The decision in Flook has been recognized as a step in the evolution of the
Court’s thinking about computers. See Arrhythmia Res. Tech., Inc. v. Corazonix Corp.,
958 F.2d 1053, 1057 n.4 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (“it appears to be generally agreed that these
decisions represent evolving views of the Court”) (citing R.L. Gable & J.B. Leaheey, The
Strength of Patent Protection for Computer Products, 17 Rutgers Computer & Tech. L.J.
87 (1991); D. Chisum, The Patentability of Algorithms, 47 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 959 (1986)).
That Flook does not support today’s per se exclusion of forms of process inventions
from access to the patent system is reinforced in the next Section 101 case decided by
the Court:
In Diamond v. Chakrabarty the Court again rejected per se exclusions of subject
matter from Section 101
In Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303 (1980), the scope of Section 101 was
challenged as applied to the new fields of biotechnology and genetic engineering, with
respect to the patent eligibility of a new bacterial “life form.” The Court explained the
reason for the broad terms of Section 101:
The subject-matter provisions of the patent law have been cast in broad
terms to fulfill the constitutional and statutory goal of promoting “the
Progress of Science and the useful Arts” with all that means for the social
and economic benefits envisioned by Jefferson. Broad general language
is not necessarily ambiguous when congressional objectives require broad
terms.
Id. at 315 (quoting U.S. Const., art. I, §8). The Court referred to the use of “any” in
Section 101 (“Whoever invents or discovers any new and useful process . . . or any new
and useful improvement thereof, may obtain a patent therefor, subject to the conditions
and requirements of this title”), and reiterated that the statutory language shows that
Congress “plainly contemplated that the patent laws would be given wide scope.” Id. at
2007-1130
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