11.09.20

[Meme] Let’s Not Kid Ourselves. Democrats Aren’t Allies of Free Software, Either.

Posted in Bill Gates, Deception, Free/Libre Software, Microsoft at 6:35 am by Dr. Roy Schestowitz

Obama's medal for Gates

Summary: Bursting the bubble regarding software freedom from the “less extreme than Donald Trump” administration

TWELVE years ago we wrote a bunch of posts about Obama after he had been elected. We didn’t blast him before the election because many can agree that a war criminal like Bush or McCain had to go (and if not to prison, then definitely out of politics). McCain is gone, Bush Sr. is also gone, Gates Sr. died a few months ago, but his son acts like nothing but a politician, actively working to loot the taxpayers.

“Sure, Trump was miles worse, but we’re still not seeing politicians that respect people’s freedom and software freedom.”Now that Biden is elected and is being publicly instructed by Gates we must remember that despite being “not Sleepy Trump” (or “not Bush”, who also won a medal by the way, presented by Biden himself), which is their main selling points, Establishment Democrats have little to offer to ordinary people. Sure, Trump was miles worse, but we’re still not seeing politicians that respect people’s freedom and software freedom. There’s nobody to bribe sponsor them for that. Whoever wins two-party (corporate parties) elections, the plutocrats remain largely in power and in almost direct control of all the important decisions and policies.

Bill Gates meets with US President-elect TrumpThis message isn’t to be misinterpreted as some pedophilia conspiracy theory or allegation that both corporate parties are equally bad. All we’re saying is, we must carry on the fight and Biden will hardly be an ally; he’ll be an obstruction, funded by special interests (rich people like Gates). The same was true for Obama (and yes, for Trump!).

10.25.20

How Microsoft is Still Worse Than Google

Posted in Antitrust, Bill Gates, Microsoft at 4:17 pm by Dr. Roy Schestowitz

Google at least publishes extensions

Source PDF [PDF]

I have decided that we should not publish these extensions. We should wait until we have a way to do a high level of integration that will be harder for the likes of Notes, Wordperfect to achieve, and which will give Office a real advantage.

I have decided that we should not publish these extensions.

Summary: “I have decided that we should not publish these extensions. We should wait until we have a way to do a high level of integration that will be harder for the likes of Notes, Wordperfect to achieve, and which will give Office a real advantage.”

Donald Trump Helped Bill Gates Increase His Wealth by More Than 50%, Especially During the Pandemic

Posted in Bill Gates, Deception, Finance at 2:49 pm by Dr. Roy Schestowitz

Bill Gates meets with US President-elect Trump
Source (video)

Summary: Contrary to ridiculous narratives disseminated by nutty accounts all around the Web, Gates and Trump are no foes but ‘partners in crime’

THE OLD Bill Gates deposition is very much relevant in light of this past week’s news about Google; Gates had the audacity to publicly instruct if not dictate who to go after next. The extent of his power if not role in the Donald Trump regime is debatable, but many people wrongly assume he's against Trump. Never mind if he personally visits Trump and was offered a job (by Trump himself) in the Trump administration.

Mean Girls: He keeps saying he gives his money away; Yeah, that's why he triples his wealthEarlier this year we saw two disturbing developments; first of all, Microsoft and Trump colluded for Microsoft to 'steal' TikTok (eventually it did not materialise) and around the same time Trump gave a contract (i.e. taxpayers’ money) to a company strongly tied — in the financial sense — to a vaccine profiteer called Gates. The financial ties are obscured using a secretive fake ‘charity’, based around the Cayman Islands. As Tim Schwab put it earlier this month

Public understanding of Gates’s finances is also limited by the foundation’s maze of inscrutable investments, like its reported $100 million stake in GTI 8 Institutional Investors—a private fund domiciled in the Cayman Islands, a jurisdiction renowned for its financial secrecy. The company in charge of the fund, Global Forest Partners, said the fund’s specific holdings are not publicly disclosed.

Yes, the Cayman Islands. Sounds like the sorts of things Trump does and would support others doing. The legal action from Barr’s (Trump’s protégé) DOJ against Google was likely the cherry on the cake prepared for Gates, modelling an action against a company that doesn't impose its products on people after an action against serial, chronic criminals that force people to use Windows, Office and so on.

Gates has always been good at pocketing taxpayers’ money (by lobbying politicians and infiltrating institutions with his dad’s help). He’s still doing just that. COVID-19 and public schools are a lot of public money. While many struggle to make ends meet Microsoft also took billions in bailouts (again, taxpayers' money).

10.20.20

Bill Gates: “I’m Not a Lawyer” (He Dropped Out of College, Where He Studied Law Before and After Breaking the Law Chronically)

Posted in Antitrust, Bill Gates, Deception, Hardware, Law, Microsoft at 8:48 pm by Dr. Roy Schestowitz

Wikipedia on IANAL

Summary: How Microsoft blackmailed other companies into supporting nothing but Microsoft and Windows; Bill Gates repeatedly lied to the interrogators about it, then said “I’m not a lawyer” (IANAL) even though he went to college to become one, just like his father who died last month

THE Bill Gates deposition contained the following bit, which in retrospect sheds a lot of light on current affairs.

How so? Read on: (we’ve also highlighted the “I’m not a lawyer” part and it’s mostly about Intel)


1 Q Did you ask Intel to keep you apprised
2 of what software work Intel was doing?
3 A I think I made that request in vein on
4 several occasions, nothing ever came of it.
5 Q Is it your testimony that they refused
6 to keep you apprised of the software work they were
7 doing?
8 A No. I just said to them that if they
9 would -- whatever software work they were doing that
10 was intended to help Windows, they should talk to us
11 about it early on if they wanted to have the highest
12 probability that it would, in fact, achieve that
13 goal.
14 And unfortunately, we never achieved
15 that result; that is, they would do things related to
16 Windows that without talking to us in advance, and
17 then once they had done the work, there would be some
18 incompatibilities between what they had done and
19 Windows itself.
20 Q When is the last time that you asked
21 Intel to keep you apprised of what software work they
22 were doing?
23 A I'm not sure.
24 Q Approximately when?
25 A I don't know.
485





1 Q Was it within the last year?
2 A I don't know.
3 Q Was it within the last two years?
4 A I honestly don't know.
5 Q Was it within the last three years?
6 A There's probably one instance where I
7 asked them to tell us about things they were doing
8 related to Windows.
9 Q Did you or others, to your knowledge,
10 from Microsoft tell Intel that if Intel began to
11 compete with Microsoft, Microsoft would be forced to
12 begin to compete with Intel?
13 A No.
14 Q Not at all, sir; never said that in
15 words or in substance?
16 A No.
17 Q To your knowledge did anyone else from
18 Microsoft ever say that?
19 A I'm not aware of anybody saying that.
20 Q If anybody had said that, would you
21 consider that to be inconsistent with company policy?
22 MR. HEINER: Objection.
23 THE WITNESS: I'm confused. Intel and
24 Microsoft are not in the same businesses, so there's
25 no policy about one of our people suggesting that
486





1 we're going to go into the chip business.
2 Q BY MR. BOIES: Was it part of what you
3 wanted to accomplish, Mr. Gates, to be to keep Intel
4 and Microsoft in separate businesses?
5 A No.
6 Q Did you ever take any action intended
7 to accomplish that?
8 A No.
9 Q Did you or, to your knowledge, anyone
10 from Microsoft ever tell people at Intel that
11 Microsoft would hold up support for Intel's
12 microprocessors if Intel didn't cooperate with
13 Microsoft in areas that Microsoft wanted Intel's
14 cooperation in?
15 A When we saw Intel doing the low quality
16 work that was creating incompatibilities in Windows
17 that served absolutely no Intel goal, we suggested to
18 Intel that that should change. And it became
19 frustrating to us because it was a long period of
20 time where they kept doing work that we thought,
21 although it was intended to be positive in the
22 Windows environment, it was actually negative. And
23 we did point out the irony of how while we seemed to
24 communicate with them on microprocessor issues and
25 yet they seemed on the areas where they were trying
487





1 to enhance Windows that the communication worked very
2 poorly.
3 Q Did you or others on behalf of
4 Microsoft tell Intel that Microsoft would hold up
5 support for Intel's microprocessors if Intel did not
6 cooperate with Microsoft?
7 A No.
8 Q No one ever told Intel that, to your
9 knowledge?
10 A That's right.
11 Q Let me see if I can refresh your
12 recollection.
13 Did you or anyone from Microsoft ever
14 tell Intel representatives that Microsoft would hold
15 up support for Intel's microprocessors if Intel
16 didn't cooperate with Microsoft on the Internet?
17 A No.
18 Q Did you or anyone from Microsoft ever
19 tell representatives of Intel that Intel would not
20 cooperate -- that if Intel would not cooperate with
21 Microsoft on communications programs, Microsoft would
22 hold up support for Intel's microprocessors?
23 A No.
24 Q Did you or to your knowledge anyone
25 from Microsoft ever tell Intel that you wanted Intel
488





1 to reduce its support of Netscape?
2 MR. HEINER: Objection.
3 THE WITNESS: It's very likely that our
4 sales force that calls on Intel as a software
5 customer talked to them about their web site and
6 their browsers. And they may have tried to convince
7 them to use our browser in terms of their internal
8 efforts. It's kind of a knit, but I think it's
9 possible.
10 Q Did you, Mr. Gates, ever yourself try
11 to get Intel to reduce its support of Netscape?
12 A I'm not aware of any work that Intel
13 did in supporting Netscape. They may have used their
14 browser internally or one of their server things, but
15 that's -- that's not really support. So I'm not sure
16 of any support they were giving to Netscape.
17 Q You may mean that to answer my
18 question, but I want to be clear.
19 It is your testimony that you're not
20 aware of any instance where you asked anybody at
21 Intel to reduce the support that Intel was providing
22 to Netscape; is that your testimony?
23 A No. I may have asked -- I may -- and I
24 don't remember it -- but I may have talked to them
25 about their internal browser use. I don't think so,
489





1 but I may have. And I may have talked to them about
2 their web servers and what they were using, but I
3 don't think so.
4 MR. HEINER: We would like to take one
5 last break here at some point, and we'll go through
6 until 4:00.
7 MR. BOIES: Okay.
8 MR. HEINER: Okay.
9 THE VIDEOGRAPHER: The time is 3:26.
10 We're going off the record.
11 (Recess.)
12 THE VIDEOGRAPHER: The time is 3:36.
13 We're going back on the record.
14 Q BY MR. BOIES: Mr. Gates, you're
15 familiar with a company called RealNetworks, are you
16 not?
17 A Yes.
18 Q Did you ever have any discussions with
19 any representative of RealNetworks concerning what
20 products RealNetworks should or should not offer or
21 distribute?
22 A No.
23 Q Microsoft signed two contracts with
24 RealNetworks, did it not, sir?
25 A I have no idea. I thought it was one.
490





1 Q RealNetworks was previously called
2 Progressive Networks; correct, sir?
3 A Right.
4 Q In the contract or contracts, if there
5 was more than one, between Microsoft and
6 RealNetworks, was there any restriction on what
7 services RealNetworks could provide to competitors of
8 Microsoft?
9 A I've never looked at those contracts.
10 Q Did you participate at all in those
11 contracts either the negotiation of those contracts
12 or discussions concerning those contracts prior to
13 the time they were entered into?
14 A I knew that Muglia and Maritz were
15 talking with Progressive about some kind of deal, but
16 I didn't know what was in the deal.
17 Q Did you know anything about what was in
18 the deal?
19 A I knew there was an investment piece.
20 I knew there was some code licensing in it. That's
21 about all.
22 Q At the time that Microsoft was
23 negotiating the contract or contracts with
24 RealNetworks -- and I'll refer to it as RealNetworks
25 even though at the time it was referred to as
491





1 Progressive Networks -- did you consider that company
2 to be a competitor of Microsoft?
3 A Not -- I think I was confused about
4 what RealNetworks -- what their plans were, and I
5 wasn't sure if they were a competitor or not.
6 Q Was there a time when you did become
7 convinced that they were a competitor?
8 A Yes.
9 Q When was that?
10 A When Rob Glaser appeared in Washington,
11 D.C.
12 Q To testify before a Congressional
13 committee?
14 A Senate, yes.
15 Q What led you to conclude from
16 Mr. Glaser's testimony that RealNetworks was a
17 competitor of Microsoft?
18 A It was nothing in his testimony.
19 Q Why did you become convinced at the
20 time of his testimony that RealNetworks was a
21 competitor of Microsoft?
22 A Well, because he went out of his way to
23 lie about us, I sort of thought, "Hum, he must be a
24 competitor."
25 Q When you say he went out of his way to
492





1 lie about you, when was that?
2 A That was at the press interview
3 surrounding the testimony -- maybe the testimony
4 itself, I'm not sure. I've never seen a transcript.
5 Q Did you ever personally have a
6 conversation with Mr. Glaser about his business?
7 A A long, long time ago when Rob was just
8 getting started I think there was one meeting that I
9 had with Rob. I haven't met with him since then.
10 Q Was that meeting before or after the
11 contract between RealNetworks and Microsoft that you
12 say that you know about?
13 A If you mean the contract where we
14 invested in Progressive, it was years before it and
15 not at all related to it.
16 Q When was the contract in which you
17 invested in Progressive Networks or RealNetworks?
18 A I'm not sure. I'd guess it's about a
19 year ago.
20 Q Did you have a conversation with
21 Mr. Glaser a few days after that agreement was
22 signed?
23 A Now that you ask me that, maybe I did.
24 Maybe I did. I think we may have had a short
25 meeting.
493





