●● IRC: #techbytes @ Techrights IRC Network: Saturday, May 28, 2022 ●● ● May 28 [07:25] schestowitz http://patentblog.kluweriplaw.com/2022/05/17/silence-at-the-epo-after-angry-outburst-president-antonio-campinos/#comments [07:25] -TechBytesBot/#techbytes-patentblog.kluweriplaw.com | Silence at the EPO after angry outburst president Antnio Campinos - Kluwer Patent Blog [07:25] schestowitz " [07:25] schestowitz Silence so far also from Josef Kratochvl, elected Chairman of the Administrative Council, who was contacted by this author about the occurrences of 26 April [07:25] schestowitz The matter is rather simple: either Mr Campinos misbehaved or he did not. I bet that if he had not, after SUEPOs report the EPO would have immediately accused SUEPO of manipulating but they refrain from it. Guess why. [07:25] schestowitz Mr Kratochvl knows perfectly well that Mr Campinos misbehaved. [07:25] schestowitz Silence Dogood [07:25] schestowitz MAY 17, 2022 AT 6:58 PM [07:25] schestowitz Actually, if we read the presidents words removing the fuc***, it says: You will never have such a nice person being the President for the next fifty years. So you wake up and make agreements with me, or you never will for your life. Isnt this an invitation for negotiation? Sounds like he has made some offers, and the counterpart is sleeping. My question is, who is sitting with the president to make deals, and to whom does this person [07:25] schestowitz report? After some years with the present president, what has this CSC member achieve? The CSC boss should also check on the members ability to reach a deal. If the member cant manage, isnt it time to find someone else? [07:25] schestowitz A. Nonymous [07:25] schestowitz MAY 17, 2022 AT 9:12 PM [07:25] schestowitz It seems that Silence Dogood has more information than I have, they may (or may not) be right. However, does anyone for one second believe that there is any negotiation? Silence Dogood writes that it sounds like some offers have been made, I am wondering whether they are of the take or leave variety, or genuine offers in the course of a negotiation. [07:25] schestowitz The Wikipedia page on negotiation starts with this: Negotiation is a dialogue between two or more people or parties with the intention of reaching a beneficial outcome regarding one or more issues where a conflict exists. and later mentions: The degree to which the negotiating parties trust each other to implement the negotiated solution is a major factor in determining whether negotiations are successful or not. [07:25] schestowitz Attentive Observer [07:25] schestowitz MAY 17, 2022 AT 11:51 PM [07:25] schestowitz To Silence Dogood, [07:25] schestowitz What is there to negotiate with a person who has systematically worsen the conditions of employment and wants to continue on this track? [07:25] schestowitz The whole financial study taken as pretext for blocking salaries and reducing benefits was an absolute scam. Just an example: the EPO would get any renewal fees for the next years. [07:25] schestowitz All actions of this president were to lower working conditions! [07:25] schestowitz Negotiation means discussing matters seriously and not merely take it or leave it. [07:25] schestowitz You take it as I am the boss is his actual attitude. [07:25] schestowitz And vulgarity has never helped a cause! [07:25] schestowitz Lets be realistic! [07:25] schestowitz Joris Bohnson [07:25] schestowitz MAY 18, 2022 AT 7:53 AM [07:25] schestowitz The EPO can go to hell. Scrap the European Patent and lets all go national! Phoaar! [07:25] schestowitz Anonymous [07:25] schestowitz MAY 18, 2022 AT 9:00 AM [07:25] schestowitz To Mister Dogood, [07:25] schestowitz I dont know whether the F-word was actually used (and I will refrain from judging anybody as long as there has been no independent confirmation), but I respectfully disagree with you that, if it was used, it should have been ignored by the CSC. I would never use the F-word at work in any circumstance. [07:25] schestowitz Personally, I would not consider a statement including the F-word as a genuine and sincere invitation to negotiate with a will to find a compromise acceptable to both parties (but consultation does not require negotiation). [07:25] schestowitz Nevertheless, it is somewhat difficult to me to see a difference in meaning between