD, G-8 resolutions
- climate change
- democracy in Africa
- MCA Compact (delays in implementation related to the Port
of Cotonou and the Access to Justice Program, efforts to curb
corruption and related laws, and additional funds for the
current Compact and a Compact II)
- recent dismissal of the Port Director that is not expected
to derail Port reforms
- tour d,horizon on USAID programs (health, education and
WJEI) and
- assistance in arranging a meeting with Bill Gates.
World Bank/IMF: Post expects President Yayi,s talks to
focus on budgetary assistance, the status of Benin,s
structural adjustment reforms and release of donors, 2008
budget support funds.
¶8. (SBU) Comment: President Yayi,s visit to the United
States presents an opportune time for USG officials to
reiterate support for his stance against corruption and
encourage concrete action to arrest and try corrupt
officials. The GOB also needs to fully engage in the
President,s Malaria Initiative (PMI) by committing the
requisite personnel for implementation of the program. In
some respects, Yayi is between a rock and a hard place.
Crippling defections from FCBE in the National Assembly
hamstring GOB efforts to move forward on key economic and
social legislation, thus hampering his ambitious program for
growth and development and ability to meet the high
expectations for change of the electorate.
BROWN
Remember that this is US perspective on Hugo Chávez, so it’s supposed to make him look bad. █
Update: Luis Tascón Met Bill Gates, Then Shot Down Free/Libre Software in Venezuela
Looking back at this Cablegate cable, we realise that Tascón did a lot more harm even to Free software.
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Posted in Apple, Asia at 6:45 pm by Dr. Roy Schestowitz
Summary: Apple and Pfizer have a lot more in common than people may realise
Apple is a Badgeware/Brandware company. It is a major competitor of Linux and common sense. It’s all about marketing and perception at Apple, arguably a big delusion and spin on products made in China but designed in California. Apple is largely based on PR (and brand value). Eliminate those and all they are left with are Foxconn-made imitations/knock-offs that merely integrate good technology from IBM (hardware), Xerox, etc. The English-speaking press likes to boost the “Mac vs PC” delusion because it’s good for the US duopoly. The matter of fact is, Asia is rising and it is using Linux. Likewise, Xbox was a loser; the Japanese consoles do exceptionally well, but they don’t control English-speaking press. Linux makes affordable products; Apple makes expensive marketing. Would one prefer paying for quality and value or just marketing/peer perception?
Regardless of this introduction which mostly reuses a message that was made public earlier, the following Cablegate cable shows how Apple guards its brand. It takes the same approach as that of drug companies and even uses the same people.
VZCZCXRO1957
PP RUEHCN RUEHGH RUEHVC
DE RUEHBJ #3732/01 2700120
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 260120Z SEP 08
FM AMEMBASSY BEIJING
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0136
INFO RUEHOO/CHINA POSTS COLLECTIVE
RUEHIN/AIT TAIPEI 7073
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO 2238
RUEHUL/AMEMBASSY SEOUL 0954
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 9123
RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA 2295
RUEAHLC/DHS WASHDC
RUCPDOC/USDOC WASHDC
RUEAWJA/DEPT OF JUSTICE WASHDC
RHMCSUU/FBI WASHINGTON DC
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 05 BEIJING 003732
SENSITIVE
SIPDIS
State for EAP/CM - PPark and EB/IPE - DBubman
State for EB/TPP - EMagdanz and INL - JVigil
State for EB/CIP - WWitteman and RDaley
USTR for China Office - AWinter; IPR Office - RBae;
and OCG - SMcCoy; and JRagland
Commerce for National Coordinator for IPR
Enforcement
Commerce for WPaugh, NWinetke
Commerce for MAC 3204/ESzymanski
Commerce for MAC 3042/SWilson, JYoung
LOC/Copyright Office - STepp
USPTO for Int'l Affairs - LBoland, EWu, STong
DOJ for CCIPS - MDubose and SChembtob
FTC for Blumenthal
FBI for LBryant
DHS/ICE for IPR Center - DFaulconer, TRandazzo
DHS/CBP for IPR Rights Branch - GMacray, PPizzeck
ITC for LLevine, LSchlitt
State for White House OTP Ambassador Richard Russell
E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: ETRD [Foreign Trade], EIND [Industry and Manufacturing],
KIPR [Intellectual Property Rights],
ECON [Economic Conditions], CH [China (Mainland)]
SUBJECT: CHINA/IPR: APPLE TAKES A BITE OUT OF
CHINESE FAKES
This cable is sensitive but unclassified and is not
for Internet distribution.
Summary
-------
¶1. (SBU) As amazing as it seems, computer maker
Apple Inc. had no global security team - including
inside China - until March 2008, when they hired
away the team from Pfizer that formed and led a
multi-year crackdown on counterfeit Viagra
production in Asia. Now with Apple, Don Shruhan,
based in Hong Kong, has taken the first basic step
of registering the company's trademarks in China and
Hong Kong and is targeting retailers, manufacturers,
distributors, and online vendors to take a bite out
of China's counterfeit iPod and iPhone production.