1 Q And did you in that meeting tell
2 Mr. Glaser in words or in substance how you thought
3 he should limit his business?
4 A Absolutely not.
5 Q Not in any way, sir?
6 A Not in any way.
7 Q Did you tell him he ought to get out of
8 the base streaming media platform business?
9 A No.
10 Q Did anyone ever tell you that
11 Mr. Glaser had said he would get out of the base
12 streaming media platform business?
13 A No.
14 Q Did Mr. Maritz ever tell you that
15 Mr. Glaser's stated plan was that he would get out of
16 the base streaming media platform business?
17 A As far as I know, we didn't know what
18 Rob's plans were.
19 Q Did you ever try to find out what those
20 plans were, sir?
21 A No.
22 Q Were those plans important to you?
23 A To me personally? No.
24 Q Were they important to Microsoft?
25 A On a relative basis, I'd say no.
494





1 Q Well, I suppose on a relative basis a
2 business as big as Microsoft, I don't know what would
3 be important, but --
4 A I can tell you.
5 Q -- but on a non-relative basis?
6 A I can tell --
7 Q Yes. Tell me what would be important
8 to Microsoft on a relative basis.
9 A Improvements in Windows, improvements
10 in Office, breakthroughs in research, breakthroughs
11 in Back Office.
12 Q How about browsers? On a relative
13 basis would that be important -- was that important
14 to Microsoft?
15 A To the degree it relates to Windows,
16 yes.
17 Q What about Java or Java runtime? Was
18 that on a relative basis important to Microsoft?
19 A To the degree it related to Windows,
20 yes.
21 Q Let me ask you to look at a document
22 that we have marked Government Exhibit 379. This
23 purports to be an e-mail from Paul Maritz. You are
24 not shown on this as receiving a copy. The portion
25 I'm particularly interested in is the last full
495





1 paragraph that says, quote,
2 "Rob's stated plan is that
3 he will get out of the base streaming
4 media platform business, and focus on
5 higher level solutions, hosting, and
6 content aggregation, and says that
7 his goal is now to get us to get his
8 base technology as widespread as
9 possible," close quote.
10 Do you see that?
11 A Uh-huh.
12 (The document referred to was marked as
13 Government Exhibit 379 for identification and is
14 attached hereto.)
15 Q BY MR. BOIES: Did anyone ever tell
16 you, as Mr. Maritz writes here, that Mr. Glaser had
17 said that his stated plan was that he would get out
18 of the base streaming media platform business?
19 A No.
20 Q Did you or, to your knowledge, anyone
21 from Microsoft ever tell Mr. Glaser that he should
22 get out of the base streaming media platform
23 business?
24 A No.
25 Q Okay.
496





1 You are aware, are you not, sir, that
2 one of the issues in this case is the extent to which
3 operating systems and browsers are or are not
4 separate products?
5 MR. HEINER: Objection.
6 Mischaracterizes the allegations of the complaint, I
7 believe.
8 MR. BOIES: Well, if the witness tells
9 me that he doesn't think that's an issue in the case,
10 he can so tell me.
11 THE WITNESS: I'm not a lawyer, so I
12 think it's very strange for me to opine on what's an
13 issue in the case. As far as I know, the issues in
14 the case are not -- are something that you decide,
15 and I don't claim to have any expertise at all.
16 Q BY MR. BOIES: And if you don't know,
17 that's okay. But one of the things that I want to
18 understand from you is whether your understanding,
19 which is important to my next line of questions, is
20 that the issue of whether or not browsers are or are
21 not a separate product from the operating system is
22 in this case.
23 MR. HEINER: Objection. What operating
24 system? What browsers? You referred to "the
25 operating system."
497





1 MR. BOIES: You want me to stop. All
2 right. I --
3 MR. HEINER: No. I want you to ask the
4 question but with specific specificity.
5 MR. BOIES: I've asked the question.
6 If he says he doesn't understand this question,
7 again, we put it down and then it's there for people
8 to look at later.
9 MR. HEINER: That's fine. You can do
10 that. And I, as his counsel, can pose an objection.
11 MR. BOIES: Yeah. But you can't pose
12 questions to me particularly when you're trying to
13 get the witness out at 4:00.
14 MR. HEINER: I can.
15 MR. BOIES: Not questions to me.
16 Q Mr. Gates -- you can put in an
17 objection, I'm not trying to keep you from putting in
18 an objection.
19 Mr. Gates, do you understand that the
20 issue of whether or not browsers are a separate
21 product or are not a separate product from the
22 operating system is an issue in this case?
23 A I don't consider myself someone who
24 could say if that's an issue in this case or not.
25 Q Have you participated in any way in
498





1 trying to get Microsoft personnel to use language
2 that would suggest that browsers and operating
3 systems are not separate products?
4 A I have no idea what you mean by that.
5 Q Well, have you seen e-mails that urge
6 people within Microsoft not to talk about browsers as
7 if they were separate from the operating system?
8 A I don't recall seeing any such e-mail.
9 Q Are you aware of any anybody within
10 Microsoft who has asserted, either in an e-mail or
11 otherwise, that people ought to not talk about
12 browsers as if they were separate from the operating
13 system?
14 A I don't remember any such e-mail.
15 Q Has Microsoft tried to get companies to
16 agree to statements that Internet Explorer comprises
17 part of the operating system of Windows 95 and
18 Windows 98?
19 A I know it's a true statement, but I'm
20 not aware of us doing anything to try to get anyone
21 else to endorse the statement.
22 Q You're not aware of any effort by
23 Microsoft to get non-Microsoft companies to endorse
24 the statement that Internet Explorer comprises part
25 of the operating system of Windows; is that what
499





1 you're saying?
2 A I'm not aware of such efforts.
3 Q Do you know whether Microsoft has made
4 any efforts to include language like that in any of
5 its license agreements?
6 A No, I don't.
7 Q Do you know why Microsoft might do
8 that?
9 MR. HEINER: Objection.
10 THE WITNESS: I'm not sure.
11 Q BY MR. BOIES: Do you recognize that
12 OEMs have a need to acquire the Windows operating
13 system that Microsoft licenses?
14 A What do you mean by OEM? Is it a
15 tautology because of the way you're defining it?
16 Q Well, if you take IBM and Compaq and
17 Dell, Gateway and some other companies, those are
18 commonly referred to as OEMs or PC manufacturers;
19 correct, sir?
20 A No. The term "OEM" would be quite a
21 bit broader than that. OEMs used means original
22 equipment manufacturer.
23 Q I see.
24 And does OEM have a specialized meaning
25 in your business to refer to people that supply
500





1 personal computers?
2 A No. It usually means our licensees.
3 Q And do your licensees, in part, supply
4 personal computers, sir?
5 A Some of our licensees.
6 Q The licensees to whom you license
7 Windows are suppliers of personal computers, are they
8 not, sir?
9 A If you exclude Windows CE and depending
10 on how you talk about workstations and servers.
11 Q So that if we can get on common ground,
12 the licensees for Windows 95 and Windows 98 would be
13 companies that you would recognize as personal
14 computer manufacturers; is that correct?
15 A Yeah. Almost all the licensees of
16 Windows 95 and Windows 98 are personal computer
17 manufacturers. Some are not, but the overwhelming
18 majority are.

Years later Gates said he was on a "Jihad" against Intel's support for Linux (apparently it's perfectly OK for a self-described "philanthropist" to speak like that). How little has changed since…

Microsoft Has Not Changed Since Being Investigated (and Prosecuted) for Crimes at a Federal Level

Posted in Antitrust, Bill Gates, Deception, Microsoft at 8:12 pm by Dr. Roy Schestowitz

“This anti-trust thing will blow over. We haven’t changed our business practices at all.”

Bill Gates

1000000 questions in a row: Corporate media

Summary: The media keeps telling us a bunch of worthless junk about Gates “saving the world” and Microsoft becoming a “nice” and “gentle” (or “soft”) company, but nothing could be further from the truth

THE timing of the Bill Gates deposition series seems apt. Microsoft is committing the very same crimes, as noted for instance a few days ago in this article (publisher infiltrated by Bill Gates some years ago, to the point where they removed Gates critics):

The Verge on Vista 10

People who insist that Microsoft has changed often turn out to be receiving Microsoft’s money (like Deb Icaza at OSI for instance). Those who claim that “GAFA” is the real problem have successfully been indoctrinated by the worst abuser out there. With the Linux Foundation thoroughly bribed as well as infiltrated, nowadays we see the same in the OSI, which took Microsoft’s bribes about a year afterwards.

“In the coming days we’ll continue unearthing more old stuff from the antitrust days (before the concept of antitrust became eternally fossilised).”We’re not exactly optimistic about the whole thing. Microsoft and Gates keep corrupting their competitors and critics. Like the cult they are, they accept nothing but their own way and the concept of competition isn’t tolerated. In the coming days we’ll continue unearthing more old stuff from the antitrust days (before the concept of antitrust became eternally fossilised).

People With God Complex Must Never be Allowed in Positions of Power

Posted in Antitrust, Bill Gates, GNU/Linux, Kernel, Microsoft at 5:13 am by Dr. Roy Schestowitz

“Get me into that and goddam, we’ll make so much money!”

Bill Gates, Microsoft

Related: Bill Gates Said He Was on a “Jihad” Against GNU/Linux, But GNU/Linux Users/Developers Engaged in Self-Defense Are Foul-Mouthed ‘Microsoft Haters’? | Bill Gates: “Where Are We on This Jihad?” (Against Linux at Intel) | Reminder: Bill Gates Called for “Jihad” (His Word) Both Before and After Being Grilled for Crimes | Bill Gates Deposition: Gates Keeps Referring to His Attacks on Competitors (Linux Included) as “Jihad” and Still Lies About Illegal Contracts | The Supposedly ‘Soft’ Bill Gates Interrogated About What Was Called His “Jihad” | Bill Gates Refers to His Business as “Jihad” and Accuses Java of Being a “Religion” With “Rabid” Supporters

Jimmy Neutron meme: It's mine, mine, mine. Bill, not everything must be controlled by you.

Summary: The attack on Linus Torvalds — an attack which at his own expense/peril he fails to recognise/acknowledge — seeks to put both projects that he founded right in Microsoft’s palm

“WHAT’S mine is mine and what’s yours is mine, too…”

So goes the motto at Microsoft, shows the Bill Gates deposition. They cannot grasp the concept of competition, let alone fair competition. Independent media is also an anathema, which is why both Gates and Microsoft bribe publishers (sometimes to oust their critics and delete articles critical of them… as if they’re “blasphemous”). They increasingly control Linux through the Linux Foundation and increasingly control Git through GitHub (which is where they want Linux to go).

“They cannot grasp the concept of competition, let alone fair competition.”Unfortunately, Mr. Torvalds is unable or unwilling to wake up and smell the coffee. Companies that want him powerless or retired (same effect) are taking over his projects and all they have in mind is proprietary software with surveillance, not Free software and not even Open Source — a term that increasingly means nothing to these people. Torvalds couldn’t have lost sight of what Microsoft did to Nokia, once the pride of his home country (and city). If someone can do anything at this point, regarding Git and Linux at least, it’s their creator, not his so-called ‘boss’ who thinks Microsoft is like a "puppy". One can imagine what he thinks of Bill Gates…

“He [Bill Gates] acted like a spoiled kid, which is what he was.”

Ed Roberts, Gates’ employer at MITS in the 1970′s (Atlanta Journal-Costitution, 04-27-97)

Bill Gates Explains How Microsoft and Apple Leverage Software Patents in Their Cross-Licensing Deals (to Perpetuate Duopoly/Shared Monopoly)

Posted in Antitrust, Apple, Bill Gates, Microsoft, Patents at 12:18 am by Dr. Roy Schestowitz

The princess and the frog so very much in love?

Frog

Summary: A look back at Apple’s and Microsoft’s use or misuse of bogus software patents in bargaining (in effect excluding those who have not amassed tens of thousands of patents)

THE Bill Gates deposition reveals how Netscape was excluded or pushed out, elbowed from the market in spite of technical advantages, including its cross-platform nature. As it turns out, patents too were leveraged to achieve this monopolisation. But patents are “innovation” (they keep insisting), right?

“As it turns out, patents too were leveraged to achieve this monopolisation.”We’ve isolated (below) the part about Apple and patents (we’ve also highlighted “patent” aspects for hurried readers; note that Mr. Maritz went on to lead a company which blatantly violated the GPL):



4 Q. My question to you now, sir, is whether
5 you believed that cancelling Mac Office 97 would do a
6 great deal of harm to Apple?
7 A. Well, I know that Apple would prefer
8 that we have a more updated version of Mac Office,
9 that that would be a positive thing for them, and so
10 that's why it was part of the negotiation relative to
11 the patent cross license.
12 Q. And did you believe that cancelling Mac
13 Office 97 would do a great deal of harm to Apple?
14 A. I told you I think it would be better
15 for Apple to have everybody doing major upgrades like
16 this. I doubt -- I can't characterize the level of
17 benefit of the upgrade to Apple, but certainly it's
18 something they wanted us to complete.
19 Q. The next sentence in Mr. Waldman's
20 June 27, 1997 e-mail to you begins, "I also believe
21 that Apple is taking this threat pretty seriously."
22 Did someone tell you in or about June
23 of 1997 that Apple was taking Microsoft's threat to
24 cancel Mac Office 97 seriously or pretty seriously?
25 A. Well, Maritz had taken the position
322





1 that it didn't make business sense to finish this
2 upgrade. And it's very possible Apple might have
3 heard about Maritz's opinion there and therefore been
4 worried that we, businesswise, didn't see a reason to
5 complete the upgrade and that they would have the
6 older Mac Office as opposed to this new work that we
7 were part way along on.
8 Q. Mr. Gates, my question is not what
9 position Mr. Maritz did or did not take. My question
10 is whether anyone told you in or about June of 1997
11 that Apple was taking pretty seriously Microsoft's
12 threat to cancel Mac Office 97?
13 A. Apple may have known that senior
14 executives at Microsoft, Maritz in particular,
15 thought that it didn't make business sense to
16 complete that upgrade.
17 Q. Mr. Gates, I'm not asking you what
18 Apple may have known or may not have known. What I'm
19 asking you is whether anybody told you in or about
20 June of 1997 that Apple was taking pretty seriously
21 Microsoft's threat to cancel Mac Office 97?
22 A. Those particular words?
23 Q. Told you that in words or in substance.
24 A. I think I remember hearing that Apple
25 had heard about Maritz's view that it didn't make
323