So you wake up and make agreements with me, or you never will for your life and Take it or leave it. [07:25] schestowitz Concerned observer [07:25] schestowitz MAY 18, 2022 AT 12:14 PM [07:25] schestowitz Well said. [07:25] schestowitz The tenure of the current President has seen the EPO increasingly adopt an approach where consultation is interpreted as merely requiring notifying affected parties of upcoming changes often after (behind the scenes) the relevant decisions have already been taken. To outside observers, this gives the impression that the primary reason that the EPO conducts consultations is for the sake of appearances, and certainly NOT for the [07:25] schestowitz purpose of listening to (and making changes in view of) feedback from those being consulted. [07:25] schestowitz The AC appointed the current President for the express purpose of easing tensions in the relationship between the EPO and its staff. As evidenced by the outcome of the latest GCC meeting, the President has clearly failed in his mission. However, he has succeeded in (further) degrading the conditions of employment of EPO staff, and has deployed underhand tactics (namely commissioning a biased financial study containing ludicrous and [07:26] schestowitz unsupportable conclusions) to help achieve this objective. In this respect, by demonstrating to EPO staff that he does not negotiate with them in good faith, the President has actually succeeded in exacerbating social tensions. [07:26] schestowitz Of course, if the AC were sincere in wanting to ease social tensions, as opposed to milking the EPO cash cow as much as possible, it would not renew the Presidents term of office. Let us see what message the ACs decision on this point sends to EPO staff. [07:26] schestowitz Ouch [07:26] schestowitz MAY 18, 2022 AT 12:31 PM [07:26] schestowitz EPOs Management interference with this blog seeking to manipulate minds whilst introducing doubts would not have done better than what Dogood has produced here above. [07:26] schestowitz Such theory could fly if Mr. Campinos had not misbehaved on several occasions in the past which he has. [07:26] schestowitz The problem is not to remove the F word and try to cast the light on the CSC instead. The problem is the repeated use of the word F by the President of the EPO. The uncontrolled behavior of Mr. Campinos is shocking and unacceptable. [07:26] schestowitz You will observe like me that the EPO did not produce any denial since they know too well that all this is on tape. A sign of intelligence of Mr. Campinos could have been to present excuses but visibly this is not an option. [07:26] schestowitz That the administrative is brain dead is acquired but Mr. Campinos crosses a line also in terms of reputational risks after Mr. Battistellis carpet bombing for 8 years If the AC does not intervene to reestablish a few rules of the game then the second mandate may be interesting. [07:26] schestowitz Max Drei [07:26] schestowitz MAY 18, 2022 AT 1:39 PM [07:26] schestowitz There is a well-known pop song in which the chorus line goes You say it best when you say nothing at all. So it is, as we wait for the AC or the Presidents office to comment on the Presidents shocking lack of respect shown to EPO employees. [07:26] schestowitz Never apologise, never explain. Thats how the House of Windsor manages the public. The EPO also now, it seems. [07:26] schestowitz What message are we, the public, expected to draw from this silence? I suspect the silence is intentional, so that the public at last draws the intended conclusion, that the AC today is no more accountable to anything on Earth than was any hereditory monarch was in The Middle Ages. [07:26] schestowitz Ouch [07:26] schestowitz MAY 18, 2022 AT 5:51 PM [07:26] schestowitz long sighs [07:26] schestowitz Caballero [07:26] schestowitz MAY 18, 2022 AT 2:24 PM [07:26] schestowitz Mr. Campinos should resign [07:26] schestowitz Atttentive Observer [07:26] schestowitz MAY 18, 2022 AT 7:26 PM [07:26] schestowitz It is not really necessary for Mr Campinos to resign. I would not expect that Mr Campinos has ever envisaged one second that he should resign. He is the boss and by this mere function he is always right. [07:26] schestowitz The absence of any comments by the EPO on the foul language reported by the CSC says enough, and there