The majority refuses to inject a technology requirement into the section 101
analysis because it believes that the terms “technological arts” and “technology” are
“ambiguous.” See ante at 21. To the contrary, however, the meaning of these terms is
not particularly difficult to grasp. “The need to apply some sort of ‘technological arts’
criterion has hardly led other countries’ and regions’ patent systems to grind to a halt; it
is hard to see why it should be an insurmountable obstacle for ours.” Cotter, supra at
885. As discussed more fully in section III, a claimed process is technological to the
extent it applies laws of nature to new ends. See Benson, 409 U.S. at 67 (“‘If there is to
be invention from . . . a discovery, it must come from the application of the law of nature
to a new and useful end.’” (quoting Funk Bros., 333 U.S. at 130)). By contrast, a
process is non-technological where its inventive concept is the application of principles
drawn not from the natural sciences but from disciplines such as business, law,
sociology, or psychology. See Thomas (1999), supra at 1168 (“[F]ew of us would
suppose that inventions within the domain of business, law or fine arts constitute
technology, much less patentable technology.”). The inventive aspect of Bilski’s
claimed process is the application of business principles, not laws of nature; it is
therefore non-technological and ineligible for patent protection.
Unlike a technological standard for patentability, the majority’s proposed test will
be exceedingly difficult to apply. The standard that the majority proposes for inclusion
in the patentability lexicon—“transformation of any physical object or substance, or an
electronic signal representative of any physical object or substance," ante at 28—is
unnecessarily complex and will only lead to further uncertainty regarding the scope of
patentable subject matter. As noted in In re Nuijten, 500 F.3d 1346, 1353 (Fed. Cir.
2007-1130
23