was broad, as set forth in Samuel Johnson’s Dictionary of the English Language (3d.
ed. 1768), which defines “manufacture” as “any thing made by art,” and defines “art” as
“the power of doing something not taught by nature and instinct”; “a science”; “a trade”;
“artfulness”; “skill”; “dexterity.” Historians explain that England’s primary motive for
patenting was to promote “[a]cquisition of superior Continental technology” at a time
when England lagged behind, see MacLeod, Inventing the Industrial Revolution 11; this
cannot be interpreted to mean that England and perforce the United States intended to
eliminate “processes” from this incentive system. It is inconceivable that on this
background the Framers, and again the enactors of the first United States patent
statutes in 1790 and 1793, intended sub silentio to impose the limitations on “process”
now created by this court.
Congress’ earliest known draft patent bill included the terms “art, manufacture,
engine, machine, invention or device, or any improvement upon the same.”
Walterscheid, To Promote the Progress of Useful Arts 92. The 1793 Act explicitly
stated “any new and useful art,” §1, 1 Stat. 318 (1793), a usage that was carried
forward until “art” was replaced with “process” in 35 U.S.C. §101 and defined in §100(b).
Historians discuss that Congress’ inclusion of any “art” or “process” in the patent system
was a deliberate clarification of the English practice. See Walterscheid, To Promote the
Progress of Useful Arts 93 (“[The first patent bill] appears to be an obvious attempt to
deal legislatively with issues that were beginning to be addressed by the English
courts. . . . [I]t states unequivocally that improvement inventions are patentable and
expands the definition of invention or discovery beyond simply ‘manufacture.’”); Karl B.
Lutz, Patents and Science: A Clarification of the Patent Clause of the U.S. Constitution,
2007-1130
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