is no reason to believe that he never used this foul language. [07:26] schestowitz It is simply for the AC not to renew his contract. The decision about renewal is most probably due at the next AC meeting. If the AC has any guts and looks correctly at the actual situation created by the present tenant it should look for a new incumbent. [07:26] schestowitz We should not forget that Mr Campinos has been appointed in order to restore social piece at the EPO. None of this has been achieved and the situation has even degraded much quicker than under his predecessor. [07:26] schestowitz Mr Campinos is playing havoc at the EPO, and he should not be allowed to continue. He is changing the whole substance of the EPC by way of secondary legislation. Nothing against amending the EPC in order for example to take into account new technical possibilities, but there are clear rules for amending the EPC, e.g. Art 172 and Art 164(2) which clearly limits the amendments of the Implementing Regulations which can be decided by the AC. [07:26] schestowitz I fear that the AC has not realised that it cannot simply do what is wished by the upper management. In last ten years, it is however what has happened. The AC has become a mere rubber stamping office of the desiderata of the upper management. [07:26] schestowitz After all, the EPC cannot be amended just at the whim of a single person or group of persons, even if the members of the BA. But this is what is actually happening. [07:26] schestowitz The EPO has never been conceived as an empty shell in which divisions and boards are not sitting together when deciding on the fate of an application, a patent or even on an opposition. I fail to see that Art 125 allows such a way of doing. [07:26] schestowitz The aim of the EPO is to grant valid patents, not to make savings at any rate, especially at the cost of its staff. One should not forget the EPO is not any longer an attractive employer as it used to be in the past. I do not wonder why. [07:26] schestowitz It is high time to stop the tail wagging the dog. It is thus to be hoped that the AC will now realise that it cannot continue like at present. By continuously milking the cow, the milk might even stop to flow. [07:26] schestowitz Caballero [07:26] schestowitz MAY 19, 2022 AT 10:56 AM [07:26] schestowitz No boss of any company using the EPO to protect their inventions would use profanities like Mr.Campinos, because -manners apart it does not work. So now Mr Campinos is not achieving the objective to restore social peace at the EPO.. I rest my case, surrender, youre not up to it. [07:26] schestowitz gasteig [07:26] schestowitz MAY 19, 2022 AT 1:05 PM [07:26] schestowitz I just do not understand why this blog meant mainly for law firms and attorneys discusses what happens in internal meetings of the EPO which do not relate to any patent law matter. Does the EPO discuss about meetings inside other companies or organisations? Maybe some one should explain the relevance of such an article for patent attorneys and its impact on IP matters, if any [07:26] schestowitz Concerned observer [07:26] schestowitz MAY 20, 2022 AT 10:57 AM [07:27] schestowitz So do I understand that you are arguing that how (or whether) the EPO functions should be of no concern to its users? [07:27] schestowitz Increased social tensions at the EPO lead to strikes, which clearly affect the EPOs users. Also, because the EPO is a public service organisation, the public has a right to know whether it is being managed in accordance with the law (and principles of good governance). [07:27] schestowitz Law firms are subject to strict rules / codes of conduct that are enforced by independent regulators. They are also subject to the jurisdiction of national courts when it comes to matters (such as employment regulations) that are governed by national laws. This contrasts sharply with the situation at the EPO, which is effectively a law unto itself, and which is overseen by an Administrative Council that has repeatedly shown itself to be asleep [07:27] schestowitz at the wheel. This makes it all the more important for the public to learn about any mismanagement at the EPO, as it is only public pressure (or shaming) that stands any chance of eliciting any positive changes. [07:27] schestowitz Is that enough for you? Nice to see that Mr