1 sense to continue the upgrade, but -- and that, you
2 know, they wanted us to continue the upgrade. But
3 I -- I don't remember any of the -- it being phrased
4 at all the way you're phrasing it.
5 Q. Well, the way I'm phrasing it is the
6 way that Mr. Waldman phrased it to you in his e-mail
7 of June 27, 1997; correct, sir?
8 A. Well, in reading it, I see those words,
9 yes.
10 Q. And you don't have any doubt that you
11 received this e-mail, do you, sir?
12 A. I have no reason to doubt it. I don't
13 remember receiving it. I do remember in general
14 sending an e-mail like the one that's at the top
15 there.
16 Q. Do you recall anyone telling you in
17 words or in substance in or about June of 1997 what
18 Mr. Waldman is writing here in this e-mail?
19 MR. HEINER: Objection.
20 THE WITNESS: This is a very long piece
21 of e-mail. Have you read the whole e-mail yourself?
22 MR. BOIES: I think my question was
23 imprecise. I was trying to avoid quoting something
24 for yet another time, but I accept your counsel's
25 view that the question was probably defective. I
324





1 thought it was clear what portion of the e-mail we
2 were talking about, but I will make it clear.
3 Q. Mr. Gates, Mr. Waldman on June 27,
4 1997, sends you an e-mail that says, "The threat to
5 cancel Mac Office 97 is certainly the strongest
6 bargaining point we have, as doing so will do a great
7 deal of harm to Apple immediately. I also believe
8 that Apple is taking this threat pretty seriously."
9 Do you recall anyone --
10 A. Do you want to finish the sentence or
11 not?
12 Q. You can if you think it is necessary to
13 answer the question.
14 Do you recall anyone telling you what I
15 have just quoted in words or in substance in or about
16 June, 1997?
17 A. No.
18 MR. HEINER: It's just about 10:00 now.
19 Can we take a break?
20 MR. BOIES: If you wish.
21 MR. HEINER: Yes, thanks.
22 VIDEOTAPE OPERATOR: The time is 9:57.
23 We're going off the record.
24 (Recess.)
25 VIDEOTAPE OPERATOR: The time is 10:21.
325





1 We are going back on the record.
2 Q. BY MR. BOIES: What were the primary
3 goals that you personally had, Mr. Gates, in terms of
4 getting Apple to agree to things?
5 MR. HEINER: Objection. Can you be
6 just a bit more specific on that?
7 MR. BOIES: Sure.
8 Q. In the period of 1996 forward, after
9 you concluded that Java, or as you put it, Java
10 runtime threat and Netscape were competitive threats
11 to Microsoft, what were your goals in terms of
12 dealing with Apple? What were you trying to get
13 Apple to agree to do for Microsoft?
14 A. Well, the main reasons we were having
15 discussions with Apple in this '97 period was that
16 they had asserted that various patents that they had
17 applied to various Microsoft products, and so our
18 primary focus in discussing an agreement with them
19 was to conclude a patent cross license of some kind.
20 Q. I want to be sure that the question and
21 answer are meeting. I asked for a period of 1996 to
22 the present and you answered about 1997. Were your
23 goals in 1996 or after 1997 any different than the
24 goals that you've just described in dealing with
25 Apple?
326





1 A. There's only one agreement with Apple,
2 so I don't know what you're talking about.
3 Q. Okay. Do you understand the word goals
4 or objectives?
5 A. You talked about agreeing with Apple --
6 there's only one agreement with Apple that I know
7 about that we're discussing and that was one that was
8 concluded in I think late July or early August, 1997
9 and there's no other agreement that I know was even
10 discussed or considered.
11 Q. Okay. Let me ask you to look at a
12 document previously marked as Government Exhibit 369.
13 The second item on the first page of this exhibit
14 purports to be an e-mail from you dated June 23, 1996
15 to Paul Maritz and Brad Silverberg with copies to
16 Messrs. Higgins, Bradford, Waldman and Ludwig on the
17 subject of "Apple meeting."
18 (The document referred to was marked by
19 the court reporter as Government Exhibit 369 for
20 identification and is attached hereto.)
21 Q. BY MR. BOIES: Did you send this
22 e-mail, Mr. Gates, on or about June 23, 1996?
23 A. I don't remember it specifically, but I
24 don't have any reason to doubt that I did.
25 Q. In the second paragraph you say, "I
327





1 have 2 key goals in investing in the Apple
2 relationship - 1) Maintain our applications share on
3 the platform and 2) See if we can get them to embrace
4 Internet Explorer in some way."
5 Do you see that?
6 A. Yeah.
7 Q. Does that refresh your recollection as
8 to what your two key goals were in connection with
9 Apple in June of 1996?
10 A. First of all, June of 1996 is not in
11 the time frame that your previous question related
12 to. And certainly in the e-mail to this group I'm
13 not talking about the patent thing, but believe me,
14 it was our top goal in thinking about Apple for many,
15 many years because of their assertions.
16 Q. My time frame in my question, sir, was
17 a time frame beginning in 1996 when you began to view
18 Netscape or the Java runtime threat as a competitive
19 threat to Microsoft.
20 A. And that was after June of 1996.
21 Q. Is it your testimony that in June of
22 1996 you did not consider Netscape to be a
23 competitive threat to Microsoft?
24 A. Netscape was a competitor, but in terms
25 of Java and all the runtime related issues, we didn't
328





1 have a clear view of that at all.
2 Q. So that -- I want to be sure I've got
3 your testimony accurately. It is your testimony that
4 in June of 1996 you considered Netscape to be a
5 competitive threat but you did not consider Java or
6 Java runtime to be a competitive threat; is that your
7 testimony?
8 A. We considered Netscape to be a
9 competitor and I told you earlier that until late '96
10 we were unclear about our position on various Java
11 runtime things and what other companies were doing
12 and what that meant for us competitively.
13 Q. Do you agree that in June of 1996 the
14 two key goals that you had in terms of the Apple
15 relationship were, one, maintain your applications
16 share on the platform, and two, see if you could get
17 Apple to embrace Internet Explorer in some way?
18 A. No.
19 Q. Do you have any explanation for why you
20 would have written to Mr. Maritz and Mr. Silverberg
21 on June 23, 1996 that those were your two key goals
22 in the Apple relationship?
23 A. They weren't involved in the patent
24 issue at all. So when I write to them, I'm focused
25 on the issues that relate to them. I do mention
329





1 patents in here, but that certainly was the primary
2 goal at this time and in subsequent times.
3 Q. Let me be clear. When you write to
4 Mr. Maritz and Mr. Silverberg, you talk about
5 patents, do you not, sir?
6 A. Where do you see that?
7 Q. Well, did you talk about patents?
8 A. Do you want me to read the entire mail?
9 Q. Have you read it enough to know whether
10 you talk about patents?
11 A. I saw the word "patent" in one place.
12 If I read the whole thing, I can find out if it's in
13 other places as well.
14 Q. You do talk about patent cross license,
15 do you not, in this memo? And if you want to look at
16 the last page, five lines from the bottom.
17 A. Yeah. They weren't involved in the
18 patent issues at all, so it looks like in this mail I
19 just mention that in a summary part, but it was our
20 top goal in our discussions with Apple.
21 Q. When you write to Mr. Maritz and
22 Mr. Silverberg, you don't describe that as your top
23 goal, in fact, you don't even describe it as one of
24 your two or three key goals; correct, sir?
25 A. This piece of e-mail doesn't talk about
330





1 the patent goal as the top goal. It's most likely
2 that's because the people copied on the mail don't
3 have a thing to do with it and I wouldn't distract
4 them with it.
5 Q. I want to be sure I have your testimony
6 correct. In June of 1996, what was Paul Maritz's
7 title?
8 A. He was involved in product development
9 activities.
10 Q. He was involved in product development
11 activities. What was his title?
12 A. I don't know. Systems.
13 Q. Systems?
14 A. Uh-huh.
15 Q. Did he have a title that went with
16 that?
17 A. Senior vice-president systems. I don't
18 know.
19 Q. Senior vice-president systems, I see.
20 Did Mr. Silverberg have a position in
21 June of 1996?
22 A. He worked for Mr. Maritz.
23 Q. Did he have a title?
24 A. I don't know what his title was at the
25 time. He would have been an officer of some kind.
331





1 Q. An officer of some kind.
2 So you're writing a memo to Paul
3 Maritz, a senior vice-president, and Brad Silverberg,
4 an officer of some kind, and you're sending copies to
5 four other people on the subject of the Apple
6 meeting, and you say, "I have 2 key goals in
7 investing in the Apple relationship."
8 A. That's quite distinct than any goals I
9 might have for a deal with Apple. It says, "I have 2
10 key goals in investing in the Apple relationship,"
11 not "I have 2 key goals for a deal with Apple."
12 Q. Well, sir, at the bottom you say what
13 you propose in terms of a deal and you talk about
14 what Apple will get out of the deal and what
15 Microsoft will get out of the deal; correct, sir?
16 A. Do you want me to read you the e-mail?
17 I mean I don't know anything more than just what it
18 says in the e-mail. I'm glad to read it to you.
19 Q. Well, sir, does it say at the bottom of
20 the e-mail that you are proposing something with
21 Apple and you are identifying what Apple would get
22 under your proposed deal and what Microsoft would get
23 under your proposed deal?
24 A. Yeah, that's at the bottom of the
25 e-mail.
332





1 Q. In fact, the bottom of the e-mail
2 talking about a proposed Apple-Microsoft deal, you
3 say, "The deal would look like this," and then you've
4 got a column "Apple gets" and a column "Microsoft
5 gets" and a column "Both get"; right, sir?
6 A. I'm reading that.
7 Q. Now, in this e-mail of a page or a page
8 and a half in which you are proposing this deal, you
9 describe your two key goals as maintaining
10 Microsoft's applications share on the platform and
11 getting Apple to embrace Internet Explorer.
12 A. No, that's wrong.
13 Q. That's wrong, okay.
14 A. The word "deal" and the word
15 "relationship" are not the same word. This says, "I
16 have 2 key goals in investing in the Apple
17 relationship." This down here is an agreement which
18 I thought we could reach with Apple.
19 Q. Is it your testimony here today under
20 oath that your two key goals in investing in the
21 Apple relationship, which you mention in the second
22 paragraph of this e-mail, is different than your two
23 key goals in the proposed deal that you describe five
24 paragraphs later?
25 A. I don't see anything in here about the
333





1 key goals -- two key goals in the deal. I've told
2 you that I'm certain that my primary goal in any deal
3 was the patent cross license.
4 Q. Mr. Gates, my question is whether it is
5 your testimony today here under oath that when you
6 talk about your two key goals in investing in the
7 Apple relationship in the second paragraph of this
8 e-mail, that that is different than what your key
9 goals were in the deal that you proposed five
10 paragraphs later?
11 A. That's right. Investing in a
12 relationship is different than the deal.
13 Q. Now, you don't tell Mr. Maritz or
14 Mr. Silverberg that your goals for investing in the
15 Apple relationship are different than your goals in
16 the proposed deal, do you, sir?
17 A. But the goals and the deal are quite
18 different, so obviously they would have known they
19 were quite different.
20 Q. Well, sir, you say the goals and the
21 deal are quite different. One of your two key goals
22 that you talk about in your second paragraph is to
23 get Apple to embrace Internet Explorer in some way.
24 And the very first thing under what Microsoft gets in
25 your proposed deal is, "Apple endorses Microsoft
334





1 Internet Explorer technology." Do you see that, sir?
2 A. Uh-huh.
3 Q. Now, does that refresh your
4 recollection that the deal that you were proposing
5 had some relationship to the two key goals that you
6 were identifying?
7 A. Some relationship, yes, but they aren't
8 the same thing at all.
9 Q. All right, sir.
10 Did you ever prepare any e-mail to
11 anyone, Mr. Maritz or Mr. Silverberg or anyone, in
12 which you said that your primary goal in an Apple
13 deal was obtaining a cross license?
14 A. I don't remember a specific piece of
15 e-mail, but I'm sure I did with at least Mr. Maffei
16 and Mr. Maritz.
17 Q. You're sure you sent them e-mail saying
18 that?
19 A. I'm sure I communicated it to them in
20 some way.
21 Q. Do you believe you sent them anything
22 in writing or an e-mail?
23 A. I think it's likely, but I don't
24 remember a specific document.
25 Q. You certainly haven't seen any such
335





1 document in being prepared for your deposition; is
2 that fair?
3 MR. HEINER: Objection. You're not
4 seeking to intrude on the attorney-client privilege?
5 MR. BOIES: No. I want to know if he
6 has seen any such document, this document he says he
7 thinks exists that wasn't produced in document
8 production. I want to see if he has ever seen it, if
9 he recalls ever seeing it now or any other time.
10 THE WITNESS: I didn't say anything
11 about what may or may not exist at this point. I
12 said I'm sure I communicated to Mr. Maritz and
13 Mr. Maffei that our primary goal in doing the deal
14 with Apple was the patent cross license.
15 Q. BY MR. BOIES: And I had thought, and
16 perhaps I misunderstood, I thought that you had said
17 that you believed that you actually communicated that
18 not merely orally but by e-mail or in writing.
19 A. I think it's likely that I communicated
20 it in e-mail.
21 Q. And if you had communicated it in
22 e-mail, would that e-mail have been preserved?
23 A. Not necessarily.
24 Q. A lot of these e-mails were preserved
25 because we now have copies of them; right?
336





1 A. That's right.
2 Q. How did Microsoft decide what e-mails
3 would be preserved and what e-mails would not be
4 preserved?
5 A. Individuals get e-mail into their
6 mailbox and they decide.
7 Q. Do you have any explanation as to why
8 people would have decided to keep the e-mail that
9 described your two key goals in the Apple
10 relationship as being what they are stated to be here
11 and not have preserved your e-mail that you say you
12 sent saying you had a primary goal of a cross
13 license?
14 MR. HEINER: Objection. Lack of
15 foundation.
16 THE WITNESS: You're missing --
17 MR. HEINER: Hold it. Objection.
18 Those facts are not established. There could be 100
19 e-mails that talk about a patent cross license and
20 you may have them or you may not have them or they
21 may not have been called for. There is a range of
22 possibilities. That question is unfair and I object.
23 MR. BOIES: Okay, you've made your
24 objection. The witness will now answer the question.
25 MR. HEINER: Let's have it read back.
337