Early evidence suggests nearly 100 percent of Apple
products in unauthorized mainland markets are knock-
offs, while factories in Guangdong province are
exporting enough counterfeits to single-handedly
supply the world with fake Apple products. End
Summary.
From Viagra to iPods
--------------------
¶2. (SBU) Apple Inc., the Cupertino, California-based
designer of Mac desktop and laptop computers, was
not especially well known in mainland China before
the introduction in 2001 of its now-ubiquitous iPod
music player and, more recently, the iPhone. Now
those products are so popular worldwide that China's
notorious counterfeit markets are filled with knock-
off versions. After finally recognizing the threat,
Apple hired Don Shruhan from Pfizer in March as
Senior Director of Security for Asia Pacific to
design and launch the company's security strategy,
including anti-counterfeiting efforts, in the
region. His focus is on China, where he is "afraid"
of the volume of fake Apple products being produced,
though he is so far unable to quantify the scope.
Shruhan's boss at Pfizer, John Theriault, was also
hired by Apple, and is now VP of Global Security,
based in California.
¶3. (SBU) Shruhan, who over the past five years
developed and implemented a security and anti-
counterfeiting strategy for Pfizer aimed largely at
tackling fake Viagra production in China, said that
he is starting more or less from scratch at Apple -
the company had not so much as registered its
trademarks in China or Hong Kong until he joined the
company early this year.
China: Source of Fake (and Real) Apples
---------------------------------------
¶4. (SBU) Effectively all of Apple's iPod and iPhone
production is performed by sole-sourced third party
vendors in China, largely in Guangdong province --
BEIJING 00003732 002 OF 005
China's manufacturing heartland and counterfeit
capital. (Note: MacBook laptop computers are also
produced in China, but are less popular than the
company's other products and not subject to
counterfeiting. Shruhan has not yet spotted any
fake Apple computers. End Note.) Media reports
indicate that a single plant operated by electronics
subcontractor Foxconn employs 200,000 workers making
iPods in Longhua, Guangdong province. While cities
in that province, which also include Shenzhen and
Guangzhou, are far and away the biggest source for
fake Apple products, Shruhan says that internal
controls at subcontracted facilities, combined with
independent audits, are good enough that he does not
believe authorized plants are producing unlicensed
products in a so-called "third shift" scenario. He
explained that Apple's system for tracking each
product's unique serial number appears very
effective, and more sophisticated than Pfizer's.
Instead, he attributes the usually poor-quality
fakes to independent operators without links to the
licensees, though he acknowledges the manufacturing
molds for iPods or iPhones could be removed from
licensed factories and used in illegal production.
This can result in fakes that appear flawless on the
surface, but whose internal hardware is substandard.
Shruhan has discovered, for instance, what appear to
be real iPods with 80GB of storage, but that in fact
have only a very inexpensive 1GB hard drive inside.
Exports Shipped through Hong Kong
---------------------------------
¶5. (SBU) Whatever means counterfeiters are able to
exploit, the numbers are compelling: Shruhan notes
that customs seizure data definitively show that
there is enough counterfeit production of Apple
products in Guangdong to effectively make China the
single source for the world's fake iPods and
iPhones, many of which are transshipped via Hong
Kong to points onward. Even with the introduction
of genuine iPod and iPhone retail sales in China
(through authorized dealers and, more recently, an
actual Apple Store), Apple's marketing strategy here
is still in its infancy. The popularity of its
products is stronger outside of China. In three
recent raids in India, all fake Apple products were
found to have been transshipped through Hong Kong
(from China). Also, goods bound by air for
Mauritius were recently seized in Hong Kong.
Shruhan explained that Hong Kong's port has
historically received less scrutiny than others for
outgoing goods. In his experience with Pfizer, he
found Hong Kong customs authorities reluctant to
launch investigations that they fear could slow port
traffic - especially in comparison to more willing
mainland customs officials - but could be convinced
to cooperate if negative publicity can be minimized.
¶6. (SBU) Hong Kong is not only the exit port for
outbound fakes, Shruhan said, but is also the point
BEIJING 00003732 003 OF 005
of entry for legitimate Apple products entering
China's gray market. By buying iPods and iPhones in
Hong Kong, outside of mainland China's customs zone,
entrepreneurs willing to transport products across
the border can resell them at an instant profit of
approximately 25 percent to mainland Chinese
accustomed to paying import duties and value-added
taxes.
Retail Outlets
--------------
¶7. (SBU) Genuine Apple products in China until
recently were sold only through authorized
resellers. In July, the company opened its first
official Apple Store in Beijing and plans to open
another - the world's largest - in the Chinese
capital in early 2009. Outside of these legitimate
channels, vendors misrepresenting themselves as
"authorized" may sell the occasional real iPod or
iPhone, but predominantly offer fakes. Shruhan
recently completed an informal (and statistically
insignificant) survey of markets in Beijing,
including the notorious Silk Street Market, where
his team found that, while many Apple products "look
good," nearly 100 percent were fake.