Campinos has his defenders, though. It puts me in mind of those who defended Boris Johnson when he was found to have broken the law. [07:27] schestowitz gasteig [07:27] schestowitz MAY 20, 2022 AT 2:37 PM [07:27] schestowitz Thank you for your explanation, I heard his name for the first time yesterday so I cannot say anything on the person Campino and the functioning of the EPO, I was just surfing on this site because I am studying on patents and IP law and was surprised to see an (very much commented on) article about an internal exchange between the chief of EPO and some internal Union members, I mean such issues happen continuously in all companies or organisations [07:27] schestowitz and I have never seen external professionals using their products or services being so interested in such internal matters. I understand the issue with the particular labour law applying there, policy makers and (I guess) politicians from all European countries must have decided so: I cannot imagine that the chief can change that even if he wants, but if there were such bad regulations why were EPO able to hire thousands of people (if I am not wrong) [07:27] schestowitz and keep them over the years? Even if I dont know how high the staff rotation level is there. And we are talking about engineers and lawyers who shouldnt have a problem in relocating. So I can still not fully understand the concerns over a ill-functioning patent releasing authority, also because if their services were so bad, considering the quite high fees that I read on the internet, patent applicants would stop using patent law firms for [07:27] schestowitz their business in Europe, and the published figures I read show actually the contrary. So what are exactly the fears of patent attorneys or inventors? And why are they so worried and indignant because of that one person who, as I read, rotates in any case every five years? There must be something else behind the scenes which I havent caught reading this blog [07:27] schestowitz Concerned observer [07:27] schestowitz MAY 20, 2022 AT 3:37 PM [07:27] schestowitz Just because it might not affect you directly, ignoring immoral or unlawful behaviour by people in positions of power has never been a good idea: [07:27] schestowitz https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/First_they_came_ [07:27] -TechBytesBot/#techbytes-en.wikipedia.org | First they came ... - Wikipedia [07:27] schestowitz The EPO has a monopoly over the granting of European (as opposed to national) patents. Looking elsewhere for such patents is therefore not an option. The best that can be hoped for is that the system for granting European patents is run in a reasonable way. This is one reason why people tend to get upset when this does not happen. [07:27] schestowitz There might be other reasons too. A belief in the rule of law, for example. Also, concern for fellow professionals who are suffering under an oppressive regime. [07:27] schestowitz If you are looking for some kind of ulterior motive, you will not find one. [07:27] schestowitz Diogenes the Cynic [07:27] schestowitz MAY 19, 2022 AT 2:37 PM [07:27] schestowitz One might well argue that Mr Campinos should resign. [07:27] schestowitz Of course he could, but why would he? [07:27] schestowitz What is likely to happen to him if he does not? [07:27] schestowitz The biggest risk that he seems to be facing at the moment is that a notoriously supine AC might decide against an automatic renewal of his contract at its June meeting. [07:27] schestowitz And once again: the Council could decide not to reappoint him and start an election procedure with endless rounds of political horse-trading [07:27] schestowitz But why would they ever be inclined to go down that arduous road when they can take the path of least resistance [07:27] schestowitz Concerned observer [07:27] schestowitz MAY 19, 2022 AT 6:32 PM [07:27] schestowitz And yet again the EPO announces a decision, taken without consultation, that degrades the service that the EPO provides to its users: [07:27] schestowitz https://www.epo.org/law-practice/legal-texts/official-journal/communications-from-the-boa/archive/20220519.html [07:27] -TechBytesBot/#techbytes-www.epo.org | EPO - Notice of the President of the Boards of Appeal dated 1 May 2022 on informing the parties of submissions made by other