1 MR. BOIES: And if you come up with
2 those hundred e-mails, we will read them with
3 interest. I don't think you're going to and you
4 don't think you're going to either.
5 MR. HEINER: I disagree with that.
6 MR. BOIES: Okay.
7 Q. I'll restate the question to just be
8 absolutely certain that it's a fair question,
9 Mr. Gates.
10 If it were the case that neither your
11 counsel nor myself, after diligent search, can find
12 an e-mail that says your primary goal in dealing with
13 Apple was a patent cross license, do you have any
14 explanation as to why that e-mail that you say you
15 think exists would not have been saved, whereas the
16 e-mail that describes one of your two key goals as
17 getting Apple to embrace Internet Explorer was
18 preserved?
19 MR. HEINER: Objection. It's not a
20 sensible question. You asked a hypothetical. How
21 can the witness explain what the facts might be in
22 your hypothetical?
23 MR. BOIES: He is not being asked to
24 explain what the facts are in a hypothetical, I think
25 that's clear. If the witness tells me he cannot
338





1 answer the question, he can do so and we will go on
2 and take that up with everything else we'll take up
3 at a subsequent time.
4 THE WITNESS: When you say "dealing
5 with Apple," there were a lot of things we were
6 dealing with Apple on. I've told you in terms of the
7 deal, the deal I was involved in discussing in '96
8 and under another management at Apple in '97, there's
9 no doubt the primary goal was the patent cross
10 license.
11 Q. BY MR. BOIES: And by "the primary
12 goal," what you mean is the primary goal that you,
13 Mr. Gates, had; is that correct?
14 A. I don't think I'm the only one who had
15 it, but certainly yes, that was the primary goal of
16 myself and for the company.
17 Q. And when you said in your June 23, 1996
18 e-mail, "I have 2 key goals in investing in the Apple
19 relationship," you were talking about yourself
20 personally; is that correct?
21 A. Yeah. When I say "investing in the
22 Apple relationship," that means spending time with
23 Apple and growing the relationship.
24 Q. And when in describing the deal five
25 paragraphs later the very first thing that Microsoft
339





1 gets is, "Apple endorses Microsoft Internet Explorer
2 technology," did that indicate to you that that was
3 an important part of what you were getting in terms
4 of the deal?
5 A. No such deal was ever struck, so I'm
6 not sure what you're saying.
7 Q. Was that an important part of the deal
8 that you were trying to get, sir?
9 A. We never got as far as trying to get
10 that deal, unfortunately.
11 Q. You never got as far as trying to get
12 that deal; is that what you're saying?
13 A. No. Well, in this time frame Gil
14 Amelio's total focus was on his new OS strategy, so
15 what I outlined here we never got them to consider.
16 Q. Well, sir, your e-mail begins, "Last
17 Tuesday night I went down to address the top Apple
18 executives;" correct, sir?
19 A. That's right.
20 Q. And down at the bottom when you're
21 introducing the deal, you say, "I proposed." Now,
22 you're referring to what you proposed to the Apple
23 top executives, are you not, sir?
24 A. Yes.
25 Q. Okay. And what you proposed was
340





1 "the deal" that you then describe at the bottom of
2 the first page and the top of the second page;
3 correct, sir?
4 A. That's right.
5 Q. And that was a deal that you proposed
6 the Tuesday night before June 23, 1996 to what you
7 describe as the top Apple executives; correct, sir?
8 A. I put forward some of those points.
9 Q. Well, you put them forward and you
10 describe them as proposing a deal, correct, sir?
11 A. That's how I describe it here, yes.
12 Q. All right, sir. Now, you'd said that
13 the deal that you were talking about never got done.
14 Did you ever get Apple to endorse Microsoft Internet
15 Explorer technology?
16 A. You're trying to just read part of
17 that?
18 Q. I'm actually -- what I'm doing is
19 asking a question right now, sir. I'm asking whether
20 in 1996 or otherwise, at any time did you get Apple
21 to endorse Microsoft Internet Explorer technology?
22 A. Well, you can get a copy of the
23 agreement we reached with Apple and decide if in
24 reading that you think it meets that criteria or not.
25 Q. Sir, I'm asking you, as the chief
341





1 executive officer of Microsoft, I'm asking you
2 whether you believe that you achieved that objective?
3 A. We did not get some exclusive
4 endorsement. We did get some -- there's some part of
5 the deal that has to do with Internet Explorer
6 technology.
7 Q. Do you know what that part of the deal
8 is?
9 A. Not really. It has something to do
10 with they will at least ship it along with other
11 browsers.
12 Q. Does the deal prohibit them from
13 shipping Netscape's browser without also shipping
14 Internet Explorer?
15 A. I'd have to look at the deal to
16 understand.
17 Q. It is your testimony sitting here today
18 under oath that you simply don't know one way or the
19 other whether Apple is today free to ship Netscape's
20 browser without also shipping Internet Explorer?
21 A. That's right.
22 Q. When you identify things as key goals,
23 do you typically tend to follow up and see to what
24 extent those goals have been achieved?
25 A. In a very general sense, yes.
342





1 Q. Did you ever follow up to see whether
2 one of the two key goals that you identify in your
3 1996 e-mail to Mr. Maritz and Mr. Silverberg and
4 others of getting Apple to embrace Internet Explorer
5 technology in some way had been achieved?
6 A. Well, certainly what I said here,
7 "I have 2 key goals in investing in the Apple
8 relationship," that -- those weren't achieved because
9 the investments I made were with Gil Amelio, who was
10 fired from Apple very soon thereafter.
11 Q. Was there something about Mr. Amelio
12 getting fired that changed what your goals were for
13 the Apple relationship?
14 A. I said, "I have 2 key goals in
15 investing in the Apple relationship." The form that
16 investment took was spending time with Gil Amelio.
17 That turned out to be wasted time because he was
18 fired from Apple rather abruptly within about, oh,
19 eight months of this.
20 Q. When he was fired, did that change what
21 goals you had for the Apple relationship, Mr. Gates?
22 A. It was basically a complete restart
23 because we had to understand what the new management,
24 what they were going to do with Apple and where they
25 were going.
343





1 Q. Did your goals change?
2 A. Goals for what? For investing in the
3 relationship?
4 Q. You say in this e-mail you have two key
5 goals for investing in the Apple relationship. One
6 of --
7 A. In investing in the Apple relationship.
8 Q. One of them is to get Apple to embrace
9 Internet Explorer technology in some way. What I'm
10 asking you is whether that changed after this person
11 got fired?
12 A. We re-evaluated all of our thoughts
13 about working with Apple based on what the new
14 management was going to do, whether they were going
15 to target the machines, what they were going to do
16 with their machines. Since they continued to say we
17 were in violation of their patents, it continued to
18 be our top goal to get some type of patent cross
19 license.

They used this sort of patent collusion also with IBM, not just with Apple, to reinforce control over fonts, codecs and GUIs, among other things, as we noted in past years. If this is the net effect of patents, what good are they to the rest of us?

Billionaires don’t even have to compete when they call their rivals “pirates” (Gates uses this word a lot), then blackmail them in courtrooms, or just threaten them out of the market with threats (‘legalised’ extortion) alone, as we noted earlier today. No wonder the rich keep getting so much richer. They make up rules that perpetuate and accentuate this gross injustice/inequality.

10.18.20

History’s Lesson: Microsoft Now Does to GNU/Linux What It Did to Java (Creating ‘Schism’ to ‘Wrest Control’)

Posted in Antitrust, Bill Gates, Deception, GNU/Linux, Java, Microsoft, Standard, SUN at 11:07 am by Dr. Roy Schestowitz

Earlier on today: Bill Gates Refers to His Business as “Jihad” and Accuses Java of Being a “Religion” With “Rabid” Supporters

Summary: We take a closer look at what Bill Gates admitted (under pressure, with ‘smoking guns’ to compel him into admission) regarding his rogue tactics

THE Bill Gates deposition is not “old news” per se; many of the things discussed in it prevail to this day as serious issues, including the cult-like mentality. This sort of cult (with terms like “Jihad” used abundantly) is why we end up with something called Linux Foundation whilst actually undermining Linux in a number of ways. Or OSI helping GitHub’s (Microsoft’s) attack on Open Source. The cult generally infiltrates and poisons its opposition.

“This sort of cult (with terms like “Jihad” used abundantly) is why we end up with something called Linux Foundation whilst actually undermining Linux in a number of ways. Or OSI helping GitHub’s (Microsoft’s) attack on Open Source. The cult generally infiltrates and poisons its opposition.”The bits below are a subset of the full text in which the interrogators discuss Microsoft’s attempt at “wrest[ing] control of Java” using “proprietary APIs” (think DirectX in WSL or Microsoft’s bastardisation of GNU/Linux) and deliberate fragmentation (in effect, technical sabotage). See our Java section in the old wiki; it’s still a go-to section for more examples like that. To make things easy for readers to digest we’ve highlighted in yellow some of the relevant bits:


	9				This is an e-mail to you from Ben
10 Slivka dated April 14, 1997. And the subject is,
11 quote, "Java review with you," close quote.
12 (The document referred to was marked as
13 Government Exhibit 372 for identification and is
14 attached hereto.)
15 Q BY MR. BOIES: Did you receive this
16 e-mail in or about April of 1997, Mr. Gates?
17 A I don't remember.
18 Q The e-mail begins that the author is
19 working with Paul Maritz to set up a two -- to
20 three-hour review for you on your Java efforts.
21 Do you see that?
22 A On our Java efforts.
23 Q On Microsoft's Java efforts?
24 A No. I think it's Ben Slivka's group.
25 Q And he is a Microsoft group; right?
399




1 A Yes. He's part of Microsoft but not
2 all of Microsoft.
3 Q So you would interpret this that he is
4 working with Paul Maritz to set up a two- to
5 three-hour review for you of part of Microsoft's Java
6 efforts but not all of Microsoft's Java efforts; is
7 that what you're saying?
8 A Yeah. The work his group is doing.
9 Q The work his group is doing on Java;
10 right?
11 A Right.
12 Q Okay.
13 And he lists what he describes as some
14 pretty pointed questions that you, Mr. Gates, had
15 about Java.
16 Do you see that?
17 A Well, I'm not sure those are the
18 pointed questions. It says, "I want to make sure I
19 understand your issues/concerns."
20 Q Well, that's actually the last part of
21 a sentence that begins, quote:
22 "When I met with you last,
23 you had a lot of pretty pointed
24 questions about Java, so I want to
25 make sure I understand your
400




1 issues/concerns."
2 That's what the sentence says; correct,
3 sir?
4 A Right.
5 Q And when Mr. Slivka says "I met with
6 you last," he's talking about you, Mr. Gates; correct
7 sir?
8 A Yes.
9 Q And when he says, "You had a lot of
10 pretty pointed questions about Java," he's again
11 talking about you, Mr. Gates; correct?
12 A Right.
13 Q And then he lists what he refers to as
14 a start:
15 "1. What is our business
16 model for Java?
17 "2. How do we wrest control
18 of Java away from Sun?"

19 Do you see that?
20 A Uh-huh.
21 Q Sometime prior to April 14, 1997, had
22 you conveyed to Mr. Slivka that one of your pointed
23 questions about Java was, quote, "How do we wrest
24 control of Java away from Sun?"

25 A I don't think I would have put it that
401




1 way. Certainly was an issue about the popularity of
2 Sun's runtime APIs versus our runtime APIs.
3 Q Is it your testimony that you didn't
4 raise the question of "How do we wrest control of
5 Java away from Sun?"
with Mr. Slivka?
6 A I'll say again, I doubt I used words
7 like that. But there certainly was an issue of the
8 popularity of our runtime APIs versus runtime APIs.
9 Q Just so that the record's clear. I'm
10 not asking you about whether there was a question
11 about the popularity of your runtime APIs or their
12 runtime APIs. What I'm asking is whether you told
13 him in words or in substance that you wanted to know
14 how Microsoft could wrest control or get control of
15 Java away from Sun
.
16 MR. HEINER: Objection. Asked and
17 answered twice.
18 MR. BOIES: I think he said he didn't
19 remember using those words. What I now want to try
20 to find out is whether he used those words or
21 conveyed that substance.
22 MR. HEINER: And he doesn't remember
23 using those words.
24 MR. BOIES: And I'm asking him whether
25 he conveyed that in words or in substance.
402




1 MR. HEINER: He testified as to
2 substance.
3 MR. BOIES: I don't believe he did.
4 But I'm in any event putting the question to the
5 witness.
6 THE WITNESS: I don't remember anything
7 about "control" as a word or in substance. But there
8 was an issue about the popularity of our runtime APIs
9 versus Sun's runtime APIs.
10 Q BY MR. BOIES: I take it you know
11 Mr. Slivka?
12 A Uh-huh.
13 Q You've got to answer "yes" or "no"
14 audibly so the reporter can take it down.
15 A Yes.
16 Q And you believe him to be a person of
17 competence and integrity?
18 A Yes.
19 Q Do you have any reason to believe that
20 he would have misstated what you told him when you
21 met with him last before April 14, 1997?
22 MR. HEINER: Objection.
23 THE WITNESS: In no way does this
24 purport to be a restatement of things I said to Ben
25 Slivka.
403




1 Q BY MR. BOIES: Well, Mr. Gates, what
2 this memorandum says is, quote,
3 "When I met with you last,
4 you had a lot of pretty pointed
5 questions about Java, so I want to
6 make sure I understand your issues
7 and concerns."
8 "Here's a start, can you
9 please add any that I'm missing?"
10 And then he lists six, the second of
11 which is, "How do we wrest control of Java away from
12 Sun?"

