It is the legislature’s role to change the law if the public interest so requires. In
Chakrabarty the Court stated: “The choice we are urged to make is a matter of high
policy for resolution within the legislative process after the kind of investigation,
examination, and study that legislative bodies can provide and courts cannot.” 447 U.S.
at 317; see also Flook, 437 U.S. 595 (“Difficult questions of policy concerning the kinds
of programs that may be appropriate for patent protection and the form and duration of
such protection can be answered by Congress on the basis of current empirical data not
equally available to this tribunal.”).
It is, however, the judicial obligation to assure a correct, just, and reliable judicial
process, and particularly to respect the principles of stare decisis in an area in which
prior and repeated statutory interpretations have been relied upon by others. See, e.g.,
Shepard, 544 U.S. at 23 (“[T]he claim to adhere to case law is generally powerful once
a decision has settled statutory meaning.”); Hilton, 502 U.S. at 202 (“Adherence to
precedent promotes stability, predictability, and respect for judicial authority.”); Payne,
501 U.S. at 827 (“Stare decisis is the preferred course because it promotes the
evenhanded, predictable, and consistent development of legal principles, fosters
reliance on judicial decisions, and contributes to the actual and perceived integrity of the
judicial process.”). These considerations appear to be abandoned.
Uncertain guidance for the future
Not only past expectations, but future hopes, are disrupted by uncertainty as to
application of the new restrictions on patent eligibility. For example, the court states
that even if a process is “tied to” a machine or transforms matter, the machine or
transformation must impose “meaningful limits” and cannot constitute “insignificant
2007-1130
33