parties to the proceedings and by third parties [07:27] schestowitz On this occasion, the situation is not so serious. Users will just need to go to the online Register (assuming that it is not experiencing issues or undergoing maintenance) to download copies of documents that the Boards of Appeal would previously have sent to the relevant parties. Nevertheless, the slow but certain grinding down of the level of customer service provided is gradually turning the EPO into something that is starting to resemble [07:27] schestowitz a self-service institution. [07:27] schestowitz Recent years have seen a decision of the Boards not to notify parties of last-minute changes to the location of oral proceedings. Then came the EPOs decision not to accept (after 1 July 2022) ST.25 sequence listings for divisionals of pre-July 2022 applications thereby shifting on to applicants all of the costs (and legal risks!) of converting listings from ST.25 to ST.26 format. On top of that, it is clear that, compared to two decades ago, [07:27] schestowitz examiners now have much less time (on average) to search and examine any given application. [07:27] schestowitz And yet there has been no decrease in the EPOs fees. Quite the opposite. Which of course means that users are now paying more for a service that, in various ways, is inferior to what it used to be. No wonder that the EPO consistently makes a thumping surplus every year and is so awash with cash that it changed the rules to enable it to effectively play on the stock markets. (Which, by the way, is impossible to reconcile with the Article 42 [07:27] schestowitz EPC requirement for the budget of the EPO to be balanced!) [07:27] schestowitz It makes you wonder how bad things need to get before the EPOs users stand up and demand the restoration of a proper level of service and whether, even if this happens, the EPOs response will be to simply raise a middle finger, safe in the knowledge that privileges, immunities and a lack of effective oversight will combine to allow the milking of the cash cow to continue uninterrupted. [07:27] schestowitz le coq ain [07:27] schestowitz MAY 19, 2022 AT 6:55 PM [07:27] schestowitz It should not be forgotten, that the internal review of the contested strike regulations, other strike related decisions and the social democracy rules took place during Campinos tenure. He decided to maintain them and openly defended them. The subsequent decisions of the ILOAT speak for themselves. This was his approach to establishing a social dialogue. There are quite a number of similar decisions awaiting judgment by the Tribunal. The [07:28] schestowitz best is yet to come. [07:28] schestowitz " [07:28] *psydruid (~psydruid@jevhxkzmtrbww.irc) has joined #techbytes [07:48] *psydruid (~psydruid@jevhxkzmtrbww.irc) has left #techbytes [07:49] *psydruid (~psydruid@jevhxkzmtrbww.irc) has joined #techbytes ● May 28 [08:54] *psydruid (~psydruid@jevhxkzmtrbww.irc) has left #techbytes [08:54] *psydruid (~psydruid@jevhxkzmtrbww.irc) has joined #techbytes ● May 28 [10:02] *GNUmoon2 has quit (Ping timeout: 2m30s) [10:04] *GNUmoon2 (~GNUmoon@4j9jkcntt88f2.irc) has joined #techbytes ● May 28 [12:21] *psydruid (~psydruid@jevhxkzmtrbww.irc) has left #techbytes [12:21] *psydruid (~psydruid@jevhxkzmtrbww.irc) has joined #techbytes [12:58] *psydruid (~psydruid@jevhxkzmtrbww.irc) has left #techbytes [12:58] *psydruid (~psydruid@jevhxkzmtrbww.irc) has joined #techbytes ● May 28 [14:51] *psydroid2 (~psydroid@memzbmehf99re.irc) has joined #techbytes ● May 28 [15:00] *u-amarsh04 has quit (Quit: Konversation terminated!) [15:06] *u-amarsh04 (~amarsh04@v6xmmrhxmbafc.irc) has joined #techbytes [15:14] schestowitz http://patentblog.kluweriplaw.com/2022/05/19/upc-a-reply-to-those-who-with-the-help-of-a-crystal-ball-have-questioned-the-arguments-as-to-why-the-ppa-is-not-legally-in-force/ [15:14] -TechBytesBot/#techbytes-patentblog.kluweriplaw.com | UPC: A reply to those who, with the help of a crystal ball, have questioned the arguments as to why the PPA is not legally in force - Kluwer Patent Blog [15:14] schestowitz " [15:14] schestowitz 27 comments [15:14] schestowitz Diogenes the Cynic [15:14] schestowitz MAY 19, 2022 AT 2:25 PM [15:14] schestowitz Well said, Mr Montana. [15:14] schestowitz But I fear that you may ultimately be mistaken on one small