13 You see that in the exhibit, do you
14 not, sir?
15 A Uh-huh, yes.
16 Q Let me ask you to look at a document
17 that has been previously marked as Government Exhibit
18 373. It's a one-page exhibit and the second item on
19 the page is a message from you to Paul Maritz dated
20 June 16, 1997, on the subject of, quote, "Java
21 schism
," close quote.
22 (The document referred to was marked as
23 Government Exhibit 373 for identification and is
24 attached hereto.)
25 Q BY MR. BOIES: Did you send this
404




1 message, Mr. Gates?
2 A I don't remember it. But I don't have
3 any reason to doubt that I did.
4 Q What did you mean by, quote, "Java
5 schism
," close quote?
6 A I think the e-mail speaks for itself.
7 Q The e-mail may very well speak for
8 itself. But what I want to know is --
9 A I could have written a mail that says,
10 "A point that is important
11 to me is to have PURE JAVA
12 applications that do a lot HAVE to
13 ship a full runtime instead of being
14 able to count on the runtime being
15 shipped with the operating system,"
16 and so on.
17 Q Maybe my question wasn't clear. What
18 I'm trying to get you to do is to tell me what you
19 meant by the term "Java schism."
20 A It's a heading for this piece of
21 e-mail. The e-mail is the communication, not the
22 heading.
23 Q I understand that, sir. But what I'm
24 asking is: You chose the heading, did you not, sir?
25 A It appears I typed that.
405




1 Q Right. And why did you choose this
2 heading for this memo? What were you meaning to
3 convey by the term "Java schism"?
4 A Exactly what I put into the message.
5 Q Well, sir, what did you mean by
6 "schism"?
7 A It explains that in the message.
8 Q I'm asking you to explain it in your
9 words what you mean by the word "schism."
10 A I'm drawing a distinction between pure
11 Java apps and where they get their runtime bits.
12 Q And is that the schism that you're
13 referring to?
14 A That's what this e-mail is about, and
15 that's -- and I titled it "Java schism" when I wrote
16 that e-mail. And the question is: "How do pure Java
17 applications get their runtime bits?"
18 Q Could you read that answer back,
19 please?
20 (Answer read.)
21 Q BY MR. BOIES: What is on the two sides
22 of the schism, Mr. --
23 A The bits you get from the browser, the
24 bits you get elsewhere. And the mail couldn't be
25 clearer. It's asking about two sources of the bits.
406




1 You can get bits from the browser, you can get bits
2 somewhere else.
3 Q Okay.
4 Now, where else can you get the bits?
5 A They can ship with the application.
6 Q And why was it important to you to have
7 pure Java applications that have the characteristics
8 that you described in here?
9 A I didn't want to have to have the
10 browser get so large that it would have all the
11 runtime bits for all the applications.
12 Q And so where would the bits be?
13 A With the application.
14 Q And what you're saying is that it's
15 important to you that Microsoft develop pure Java
16 applications that have a lot of bits in them so that
17 those bits don't have to be in the browser. Is that
18 the case?
19 A No. It doesn't say anything about
20 Microsoft developing pure Java applications.
21 Q You're right, it doesn't.
22 A And it's clearly not about that.
23 Q What is it about then, sir?
24 A It's about pure Java applications in
25 general.
407




1 Q Did you believe that it was desirable
2 to have as many pure Java applications as possible?
3 A It has nothing to do with this e-mail.
4 The answer is no. But if you think it has something
5 to do with this e-mail, you're -- that's incorrect.
6 Q Okay. I think that it may or may not
7 be productive for you to speculate as to what I
8 think. What I am trying to do is I'm trying to get
9 your testimony about this e-mail and about your views
10 of Java more generally.
11 A I thought so.
12 Q And first let me ask a general
13 question, and that is: Did you believe that from
14 Microsoft's standpoint it was desirable to have as
15 many pure Java applications as possible?
16 A We weren't focused on that as a goal,
17 no.
18 Q In fact, is it fair to say that you
19 preferred fewer pure Java applications to more pure
20 Java applications?
21 A We preferred more applications that
22 took advantage of our APIs, and so we worked with
23 ISVs to maximize the number that took advantage of
24 our APIs.
25 Q And your APIs were not pure Java APIs;
408




1 correct?
2 A No. Some were, and some weren't.
3 Q Yes, sir, some were, and some weren't.
4 But the APIs that you wanted people to
5 use were APIs that were not pure Java APIs; correct,
6 sir?
7 A No. We were glad to have people use
8 both.
9 Q Were you indifferent as to whether they
10 used your pure Java APIs or your proprietary APIs?
11 MR. HEINER: Objection.
12 THE WITNESS: You've introduced the
13 word proprietary, and that completely changes the
14 question. So help me out, what do you want to know?
15 Q BY MR. BOIES: Is the term "proprietary
16 API"
a term that you're familiar with, sir?
17 A I don't know what you mean by it.
18 Q Is it a term you're familiar with in
19 your business?
20 A I really don't know what you mean. You
21 mean an API that you have a patent on?
22 Q Mr. Gates, is the term "proprietary
23 API"
a term that is commonly used in your business?
24 A Let me give you --
25 Q All I'm trying to do --
409




1 A -- the common meanings that those words
2 could have. And then you can pick one of them, and
3 ask me a question about it.
4 Q No. All I need --
5 A Just -- you want me to define
6 "proprietary API" or not?
7 Q No, I don't want you to define
8 "proprietary API." I didn't ask you to define
9 proprietary API. I asked you a simple question
10 whether the term "proprietary API" was commonly used
11 in your business.
12 Now, I'm prepared to sit here as long
13 as you want to to answer questions that I haven't
14 asked. But I have a certain number of questions that
15 I'm going to ask at the end of these other answers.
16 Now, this is a simple question. You can say "yes,"
17 "no," or "It is used in lots of different ways." But
18 then I can choose what to follow up on. Or you can
19 simply make whatever statements you want, and I'll go
20 back to my question afterwards.
21 MR. HEINER: The witness is simply
22 trying to help you through a difficult subject
23 matter. That's all that's happening. It's not
24 offensive.
25 MR. BOIES: It is not offensive. But
410




1 all I am saying is with due respect, this witness's
2 efforts do not help me clarify difficult subjects.
3 MR. HEINER: They could help. But go
4 ahead and read the question one more time, or state
5 it again and he can answer it.
6 MR. BOIES: Okay.
7 Q Is the term "proprietary API" a term
8 that is commonly used in your business?
9 A I don't know how common it is. It has
10 many different meanings.
11 Q Is it a term that you have used in your
12 business?
13 A Sometimes.
14 Q Okay. Now, is it fair to say that when
15 you use the term "proprietary APIs" sometimes you
16 mean one thing and sometimes you mean something else?
17 A That's right.
18 Q Would you give me the different
19 meanings that you sometimes ascribe to the term
20 "proprietary APIs" when you use that term?
21 A It can mean an API that only happens to
22 be available from one company. It can mean an API
23 that for some reason related to intellectual property
24 can only be available from one company, and, of
25 course, that's never a black and white thing. It can
411




1 mean an API that somebody's chosen not to take to a
2 standards body. Those are three different things you
3 might mean by it.
4 Q I just want to be sure that the answer
5 is clear.
6 I'm not asking what I might mean by it
7 or what a person might mean by it. What I'm trying
8 to do is get you to tell me meanings that you ascribe
9 to that term when you use it.
10 A I've used all three of those.
11 Q Okay.
12 Are there other meanings that you have
13 ascribed to the term "proprietary API" in your use of
14 that term?
15 A Not that I can think of right now.
16 Q Okay.
17 Now, with respect to the API in
18 Windows, there are both Java APIs and non-Java APIs;
19 is that fair?
20 A I hate to tell you this, but what you
21 mean by "Java" there is subject to massive ambiguity.
22 Q Let me try to put the question this
23 way: In Windows there are pure Java APIs, there are
24 impure Java APIs, and there are APIs that have
25 nothing to do with Java; is that fair?
412




1 MR. HEINER: Objection. I guess at
2 this point I'll have to say that if we're going to
3 talk about pure Java APIs, you'll have to take the
4 time to go down that path as well, which I know
5 you're happy to do of defining what that term means.
6 MR. BOIES: I mean what the witness
7 meant when he wrote this e-mail on June 16, 1997.
8 MR. HEINER: Fine.
9 THE WITNESS: I don't see anything
10 about APIs.
11 Q BY MR. BOIES: Do you see "PURE
12 JAVA" --
13 A Yeah. But I don't see APIs.
14 Q -- in capital letters?
15 And I can spend as much time as we have
16 to on this. I think it shouldn't be necessary, but
17 if we have to, we will.
18 MR. HEINER: Mr. Boies, the difficulty
19 is -- I don't mean to be at all rude, but it's
20 partly -- you know, it's partly the complexity of the
21 subject matter and the difficulty you're having in
22 posing these questions. Java is a complex subject.
23 MR. BOIES: Java is a complex subject.
24 But when somebody talks about pure Java APIs, I don't
25 think that that is something that the witness can't
413




1 answer.
2 THE WITNESS: But you said that the
3 e-mail talks about pure Java API. And it doesn't.
4 MR. BOIES: No. I said pure Java.
5 THE WITNESS: No. You said APIs.
6 Q BY MR. BOIES: Mr. Gates, let me ask a
7 question. If you can't answer the question, you
8 can't answer the question.
9 Does Windows include pure Java APIs?
10 A There's a -- in some versions of
11 Windows there are some Java runtime APIs which at one
12 time Sun labeled as pure Java APIs.
13 Subsequently they changed in a way that
14 was not upwards compatible, so it's actually kind of
15 confusing.
16 Q Does Windows have any APIs that you
17 would consider to be pure Java APIs?
18 A Today?
19 Q Yes.
20 A Yeah. I guess the AWT 1.1 stuff you
21 might think of that way.
22 Q Anything else?
23 A I don't know what you mean "anything
24 else." Are we enumerating?
25 Q Any other API in Windows that you would
414




1 consider to be pure Java APIs, Mr. Gates?
2 A I know there's more. I don't know the
3 technical names for them.
4 Q And does Microsoft have a version of
5 Java that is not what you refer to in your memo as
6 pure Java?
7 A I have no idea what you mean by that
8 question.
9 Q Okay.
10 Does Windows include APIs that are
11 written in what is described as a form or version of
12 Java but not pure Java?
13 A Are you talking about the language?
14 Q If you don't understand the question,
15 Mr. Gates, you can simply say you don't understand
16 the question.
17 A Okay. I'm sorry. I don't understand
18 the question.
19 Q Good. Okay. That's what I'm trying to
20 do. What I'm trying to do is get on the record what
21 you say you understand and what you say you don't
22 understand.
23 MR. HEINER: Any time that the witness
24 clearly indicates he doesn't understand the question
25 but doesn't preface it with the words "I don't
415




1 understand the question." If you want that
2 convention --
3 MR. BOIES: I do, because I don't want
4 speeches as to what the witness does think if he
5 simply doesn't understand the question.
6 THE WITNESS: No. But I was pointing
7 out to you the part of the question that I didn't
8 understand because it was ambiguous.
9 MR. BOIES: Would you read the answer
10 back, please, or the statement.
11 (The following answer was read:
12 "A Are you talking about the language?")
13 MR. BOIES: No. I'm not talking about
14 the language if by "the language," you mean all the
15 things that you said about the Java language when we
16 were talking about Java yesterday. Now, let me go
17 back to me asking the questions, if I can.
18 Q As part of an effort to take control of
19 Java away from Sun in the terms used by Mr. Slivka in
20 his memo with Mr. Gates -- to you dated April 14,
21 1997, did Microsoft make an effort to get people to
22 use a version of Java APIs that was not pure Java
23 APIs?
24 MR. HEINER: Objection.
25 THE WITNESS: That's a very compound --
416




1 I don't understand the question.
2 Q BY MR. BOIES: Okay.
3 In an attempt to, in Mr. Slivka's
4 words, wrest control of Java away from Sun, did
5 Microsoft make an effort to get programmers to write
6 to APIs that could be used to run applications on
7 Windows but not on all other operating systems to
8 which a pure Java written program could be run?
9 A I wouldn't say that was part of
10 anything to do with controlling Java. But we do
11 promote the use of the unique Windows APIs.
12 Q And with respect to the unique Windows
13 APIs, are some of those APIs APIs that Microsoft
14 describes as Java APIs or has in the past?
15 A All of our APIs can be called from
16 Java. So now I don't know what you mean by a Java
17 API. Usually somebody would mean something that you
18 can only call from Java or something you can call
19 from Java whether you can call it from other
20 languages or not.
21 Our APIs we make available to a broad
22 set of languages including Java but others as well.
23 Q Mr. Gates, you've been sued by Sun
24 Microsystems over Java, have you not?
25 A There's a lawsuit with Sun.
417




1 Q Well, there's a lawsuit with Sun, and
2 it's a lawsuit with Sun relating to the use of Java;
3 right?
4 A It relates to a very specific contract
5 that we have with Sun.
6 Q And does that very specific contract
7 with Sun relate to Java?
8 A It's a license to various Sun
9 technologies related to Java.
10 Q Now, you're familiar with that lawsuit,
11 are you not, sir?
12 A Not very.
13 Q Not very?
14 Do you know what the contentions in
15 that lawsuit are?
16 A No.
17 Q Never tried to find out? Is that your
18 testimony?
19 A I haven't read the complaint, if that's
20 your question.
21 Q That's not my question.
22 My question is whether you've ever
23 tried to find out the substance of the allegations
24 about Java that Sun is making in its lawsuit against
25 Microsoft.
418




