result." Appellants' Br. at 9. But as previously discussed, the correct analysis is
whether the claim meets the machine-or-transformation test, not whether it recites
"physical steps." Even if it is true that Applicant's claim "can only be practiced by a
series of physical acts" as they argue, see id. at 9, its clear failure to satisfy the
machine-or-transformation test is fatal. Thus, while we agree with Applicants that the
only limit to patent-eligibility imposed by Congress is that the invention fall within one of
the four categories enumerated in § 101, we must apply the Supreme Court's test to
determine whether a claim to a process is drawn to a statutory "process" within the
meaning of § 101. Applied here, Applicants' claim fails that test so it is not drawn to a
"process" under § 101 as that term has been interpreted.
On the other hand, while we agree with the PTO that the machine-or-
transformation test is the correct test to apply in determining whether a process claim is
patent-eligible under § 101, we do not agree, as discussed earlier, that this amounts to
a "technological arts" test. See Appellee's Br. at 24-28. Neither the PTO nor the courts
may pay short shrift to the machine-or-transformation test by using purported
equivalents or shortcuts such as a "technological arts" requirement. Rather, the
machine-or-transformation test is the only applicable test and must be applied, in light of
the guidance provided by the Supreme Court and this court, when evaluating the
patent-eligibility of process claims. When we do so here, however, we must conclude,
as the PTO did, that Applicants' claim fails the test.
Applicants' claim is similar to the claims we held unpatentable under § 101 in
Comiskey. There, the applicant claimed a process for mandatory arbitration of disputes
regarding unilateral documents and bilateral "contractual" documents in which
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