but crucial point. [15:15] schestowitz Your screed appears to be premised on the assumption that the entry into force of the UPC is a matter to be decided by the power of logic. [15:15] schestowitz It seems far more likely to me that we are dealing with something which will ultimately be decided by the logic of power. [15:15] schestowitz Patent robot [15:15] schestowitz MAY 19, 2022 AT 5:03 PM [15:15] schestowitz The keynote speech of said EU Commissioner for the Internal Market reminds me of another speech, probably from the same Commissioner, who explained in FRENCH to an INTERNATIONAL audience how nice it is that unitary patents do not have to be translated. [15:15] schestowitz Leo Steenbeek [15:15] schestowitz MAY 19, 2022 AT 5:39 PM [15:15] schestowitz For some reason, the counterarguments presented in the above post do not discuss the arguments that I presented to show that the Protocol on Provisional Application (PPA) of the UPC Agreement has entered into force in a legally correct manner. [15:15] schestowitz In view thereof, I believe that it is important to restate these arguments that are based on well-established principles of EU law supported by various CJEU decisions. [15:15] schestowitz In view of the primacy of EU law, anything in the PPA and the UPC Agreement itself that is in violation of EU law is null and void. [15:15] schestowitz The primacy of EU law does not follow from a provision in the UPC Agreement. Instead, the provision of EU law in the UPC Agreement merely restates a key feature of EU law since the very beginning of the EU, see e.g. the CJEU decisions [15:15] schestowitz C 26/62 Van Gend & Loos (https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A61962CJ0026): [15:15] schestowitz The European Economic Community constitutes a new legal order of international law for the benefit of which the States have limited their sovereign rights. [15:15] -TechBytesBot/#techbytes-eur-lex.europa.eu | EUR-Lex - 61962CJ0026 - EN - EUR-Lex [15:15] schestowitz C 6/64 Costa v E.N.E.L. (https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A61964CJ0006): [15:15] schestowitz By contrast with ordinary international treaties, the EEC Treaty has created its own legal system which, on the entry into force of the treaty, became an integral part of the legal systems of the Member States and which their courts are bound to apply. [15:15] -TechBytesBot/#techbytes-eur-lex.europa.eu | EUR-Lex - 61964CJ0006 - EN - EUR-Lex [15:15] schestowitz By creating a Community of unlimited duration, having its own institutions, its own personality, its own legal capacity and capacity of representation on the international plane and, more particularly, real powers stemming from a limitation of sovereignty or a transfer of powers from the states to the Community, the Member States have limited their sovereign rights and have thus created a body of law which binds both their nationals and themselves. [15:15] schestowitz [15:15] schestowitz The reasons that only EU states can join the UPC Agreement are as follows: [15:15] schestowitz 1. Under the AETR decision C 22/70 of the EU Court of Justice (https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A61970CJ0022), each time the EU, with a view to implementing a common policy envisaged by the Treaty on the Functioning of the EU, adopts provisions laying down common rules, whatever form they may take, the Member States no longer have the right, acting individually or even collectively, to undertake obligations with third [15:15] -TechBytesBot/#techbytes-eur-lex.europa.eu | EUR-Lex - 61970CJ0022 - EN - EUR-Lex [15:15] schestowitz countries which affect those rules or alter their scope. [15:15] schestowitz The UPC Agreement comprises several aspects that touch EU law, e.g. the EU regulations on Supplementary Protection Certificates, the EU IPR enforcement directive, and the EU regulations on the unitary patent. In view thereof, the EU states are prevented from entering into a UPC Agreement together with non-EU states like Switzerland, Turkey, Norway, and after Brexit the UK. [15:15] schestowitz This CJEU decision C 22/70 on AETR shows that already more some 50 years ago it was established that the above primacy of EU law results in a limitation for the EU states in their ability to conclude treaties. [15:15] schestowitz 2. Under Opinion 