1 A My understanding of their allegations
2 is very limited.
3 Q What is your understanding of their
4 allegations?
5 A I haven't read the contract between
6 Microsoft and Sun.
7 Q I'm asking you about the allegations in
8 the complaint, not whether you've read the contract.
9 I'm asking you for your understanding, which I know
10 you've already said is very limited. But I'm asking
11 for your understanding of what allegations Sun makes
12 in its claim against Microsoft.
13 A I think there's some dispute about they
14 were supposed to make the test cases public and
15 upwards compatible, and they didn't make them public,
16 and they weren't upwards compatible. And that
17 relates to the contract that I haven't read.
18 Q And that's what you think they allege
19 in the complaint?
20 A Well, that -- those are certain things
21 that they were required to do, I believe.
22 Q My question is not about what you
23 believe they were required to do, Mr. Gates. My
24 question is: What is your understanding about the
25 complaint that they make about what you did, about
419




1 what Microsoft did?
2 Do you understand the question?
3 A You're asking me to summarize their
4 lawsuit?
5 Q I'm asking you to tell me what you know
6 about the claims they make in that lawsuit. You said
7 you know something about it, but it's very limited.
8 All I'm trying to do is get you to tell me what it is
9 you know about the claims they make in their lawsuit.
10 A I think they want us to ship JNI.
11 Q Is that all you know about their
12 claims?
13 A I think there was something about a
14 trademark.
15 Q What about the trademark?
16 A Whether we could use the trademark.
17 I'm not sure.
18 Q Don't you know, Mr. Gates, one of the
19 allegations that they make is that you're taking
20 their trademark and applying it to things that it
21 shouldn't be applied to?
22 A Yeah. I think there's a trademark
23 issue. I'm not sure what they're saying about the
24 trademark.
25 Q Do you know anything that they're
420




1 saying about the trademark according to your present
2 testimony?
3 A I know there's a dispute about the
4 trademark.
5 Q Well, don't you know that one of the
6 things they're alleging is that Microsoft is taking
7 their trademark and applying it to things that
8 shouldn't be applied to according to them?
9 A I'm not sure that's right.
10 Q You're not sure?
11 A Because I don't think we used their
12 trademark, I'm not sure. I'm kind of confused about
13 that. I've never seen us using their trademark, so
14 I'm a little confused about how that relates to any
15 dispute with Sun.
16 Q Did you ever try to find that out?
17 A What?
18 Q What the claims were more than your
19 present knowledge.
20 A I read something that was on our web
21 site about four days ago.
22 Q About the Sun lawsuit?
23 A Yeah. Bob Muglia had some statements.
24 Q Other than that, did you ever try to
25 find out what Microsoft is being charged with, what
421




1 they're alleged to have done wrong?
2 A I've had discussions with Maritz
3 saying: Do I need to learn about this lawsuit? Do I
4 need to spend a lot of time on it?
5 Q What did he say?
6 A He said, no, he's focused on that and I
7 can focus on other things.
8 Q Is one of the things that you're
9 focused on trying, in Mr. Slivka's words, to wrest
10 control or get control, if wrest is a word that you
11 don't like, of Java away from Sun?

12 A No.
13 Q How did you think Microsoft could get
14 control of Java away from Sun?
15 MR. HEINER: Objection.
16 THE WITNESS: I honestly don't know
17 what you mean by "control of Java." I know those
18 words are in that e-mail from Mr. Slivka. But when
19 you're asking me the question, I don't know what you
20 mean "control of Java."
21 Q BY MR. BOIES: Is it your testimony,
22 Mr. Gates, that as you sit here today under oath you
23 have no idea what Mr. Slivka meant when he said that
24 one of the pointed questions that you had raised with
25 him was how to get control of Java away from Sun?
422




1 A I told you, I think it related to our
2 attempt to make our runtime APIs the most popular
3 runtime APIs.
4 Q And not the Java APIs from Sun; is that
5 what you're saying?
6 A Well, let's not label the APIs, not the
7 unique ones that Sun was promoting.
8 Q When you say the unique ones that Sun
9 was promoting, what were the unique ones that Sun was
10 promoting called?
11 A I'm not sure what they're called. I
12 think AWT 1.2 maybe or JDK 1.2.
13 Q And is it your best testimony that
14 that's what you think this would have meant back in
15 April of 1997, sir?
16 A That what meant?
17 Q Getting control of Java away from Sun.
18 The thing we've been talking about here.
19 A Is that the same as "wrest control"?
20 You keep reading me these words from the e-mail.
21 Q Well, I'm trying to get away from the
22 word "rest" because you say you don't remember that
23 exact word. So I'm trying to use a word that's more
24 neutral like get or obtain control.
25 A And I've told you, I can't understand
423




1 what's meant by "control" there. I know that we're
2 trying to make our APIs popular with developers.
3 Q How does making your APIs popular with
4 developers relate to obtaining control of Java, if at
5 all?
6 A I don't know what it means to control
7 Java. How can somebody control Java? What does that
8 mean?
9 Q Is it your testimony that you have no
10 idea what that means?
11 A To control Java? I don't think anyone
12 can control Java. It's like saying controlling Basic
13 or COBOL.
14 Q Do you really mean that, sir?
15 A Yes.
16 Q And I'm going to press this just
17 another 30 seconds and then I will stop. But I
18 really do want to be sure that I have given you a
19 full and fair opportunity.
20 Is it your testimony that as you sit
21 here today under oath that you have no idea what is
22 meant by control of Java as used in this e-mail to
23 you by Mr. Slivka?
24 A I've said several times I think he must
25 be referring to our effort to make our APIs the most
424




1 popular APIs. But that wouldn't give us control of
2 Java. So I'm having a hard time relating it to these
3 specific words.
4 Q Well, without relating it to the
5 specific words, how would getting people to use your
6 APIs get control of Java? Why do you relate those
7 two in your mind?
8 A Because he probably means the Java
9 runtime, not Java.
10 Q Let's say he means the Java runtime.
11 A Then he's talking about the competition
12 of APIs.
13 Q Is it fair to say, Mr. Gates, that you
14 interpret this as how does Microsoft get, obtain,
15 control of Java runtime? Is that what you're saying?
16 A I think that's the most likely
17 explanation of what he meant. I still don't
18 understand the word "control" there because it's not
19 the word I'd use.
20 Q Well, according to Mr. Slivka it is the
21 word you used, is it not, sir?
22 MR. HEINER: Objection.
23 THE WITNESS: We've already been
24 through that.
25 Q BY MR. BOIES: But looking at this
425




1 doesn't refresh your recollection about having used
2 that word?
3 A It does not.
4 Q Have you ever said in words or in
5 substance to anyone that you wanted to obtain control
6 over Java or under -- over Java runtimes?
7 A I don't remember using those words.
8 Q Do you remember conveying that concept
9 or conveying that substance?
10 A If by "that concept" you mean conveying
11 the idea that we wanted our runtime APIs to be the
12 most popular, then the answer is yes.
13 Q Why did you want your runtime APIs to
14 be the most popular?
15 A By having our runtime APIs be the most
16 popular it means that people are more likely to
17 license Windows because there's applications that
18 take advantage of the unique innovations that are in
19 the Windows product.
20 Q Why does the fact that their
21 applications that take advantage of the unique APIs
22 that are in the Windows product make people more
23 likely to license Windows?
24 A Because it shows off the unique
25 innovations of Windows.
426




1 Q How does it show off the unique
2 innovations of Windows?
3 A Well, let's say, for example, they call
4 our tasking APIs, then it shows off the unique way
5 that we've done tasking. Let's say they call our
6 clipboard APIs, then it shows off the advances we've
7 made in data exchange which are very advanced.
8 Q Is it your testimony that trying to get
9 applications writers to write to Windows' own APIs
10 was something that you were trying to do only for the
11 reason that you've identified?
12 MR. HEINER: May I have that read back,
13 please?
14 (Question read.)
15 THE WITNESS: I think there's
16 additional reasons as well.
17 Q BY MR. BOIES: Isn't it a fact,
18 Mr. Gates, that one of the reasons that you were
19 trying -- that Microsoft was trying to get control
20 over the Java runtimes or Java, as it's described in
21 Mr. Slivka's memorandum, was to prevent Java or Java
22 runtimes from supporting competition with Windows?
23 MR. HEINER: Objection.
24 THE WITNESS: I don't know what you
25 mean by "control." That means I don't understand the
427




1 question.
2 Q BY MR. BOIES: Okay.
3 Did you ever participate in any
4 discussions within Microsoft as to the extent of
5 which Java or Java runtimes posed a threat to
6 Microsoft's position with respect to the Windows
7 platform?
8 A Yeah. I've already told you that there
9 came a point where we viewed Sun's unique Java
10 runtime APIs as a -- as a part of the competitive
11 environment, a competitor.
12 Q Okay.
13 Now, why were the Java APIs from Sun a
14 competitor?
15 A Well, if people just used the least
16 common denominator APIs, then they don't show off the
17 innovations that we're doing in Windows, and it makes
18 it less attractive to people to license Windows or
19 update Windows.
20 Q Now, what I'm trying to do -- and you
21 may think you've answered this question, but I don't
22 think the record makes it clear in any event.
23 What I'm trying to do is distinguish
24 between that reason which you've given me a couple
25 times and any other reason that may exist.
428




1 Do you understand what I'm asking?
2 A No.
3 Q Okay. Let me try it again.
4 Isn't it true, Mr. Gates, that in
5 addition to whatever desire you may have had to show
6 off your Windows capabilities that you say you had,
7 that one of the things that was going on here was
8 your trying, Microsoft's trying, to prevent Java from
9 getting wide enough distribution so that it could
10 support applications programming for platforms other
11 than Windows?
12 A No.
13 Q Not at all, sir?
14 A There's no limitation of distribution.
15 Q Didn't ask whether there was any
16 limitation of distribution. I asked you whether in
17 any way the desire to prevent Java from developing
18 applications that could be used on platforms other
19 than Windows motivated what Microsoft was doing in
20 connection with Java.
21 MR. HEINER: Objection. That's a
22 distinctly different question.
23 THE WITNESS: What does it mean Java
24 developing applications?
25 Q BY MR. BOIES: I actually didn't recall
429




1 that I used that phrase.
2 THE WITNESS: Can you read me the
3 question?
4 (The following question was read:
5 "Q I asked you whether in
6 any way the desire to prevent Java
7 from developing applications that
8 could be used on platforms other than
9 Windows motivated what Microsoft was
10 doing in connection with Java.")
11 MR. BOIES: Can you answer that
12 question, Mr. Gates. If you can't, I'll rephrase it.
13 But if you can answer, I'd like an answer.
14 THE WITNESS: I don't know what you
15 mean "Java developing applications."
16 Q BY MR. BOIES: Isn't it a fact,
17 Mr. Gates, that in addition to whatever other reasons
18 you say you had for what you did with Java and
19 Windows APIs, part of what you were trying to do was
20 to prevent Java from having a wide enough
21 distribution so that it could support programs that
22 could be used on platforms other than Windows?
23 A We had no way of preventing Java from
24 being used on other platforms. It is used on other
25 platforms.
430




1 Q That wasn't my question, sir. My
2 question is whether or not part of what you and
3 Microsoft was trying to do was to limit the
4 distribution of Java sufficiently so that you could
5 thereby limit or reduce the extent to which
6 applications were written that could be used on
7 platforms other than Windows.
8 A No. In fact, we sell the most popular
9 Java tools in the market.
10 Q It is your testimony, then, sitting
11 here, that Microsoft was not at all motivated by a
12 desire to limit the extent to which Java could be
13 used to develop applications programming that could
14 be used on platforms other than Microsoft's Windows?
15 Is that your testimony?
16 A Yes.
17 Q All right, sir.
18 Was your concern over Netscape's
19 browser at all related to the fact that Netscape's
20 browser was viewed within Microsoft as a method of
21 distributing Java?
22 MR. HEINER: Objection. At the risk of
23 belaboring the record.
24 Would you care to state the question
25 more precisely and perhaps develop a better record?
431




1 Or do you want to stick with the question you have?
2 MR. BOIES: If the witness tells me he
3 can't understand that question, that's an answer. If
4 he can understand the question, I'd like to have an
5 answer.
6 MR. HEINER: In addition to that
7 there's an objection based on that, so that's a
8 second consideration.
9 THE WITNESS: Well, you have to read
10 the question again. Sorry.
11 (The following question was read:
12 "Q Was your concern over
13 Netscape's browser at all related to
14 the fact that Netscape's browser was
15 viewed within Microsoft as a method
16 of distributing Java?")
17 MR. HEINER: Another objection.
18 Foundation.
19 MR. BOIES: Okay. I think the
20 foundation objection may be well-taken. Let me ask
21 the foundation question.
22 Q Did Microsoft believe that Netscape's
23 browser was a means of distributing Java APIs?
24 A Well, Netscape had some APIs in its
25 browser. I'm not sure if you would refer to them as
432




1 Java APIs or not.
2 Q It's not a question whether I would
3 refer to them that way or not, Mr. Gates. What I'm
4 asking you is what you and Microsoft believe.
5 And my question is: Did you and others
6 at Microsoft believe that Netscape's browser was a
7 method for distributing Java APIs?
8 A There were APIs in the Netscape
9 browser. I don't think they were strictly Java APIs
10 or even in a direct sense specifically.
11 Q Have you completed your answer, sir?
12 A Uh-huh.
13 MR. BOIES: Can I have the question
14 read back again?
15 (The following question was read:
16 "Q It's not a question
17 whether I would refer to them that
18 way or not, Mr. Gates. What I'm
19 asking you is what you and Microsoft
20 believe.
21 "And my question is: Did
22 you and others at Microsoft believe
23 that Netscape's browser was a method
24 for distributing Java APIs?")
25 Q BY MR. BOIES: Can you tell me that,
433




1 sir?
2 A There were APIs in Netscape browser
3 some of which under some definition of Java APIs
4 you'd call Java APIs.
5 Q And was there concern within Microsoft
6 that the distribution of these things that you say
7 could be called Java APIs would adversely affect
8 Microsoft?
9 A Our concern is always to get people to
10 develop Windows applications. And to the degree that
11 there's other APIs people to develop to, there's some
12 competition for the attention of developers and
13 focusing on those APIs. But that doesn't relate to
14 distribution.
15 MR. BOIES: Can I have my question read
16 back again, please?
17 (The following question was read:
18 "Q And was there concern
19 within Microsoft that the
20 distribution of these things that you
21 say could be called Java APIs would
22 adversely affect Microsoft?")
23 Q BY MR. BOIES: Could I have an answer
24 to that question, please, sir?
25 A No, not the distribution.
434