The Approach to Fighting Fakes
------------------------------
¶8. (SBU) In many ways, Shruhan intends to model
Apple's security plan in China on his successful
experience at Pfizer, so he can quickly unroll a
strategy. In broad terms, the company will target
retailers first to raise their costs and get
counterfeit products off the street. Next, Shruhan
will work with the authorities to crack down on
major manufacturers and distributors of fakes to
undermine the supply of fake products. Finally, he
will seek out vendors who sell knock-offs online.
To accomplish this will require not only a team of
investigators, which Shruhan has subcontracted, but
also tools like a laboratory to begin accurately
tracing the source of counterfeit goods. A lab that
can perform forensic analysis on individual parts
like batteries, for example, can help to locate
high-volume manufacturers of such component parts.
Cooperation with the Chinese Government
---------------------------------------
¶9. (SBU) A key component in Shruhan's plan is close
cooperation with the Public Security Bureau (PSB).
Pfizer enjoyed very strong support from the PSB in
pursuing counterfeit pharmaceuticals, in large part
due to health and safety implications at a time when
China was particularly sensitive to such image
issues after the use of lead-based paint in toys and
unsafe Heparin. Shruhan is unsure how much the PSB
will focus on Apple's issues, but believes a safety
angle like shoddy devices causing fire hazards will
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strengthen his case. Short of this, his most
persuasive argument will be the economic impact of
counterfeiting: lost tax revenue and jobs. Apple is
studying what this costs the Chinese Government per
counterfeit device sold. Whatever degree of support
the PSB offers, Shruhan accepts that, as with
Pfizer, the reality of successful cooperation will
be that his team "does 95 percent of the
investigative work," turns case files over to the
PSB, and "gives the PSB 100 percent of the credit"
for successful enforcement actions. The payoff is
worth it. China has some of the strictest penalties
around for counterfeiters, he claimed - if the PSB
can successfully prosecute a case. Shruhan recalled
a pharmaceuticals case in which the counterfeiter
was sentenced to ten years and received a USD
250,000 fine.
¶10. (SBU) Apple's first raids will be carried out in
Shenzhen in Guangdong province, where Shruhan has
identified at least one major underground factory.
In such a raid, carried out by the PSB, the factory
will be shut down by authorities only if its output
exceeds the criminal threshold that under Chinese
law represents production on a commercial scale: RMB
150,000 (USD 22,000). In addition to working with
the PSB to shut down manufacturers, Shruhan is also
encouraging China's local Administrations of
Industry and Commerce (AICs) to raid retailers.
Such raids may not put vendors out of business, but
associated fines and penalties from civil suits will
raise their costs. Shruhan said that low profile
retail raids are a good option for Apple, a company
that wants to stay away from too much publicity
surrounding this issue. The evidence Apple gathers
doing market surveys, including the names of
infringing shops, the number of fakes found, and the
trademarks being violated, will be provided to the
AIC for support in upcoming raids in cities
including Shanghai, Beijing, Guangzhou, and
Shenzhen.
¶11. (SBU) Shruhan describes his relationship with
China Customs, developed over five years of joint
efforts to fight fake drugs, as very cooperative,
and he is already getting the support he needs,
including five export seizures in August. A key
element of his relationship with customs officials
in the past has been providing them with the
training they need to identify counterfeit goods in
the field. In addition to building strong
relationships with investigators and law enforcement
agencies, Shruhan knows that currying favor with the
Supreme People's Procuratorate and the courts are
essential in ensuring effective prosecution and
sentencing.
Selling the Plan in California
------------------------------
¶12. (SBU) While Shruhan has the benefit of his
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Pfizer experience in China, he laments that Apple
lawyers do not. Based in California, the company's
inexperience has slowed cooperative progress with
Chinese Authorities. Officials at Lowu Commercial
City, one of China's notorious counterfeit markets
near Hong Kong, asked Apple for training and
evidence of counterfeit sales in their shops.
However, reluctance by the company to accept
standard Chinese legal documents and other problems
in corporate communication have so far prevented
such cooperation. Shruhan has an ally at Apple's
Cupertino headquarters who will help him win the
support he needs to build an effective security
operation in China. John Theriault, former Vice
President of Global Security for Pfizer, was
Shruhan's boss for the last five years, and is the
one responsible for bringing Shruhan to Apple, where
Theriault is now Vice President of Global Security.
Theriault, said Shruhan, has already pitched the
China security strategy to Steve Jobs.
Comment
-------
¶13. (SBU) Shruhan and Theriault spent five years
building an effective security plan for Pfizer,
resulting in high-profile raids and seizures of
large quantities of counterfeit drugs like Viagra.
This was due in large part to the high priority the
Chinese Government placed on health and safety
issues. Now at Apple, they have an excellent
understanding of China's underground manufacturers
and global distribution channels that will serve
them well as they seek to stem fake iPod and iPhone
production. However, the key will be whether their
personal relationships with customs, law
enforcement, and judiciary officials will be enough
to focus the Chinese Government on Apple's non-
health-related problems as they seek to make life
uncomfortable for counterfeiters. End Comment.
If Apple “hired away the team from Pfizer that formed and led a multi-year crackdown on counterfeit Viagra production in Asia,” does that explain Apple’s fertile spirit of litigation and assaults? █
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