categories of patentable subject matter in 1952, it incorporated the definition of ‘process’
that had evolved in the courts.” (footnote omitted)). If Congress had wished to change
the established practice of disallowing patents on business methods, it was quite
capable of doing so explicitly. See Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 596 (1978) (stressing
that courts “must proceed cautiously when . . . asked to extend patent rights into areas
wholly unforeseen by Congress”).
State Street’s decision to jettison the prohibition against patenting methods of
doing business contravenes congressional intent. Because (1) “the framers consciously
acted to bar Congress from granting letters patent in particular types of business,”
Comiskey, 499 F.3d at 1375, and (2) Congress evidenced no intent to modify the long-
established rule against business method patents when it enacted the 1952 Patent Act,
it is hard to fathom how the issuance of patents on business methods can be supported.
II.
Business method patents have been justified, in significant measure, by a
misapprehension of the legislative history of the 1952 Patent Act. In particular,
proponents of such patents have asserted that the Act’s legislative history states that
Congress intended statutory subject matter to “include anything under the sun that is
made by man.”
AT&T, 172 F.3d at 1355 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (citations and internal
quotation marks omitted); see also Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 309 (1980).
Read in context, however, the legislative history says no such thing. The full statement
from the committee report reads: “A person may have ‘invented’ a machine or a
manufacture, which may include anything under the sun that is made by man, but it is
not necessarily patentable under section 101 unless the conditions of the title are
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