1 Q Let me ask you to look at a document
2 that has been previously marked as Government Exhibit
3 349. The first message in this exhibit is an e-mail
4 from Paul Maritz to you and a number of other people
5 dated July 14, 1997; correct, sir?
6 A That's what it appears to be, yes.
7 Q Did you receive this e-mail, sir?
8 A I don't remember it. But I don't have
9 any reason to doubt that I did.
10 Q Mr. Maritz writes to you in the third
11 sentence, quote,
12 "If we look further at
13 Java/JFC being our major threat, then
14 Netscape is the major distribution
15 vehicle."
16 Do you see that, sir?
17 A Uh-huh.
18 Q Do you recall Mr. Maritz telling you in
19 words or in substance that Netscape was the major
20 distribution vehicle for the Java/JFC threat to
21 Microsoft?
22 A No.
23 Q Did you believe in July of 1997 that
24 Java/JFC was a major threat to Microsoft as
25 Mr. Maritz writes here?
435




1 A It was a significant issue for his
2 group in terms of how ISVs would choose to focus
3 their development in the future.
4 Q Did you believe in July of 1997 that
5 Java/JFC was a major threat to Microsoft?
6 A In the form that it existed as of that
7 day, maybe not. But if we looked at how it might be
8 evolved in the future, we did think of it as
9 something that competed with us for the attention of
10 ISVs in terms of whether or not they would take
11 advantage of the advanced features of Windows.
12 Q Do you have any understanding as to
13 what Mr. Maritz meant when he wrote to you about
14 Java/JFC being a major threat to Microsoft?
15 A Yeah. I just answered that.
16 Q What did you understand Mr. Maritz to
17 mean when he says Java/JFC was Microsoft's major
18 threat?
19 A I just answered that.
20 Q You'll have to give me an answer,
21 Mr. Gates, because if you did answer it, it's not an
22 answer that I can understand how it applies to the
23 particular question I'm asking.
24 A I said we looked at how the various
25 runtime APIs which was always confusing, you know,
436




1 where they were going or what they were doing. And
2 "JFC" is just a term for some of those, how they
3 might evolve in a way that would take away the focus
4 of developers in terms of writing applications that
5 would take unique advantage of Windows features.
6 Q I understand that you say that that was
7 an issue for you. Why was that a major threat to
8 Microsoft, if you have any understanding?
9 A Well, if people stopped writing
10 applications that took advantage of Windows runtime
11 APIs, that would mean that users wouldn't have access
12 to the innovative features that we were putting into
13 Windows.
14 Q Why was that a major threat to
15 Microsoft?
16 A If ISVs weren't writing applications to
17 take unique advantage of Windows, then it wouldn't
18 show off the Windows innovation and so users wouldn't
19 have much reason to update Windows or to license any
20 new versions of Windows.
21 Q You referred to JFC in a couple answers
22 ago and, of course, that's here in the memo. What
23 does "JFC" stand for as you understand it?
24 A I was always a little confused about
25 that, and it changed over time. It stands for Java
437




1 Foundation Classes.
2 Q Mr. Maritz writes here that Netscape is
3 the major distribution vehicle for Java and Java
4 Foundation Classes.
5 Do you see that?
6 A That's at the end of that sentence?
7 Q Yes.
8 A Uh-huh.
9 Q Do you see that?
10 A Yes.
11 Q Now, in a prior answer you said you
12 didn't understand how the browser was a distribution
13 vehicle. Does this refresh your recollection that at
14 least within Microsoft in July of 1997 Netscape was
15 viewed as the major distribution vehicle for Java?
16 A Not for Java. And in my view, the
17 browser wasn't a key distribution channel. Maritz
18 may or may not have agreed with that. But you can
19 always ship the runtime with the applications.
20 Q Mr. Maritz here says, "Netscape is the
21 major distribution vehicle."
22 Now, it's clear to you, is it not, sir,
23 that he means the major distribution vehicle for Java
24 and Java Foundation Classes?
25 A He doesn't mean for Java.
438




1 Q Well, sir, he says --
2 A I told you many times about the use of
3 the word "Java." And I'm not sure you heard me.
4 When people use the word "Java," they don't mean just
5 Java.
6 Q So when Mr. Maritz here used the word
7 "Java," in this e-mail that you say you don't recall
8 receiving, you're telling me that he meant something
9 other than just Java?
10 A He -- I bet he meant some runtime APIs,
11 not Java.
12 Q Okay.
13 Let's assume that you're right, let's
14 assume that when he talks about Java he means Java
15 runtime APIs. Would you then agree that what he is
16 saying here is that Netscape is the major
17 distribution vehicle for Java runtime APIs and Java
18 Foundation Classes?
19 A That appears to be what he's saying in
20 this e-mail.
21 Q And what was Mr. Maritz's position in
22 July of 1997?
23 MR. HEINER: Asked and answered too
24 many times.
25 THE WITNESS: Yeah. I've answered this
439




1 three times.
2 MR. BOIES: I'm not sure you did as to
3 this particular point in time. And one of the things
4 that you have told me is that the titles changed.
5 And so one of the things I want to be sure the record
6 is clear on is what Mr. Maritz's position was as of
7 the time of this key document.
8 MR. HEINER: You can cut and paste the
9 transcript any way you want in your briefs and in
10 your opening and closing argument. The witness has
11 testified as to his title many times.
12 Q BY MR. BOIES: Mr. Gates, what was
13 Mr. Maritz's title on July 14, 1997?
14 A I think group vice president.
15 Q What was he group vice president of?
16 A I don't know what the title would have
17 said after that. But he managed the group that
18 contained all of our Windows activities.
19 Q Was he group vice president for
20 Platforms?
21 A I'm not sure. I'm sure if it contained
22 the word "Platforms," it didn't just say Platforms,
23 because he's got Office and some other things also.
24 Q But within his responsibilities would
25 have been Windows?
440




1 A That's right.
2 Q Let me ask you to look at a document
3 that has been marked as Government Exhibit 374. This
4 is an e-mail to you from Tod Nielsen dated August 25,
5 1997, with copies to Brad Chase.
6 (The document referred to was marked as
7 Government Exhibit 374 for identification and is
8 attached hereto.)
9 Q BY MR. BOIES: Did you receive this
10 e-mail, sir?
11 A I don't remember receiving it. But I
12 don't have any reason to doubt that I did.
13 Q Let me ask you to look at the seventh
14 paragraph down. That's the third paragraph from the
15 bottom, the last sentence. That says, quote,
16 "So, we are just proactively
17 trying to put obstacles in Sun's path
18 and get anyone that wants to write in
19 Java to use J/Direct and target
20 Windows directly," close quote.
21 Do you see that, sir?
22 A Uh-huh.
23 Q Do you recall being told in or about
24 August of 1997 that Microsoft was trying to put
25 obstacles in Sun's path and get anyone that wants to
441




1 write in Java to use J/Direct and target Windows
2 directly?
3 A No.
4 Q Do you know why Microsoft was trying to
5 put, quote, "obstacles in Sun's path," close quote?
6 A I don't know what that means.
7 Q Do you know why Microsoft was trying to
8 get anyone that wants to write in Java to use
9 J/Direct?
10 A Yes.
11 Q Why was that?
12 A Because J/Direct allows you to make
13 calls that show off unique innovations in Windows and
14 make -- therefore, make Windows more attractive.
15 Q Was there any reason other than that
16 that Microsoft wanted to get anyone that wants to
17 write in Java to use J/Direct?
18 A Yes.
19 Q What?
20 A Well, there's a benefit to us if people
21 are showing off Windows, and it increases Windows
22 popularity. That helps us with the other
23 applications we write for Windows as well including
24 Microsoft Office.
25 Q How is that so?
442




1 A Because Microsoft Office is targeted to
2 Windows, we get a benefit that goes even beyond
3 increased sales of Windows if we manage to popularize
4 Windows.
5 Q Why is that?
6 A Because they can buy Office.
7 Q They can buy Office and use it on the
8 Mac, too, can't they, since you didn't cancel Mac
9 Office?
10 A We have a much wider set of
11 applications available for the Windows platform than
12 any other platform. And we have more frequent
13 updates of products like Office on the Windows
14 platform. It's a more powerful version, the Windows
15 version, and it -- therefore, our revenue per unit is
16 somewhat higher.
17 Q You mean the version of Office for
18 Windows is more powerful than the version of Office
19 for Mac? Is that what you're saying?
20 A Yes. We have Office Pro.
21 Q What is J/Direct?
22 A J/Direct is a way of allowing Java
23 language code to call native OS functionality. It's
24 a fairly clever thing that we have done. And others
25 now use that term to refer to it when they let their
443




1 OS functionality show through as well.
2 Q You have referred to Java runtimes.
3 Are there J/Direct runtimes?
4 A There's a thunk, but it's -- I don't
5 know if you would call it a runtime or not. It's a
6 thunk.
7 Q Would you define for me what the
8 difference is, in your mind, between a thunk and a
9 runtime?
10 A A thunk is a small piece of runtime
11 that remaps parameters and calling conventions in
12 such a way to be able to pass along an API call to
13 another piece of runtime.
14 Q Does -- or I should say, when was
15 J/Direct developed by Microsoft?
16 A I'm not sure.
17 Q Approximately?
18 A I don't -- I don't know. I mean --
19 Q Why was J/Direct developed by
20 Microsoft?
21 A To make is easy for people who choose
22 the Java language to call the unique runtime features
23 in various operating systems including Windows.
24 Q Why do you want people to write in
25 J/Direct as opposed to Java?
444




1 A They are writing in Java. You only use
2 J/Direct if you write in Java.
3 Q Well, what Mr. Nielsen says is that
4 Microsoft is trying to get anyone that wants to write
5 in Java to use J/Direct.
6 Do you see that?
7 A That's right. And that means writing
8 in Java.
9 Q And why do you want to get anyone who
10 wants to write in Java to use J/Direct?
11 A Because that gives them a way of
12 calling unique Windows APIs that allow us to show off
13 the innovative features in Windows.
14 Q Couldn't you do that by having them
15 simply write in Java and you providing the thunk
16 separately?
17 A The name of the thunk is J/Direct. I
18 guess we could have another thunk and call it
19 something other than J/Direct, and that would be
20 another way that they could do it. But we didn't
21 choose to do it twice.
22 Q No, you didn't choose to do it twice.
23 That's not my question, Mr. Gates.
24 My question is why you were trying to
25 get program developers, independent programming
445




1 people, to use J/Direct. Why were you trying to get
2 them to do that?
3 MR. HEINER: Certainly asked and
4 answered.
5 THE WITNESS: Because it allows them to
6 get at the unique API functionality that's in the
7 Windows product and show off the innovations that we
8 do there.
9 Q BY MR. BOIES: But you didn't have to?
10 A Tell me some other way.
11 Q Well, I'm asking you. If you tell me
12 that that's what you say is the only way that you
13 could think of for them to do it, that's your
14 testimony. I don't get to testify here. If I did,
15 there would have been a lot of things I would have
16 said along the way. But since I don't get to
17 testify, all I get to do is ask you questions.
18 And my question to you is whether there
19 was a way, that you were aware of at the time, to let
20 people see all of what you refer to as the
21 functionality of Windows without getting people to
22 write to what you refer to here to use J/Direct if
23 they wanted to write in Java.
24 A J/Direct is exactly the work we did to
25 make it possible and reasonable for people writing in
446




1 Java to call the unique Windows APIs.
2 Q Have you finished your answer?
3 A Yes.
4 Q Okay.
5 Now, were you aware of other ways of
6 accomplishing the same result that you considered and
7 rejected at the time?
8 A What time is that?
9 Q The time that you developed J/Direct.
10 A We don't know what that time is.
11 Q Well, you may not know the exact year.
12 But do you know that when -- were you aware when
13 J/Direct was being developed within Microsoft? Were
14 you aware of it at the time?
15 A I'm not sure.
16 Q Did you know it was being developed?
17 A I'm not sure.
18 Q Did you have any discussions about the
19 development of J/Direct?
20 A I was not involved in the design of
21 J/Direct.
22 Q I'm not asking you whether you were
23 involved in the design of J/Direct. I'm asking you
24 whether you were aware at the time that J/Direct was
25 being developed that it was being developed?
447




1 A I'm not sure.
2 Q Did you ever have any discussions with
3 anyone about the development of J/Direct at or about
4 the time it was being developed?
5 A I don't think so.
6 Q At the time that J/Direct was being
7 developed, did you know that people were trying to
8 develop J/Direct?
9 A It's just a thunk.
10 Q My question is: Did you know that they
11 were trying to develop this thunk?
12 A I doubt it.
13 Q Did you participate at all in any
14 discussions as to what alternatives there were to the
15 development of J/Direct?
16 A Before it was developed?
17 Q Let's start with before it was
18 developed.
19 A No, I don't think so.
20 Q What about during the time it was being
21 developed?
22 A I don't think so.
23 Q How about after it was developed?
24 A I don't think so.
25 MR. HEINER: We should take a break
448




1 soon.
2 MR. BOIES: Okay.
3 MR. HEINER: Okay.
4 THE VIDEOGRAPHER: The time is
5 2:02 P.M. We're going off the record. This is the
6 end of Tape 3 of the videotaped deposition of Bill
7 Gates.
8 (Recess.)
9 THE VIDEOGRAPHER: The time is 2:16.
10 We're going back on the record. This is Tape 4 of
11 the videotaped deposition of Bill Gates on August 28.
12 Q BY MR. BOIES: Let me show you a
13 document that has been previously marked as
14 Government Exhibit 378.
15 (The document referred to was marked as
16 Government Exhibit 378 for identification and is
17 attached hereto.)
18 Q BY MR. BOIES: In the middle of the
19 first page there is a message dated May 14, 1997,
20 from Ben Slivka to you and others.
21 Did you receive this e-mail on or about
22 May 14, 1997?
23 A I'm not sure. But I have no reason to
24 doubt that I did.
25 Q When Mr. Slivka writes as he does in
449




1 the second paragraph, "This summer we're going to
2 totally divorce Sun," do you know what he's referring
3 to?
4 A I'm not sure.
5 Q Did you ever ask him what he was
6 referring to?
7 A No.
8 Q In the next to last -- or in the last
9 sentence, actually, in the last sentence of the
10 second paragraph, Mr. Slivka writes that "JDK 1.2 has
11 JFC." And is the JFC there the Java Foundation
12 Classes that you referred to earlier?
13 A It's one of the many JFCs.
14 Q What is one of the many JFCs?
15 A The one in JDK 1.2.
16 Q Is the JFC in JDK 1.2 part of what was
17 described as a major threat to Microsoft?
18 A I have no idea which JFC that sentence
19 written by somebody other than me referred to.
20 Q Well, the sentence written by somebody
21 other than you was written to you; right, sir?
22 A It was sent to me.
23 Q Yes. And it was sent to you by one of
24 your chief -- one of your top executives; correct,
25 sir?
450




1 A In an e-mail.
2 Q Yes.
3 And that's a frequent way that your top
4 executives communicate with you; correct, sir?
5 A Yes.
6 Q Now, Mr. Slivka here says that
7 Microsoft is going to be saying uncomplimentary
8 things about JDK 1.2 at every opportunity.
9 Do you see that?
10 A Where's that?
11 Q That is, "JDK 1.2 has JFC, which we're
12 going to be pissing on at every opportunity."
13 A I don't know if he's referring to
14 pissing on JFC or pissing on JDK 1.2 nor do I know
15 what he specifically means by "pissing on."
16 Q Well, do you know that generally he
17 means by pissing on he's going to be saying and
18 Microsoft is going to be saying uncomplimentary
19 things.
20 A He might mean that we're going to be
21 clear that we're not involved with it, that we think
22 there's a better approach.
23 Q Well, as you understand it, when
24 Mr. Slivka says he's going to be pissing on JDK 1.2,
25 as you seem to interpret it, at every opportunity, do
451




1 you interpret that as meaning that Microsoft is going
2 to be saying uncomplimentary things about JDK 1.2?
3 A I told you I don't know whether pissing
4 applies to JFC or JDK.
5 Q Well, he's going to be pissing on or
6 Microsoft is going to be pissing on either JDK 1.2 or
7 JFC or both according to Mr. Slivka.
8 Is that at least fair?
9 A That's appears to be what the sentence
10 says.
11 Q Yeah. And as the chief executive
12 officer of Microsoft, when you get these kind of
13 e-mails, would it be fair for me to assume that
14 "pissing on" is not some code word that means saying
15 nice things about you, that has the usual meaning
16 that it would in the vernacular?
17 A I don't know what you mean in this kind
18 of e-mail.
19 Q The kind of e-mail that is sent to you
20 by executives in the course of your business,
21 Mr. Gates.
22 A So all e-mails I get? Ben Slivka's not
23 an executive.
24 Q All the e-mails you get from people
25 telling you that they're going to piss on competitive
452




1 products, that's what I'm talking about.
2 A I don't remember mail like that. It
3 looks like I got one. But believe me, it's not a
4 term that's commonly used.
5 Q But you have no reason to think that he
6 means it in any way other than the normal meaning of
7 that term, do you, sir?
8 A I think it's a term of multiple
9 meanings. In this case I think it means what you've
10 suggested it means.
11 Q I thought it did too, and I hope to
12 avoid asking you going through the actual language.
13 And, Mr. Gates, let me show you a
14 document that has been previously marked as
15 Government Exhibit 377.
16 The second e-mail here refers to what
17 is attached as a final copy of the memo that was sent
18 to you for Think Week in November 1995.
19 (The document referred to was marked as
20 Government Exhibit 377 for identification and is
21 attached hereto.)
22 Q BY MR. BOIES: Do you recall receiving
23 this document, sir?
24 A No. What I recall about this document
25 is that it's already been marked as an exhibit and
453




1 that I spoke with Mr. Houck about it yesterday.
2 Q That may be so. My question to you is:
3 Do you recall receiving this -- let me make it
4 simple.
5 Did you receive this memo in or about
6 November of 1995?
7 A As I said before, for my Think Weeks I
8 get about three cardboard boxes of materials that
9 people put together for me. And in looking at this
10 memo, it's not a memo that I had seen before
11 Mr. Houck's deposition questions put to me yesterday.
12 Q So it's your testimony the first time
13 you saw this document was when Mr. Houck showed it to
14 you yesterday?
15 A That's right. It had a different
16 exhibit number then.
17 Q Let me ask you to go to page 5 of the
18 document which bears in the bottom right-hand corner
19 the Microsoft document production number ending 4683.
20 A Okay.
21 Q Do you see the heading "Shell
22 Integration"?
23 A Yes.
24 Q Do you see the second sentence where it
25 says, "We will bind the shell to the Internet
454




1 Explorer, so that running any other browser is a
2 jolting experience"?
3 A I see that.
4 Q Do you have any understanding as to
5 what was meant by that?
6 A I can guess.
7 Q Well, first, this is in a memo that is
8 entitled "How to Get 30 percent share in 12 Months";
9 correct?
10 A Let's take a look. Yeah, that's on the
11 first page.
12 Q And is it clear to you that that is
13 referring to getting a 30 percent share of the
14 browser market?
15 A I haven't read the document, but it
16 seems likely that's what it is.
17 Q Okay.
18 Now, do you have an understanding --
19 I'm not asking you to guess. But do you have an
20 understanding as to what is meant by the statement,
21 "We will bind the shell to the Internet Explorer, so
22 that running any other browser is a jolting
23 experience"?
24 A I don't know what he meant by it, but I
25 can tell you what it likely means.
455




1 Q Okay. I take it this is really how you
2 would have interpreted this when you received it; is
3 that fair?
4 A I didn't read it, so --
5 Q I said if you had received it, this is
6 how you would interpret it?
7 A I said I didn't read it. I actually --
8 I would have read the whole memo if I had received
9 it. I wouldn't have turned to that one page and just
10 looked at that one sentence. I would have read the
11 memo from the beginning page by page, and then I
12 probably would have understood it better than I do at
13 this moment.
14 Q If you do not have an understanding of
15 what is meant by it, you can tell me. If you do have
16 an understanding of what is meant by it, I would like
17 to have it.
18 A I don't know what he meant by it, but
19 I'd be glad to guess as to what it might mean.
20 Q I don't want you to guess. But if you
21 as the chief executive officer of Microsoft can tell
22 me how you would, in the ordinary course of your
23 business, interpret this statement, I would like to
24 have you do so.
25 MR. HEINER: Mr. Gates was prepared to
456




1 do that quite a while ago. That was an unnecessary
2 exchange.
3 Go ahead. You may answer.
4 THE WITNESS: He may be referring to
5 the fact that when you get a separate frame coming up
6 on the win -- on the screen, it's different than
7 having something take place in frame. And part of
8 our shell integration strategy going back all the way
9 to 1990 included the idea that as you navigated or
10 browsed through different media types, you didn't
11 have to have another frame come up because that --
12 that's sort of an artifact of having to think about
13 applications instead of objects.
14 And so as he looked at integrating the
15 browser and the shell together, we were going to
16 create a form of navigation optionally but as the
17 default where you don't switch frames as you navigate
18 the links from the shell to what's out on the
19 Internet back to what's in the local store.
20 Q BY MR. BOIES: Did anyone ever tell you
21 independent of this document in words or in substance
22 that Microsoft intended to bind the shell to the
23 Internet Explorer so that running any other browser
24 is a jolting experience?
25 A Well, certainly the idea of integrating
457




1 in a way that made a better browsing experience was
2 something we were talking about quite a bit. Those
3 words, no, I never heard anything along the lines of
4 those words.
5 Q The words that are in this document; is
6 what you're saying?
7 A That's right.
8 Q Okay.
9 Did Microsoft make any effort to
10 discourage Apple from writing in a JDK 1.2?
11 A That never would have come up. Apple
12 is not an application developer.
13 Q Let me -- let me back up.
14 Did Microsoft ever make an effort to
15 get Apple to discourage applications writers for
16 Apple's machines from writing in what you have
17 referred to as Sun's Java or using the Sun Java
18 runtimes?
19 A I'm sure there was discussion with
20 Apple about the fact that their unique operating
21 system capabilities wouldn't show through with the
22 least common denominator pure approach. Whether that
23 related specifically to JDK 1.2 or not, I can't say.
24 Q When you say you're sure there were
25 discussions, are you talking about discussions
458




1 between Microsoft representatives and Apple
2 representatives?
3 A Yes.
4 Q What was Microsoft's interest in having
5 Apple discourage applications writers for Apple's
6 operating system from using Java runtimes or JDK 1.2?

Here’s more:

17			Q	Let me ask you to look at the last
18 paragraph under the heading "Sun byte codes are bad
19 for them." And you say, quote,
20 "I want them to understand
21 that helping NCs and JAVA will push
22 us to do Windows and other software
23 in SUN byte codes even if we don't
24 rewrite them in JAVA," close quote.
25 Do you see that?





1 A Uh-huh.
2 Q When you say "I want them to
3 understand," are you referring to Intel?
4 A I think so.
5 Q Did Microsoft make any effort to
6 convince Intel not to help Sun and Java?
7 A Not that I know of.
8 Q Did you or anyone at Microsoft attempt
9 to convince Intel not to engage in any software
10 activity?
11 MR. HEINER: Objection.

Then again with Java:

	5			Q	And if they did, I take it it's your
6 testimony no one ever told you about it?
7 A That's right.
8 Q Did you or, to your knowledge, anyone
9 at Microsoft express concern to Intel about the
10 success of Java or what you have referred to in this
11 deposition as Java runtimes?
12 A From time to time we'd have general
13 discussions with Intel about things going on in the
14 industry. And I'm sure our views of the Java runtime
15 competition may have come up in some of those
16 discussions.
17 MR. BOIES: Could I have the question
18 and answer read back please?
19 (The following record was read:
20 "Q Did you or, to your
21 knowledge, anyone at Microsoft
22 express concern to Intel about the
23 success of Java or what you have
24 referred to in this deposition as
25 Java runtimes?
481




1 "A From time to time we'd
2 have general discussions with Intel
3 about things going on in the
4 industry. And I'm sure our views of
5 the Java runtime competition may have
6 come up in some of those
7 discussions.")
8 Q BY MR. BOIES: In those discussions,
9 did you or others from Microsoft express concern
10 about Java and Java runtime's popularity to Intel
11 representatives?
12 A I think it's likely in those general
13 discussions. We talked about some of the
14 opportunities and competitive things going on
15 including our view of what was going on in Java
16 runtime.
17 Q Did you tell representatives of Intel
18 or, to your knowledge, anyone from Microsoft tell
19 representatives of Intel that in Microsoft's opinion
20 the wide distribution of Java and Java runtimes were
21 incompatible with interests of both Intel and
22 Microsoft?
23 A Actually, there -- there's one aspect
24 of Java that could have an effect on Intel and would
25 have no effect on Microsoft. So it's completely
482




1 orthogonal. And I pointed out to them what that was.
2 And so I did think there was one thing they ought to
3 think about in terms of where the world of software
4 development was going. But it wasn't an issue that
5 related to Microsoft.
6 Q Irrespective of what you said about
7 that particular issue, did you or others from
8 Microsoft tell Intel in words or in substance that is
9 as a general matter, a general conclusion, the
10 popularity of Java and Java runtimes was not in your
11 joint interest? And joint interest, I mean Microsoft
12 and Intel.
13 A No. There was nothing about it that
14 related to any joint interest. There was one thing
15 about it that related to some of Intel's interests
16 and there were other things about it that related to
17 some of Microsoft's interests. But there's no
18 overlap between those two.
19 Q Let me put the question this way: Did
20 you or, to your knowledge, others from Microsoft tell
21 Intel that for whatever reasons you believed that the
22 widespread distribution of Java and Java runtimes was
23 inconsistent with both interests of Intel and
24 interests of Microsoft?
25 A Well, it's like you're trying to
483




1 rephrase what I said in a more inaccurate way. I
2 told you there's an aspect of it that I thought they
3 should think about that related to them only, that's
4 the byte code piece. And then there's an aspect of
5 it that relates to us only. So there's no end there,
6 there's just a piece that might have been of interest
7 to them that I articulated, and then there's the part
8 that relates strictly to us.
9 Q Let me take it in two pieces. Did you
10 tell Intel representatives that you believed that
11 there were reasons why the widespread distribution of
12 Java and Java runtimes were not in Intel's interests?
13 A Not in that general sense. I pointed
14 out the very specific aspect of it, the byte code
15 aspect, that I thought they ought to think about that
16 had no effect on us.
17 Q Did you tell Intel representatives that
18 there were things about the wide distribution of Java
19 and Java runtimes that Microsoft believed was not in
20 Microsoft's interest?
21 A It's likely that in the general
22 discussion the notion of some of the new competitive
23 activities including the Java runtime issues would
24 have come up in some discussions with Intel but
25 not -- not related to anything they were doing.
484

Right now, in 2020, Microsoft is trying to “wrest control” of Linux and “proprietary APIs” (or file systems, formats etc.) help this agenda.

“This anti-trust thing will blow over. We haven’t changed our business practices at all.”

Bill Gates

« Previous entries Next Page » Next Page »

RSS 64x64RSS Feed: subscribe to the RSS feed for regular updates

Home iconSite Wiki: You can improve this site by helping the extension of the site's content

Home iconSite Home: Background about the site and some key features in the front page

Chat iconIRC Channels: Come and chat with us in real time

New to This Site? Here Are Some Introductory Resources

No

Mono

ODF

Samba logo






We support

End software patents

GPLv3

GNU project

BLAG

EFF bloggers

Comcast is Blocktastic? SavetheInternet.com



Recent Posts