1/09 of the EU Court of Justice (https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A62009CV0001), it is for the national courts and tribunals and for the Court of Justice to ensure the full application of European Union law in all Member States and to ensure judicial protection of an individuals rights under that law. Consequently, the Member States cannot confer the jurisdiction to resolve disputes between individuals [15:15] schestowitz in the field of patents on a court created by an international agreement which would deprive those courts of their task, as ordinary courts within the European Union legal order, to implement European Union law and, thereby, of the power provided for in Article 267 TFEU, or, as the case may be, the obligation, to refer questions for a preliminary ruling in the field concerned. However, it would be OK to confer such jurisdiction to a court that [15:15] -TechBytesBot/#techbytes-eur-lex.europa.eu | EUR-Lex - 62009CV0001 - EN - EUR-Lex [15:15] schestowitz is like the Benelux Court common to a number of Member States, and situated, consequently, within the judicial system of the European Union, so that its decisions are subject to mechanisms capable of ensuring the full effectiveness of the rules of the European Union. [15:15] schestowitz As the draft agreement discussed in CJEU Opinion 1/09 intended to cover non-EU states like Switzerland, the draft agreement would establish a patent court outside the EU legal order that is incompatible with EU law. However, a patent court common to EU states only would be within the EU judicial system and thus compatible with EU law. [15:15] schestowitz Importantly, EU Regulation 542/2014 clarifies that the UPC is indeed a common court within the EU legal order, and thus OK under CJEU Opinion 1/09. [15:15] schestowitz For these reasons, participation of non-EU states in the UPC Agreement is a violation of EU law. Dont blame me for the confusion caused by other people, unrelated to me, who maintained that a post-Brexit UK could still participate in the UPC. I strongly disagree to those other people, and I have never supported their views. [15:15] schestowitz So, since Brexit, UK participation in the UPC Agreement and its PPA is a violation of EU law. This means that [15:15] schestowitz where the PPA requires a ratification by the UK, that requirement is null and void, so that it suffices for the PPA to enter into force that it has been joined by 13 states including Germany and France, and [15:15] schestowitz where the UPC Agreement refers to London as a seat of a part of the UPC Central Division, such references are a violation of EU law that can be addressed by the UPC Administrative Committee under Article 87(2) UPC Agreement. The Administrative Committee could do so e.g. on 8 AM of the morning that the UPC Agreement enters into force, so that when at 9 AM the UPC opens its doors, it has a Central Division with seats that each have a clear [15:15] schestowitz jurisdiction laid down in the UPC Agreement. [15:15] schestowitz Concerned observer [15:15] schestowitz MAY 19, 2022 AT 6:58 PM [15:15] schestowitz Leo, I am afraid that there is a serious hole in your logic. [15:15] schestowitz The UPCA and the PPA are both international treaties. It is not clear whether those treaties are consistent with the supremacy of EU law (indeed, the constitutional challenges in Germany asserted that they were not). This means that it cannot be assumed that those treaties do not violate EU law. [15:15] schestowitz If, in fact, the treaties DO violate EU law, the consequences would not be what you assert. This is because, for the reasons outlined below, there is also no legal basis for your assertion that anything in the PPA and the UPC Agreement itself that is in violation of EU law is null and void. [15:15] schestowitz The CJEU is the ultimate guarantor of the integrity of the EU legal system. It would therefore fall to the CJEU to decide what to do in the event that the UPCA, the PPA and/or any provisions of those treaties were found to be inconsistent with (the supremacy of) EU law. However, because the UPCA and the PPA are international treaties, the CJEU would not be competent to rule upon the validity of those treaties, or any of their provisions. [15:15] schestowitz To illustrate this point, consider the ruling in C 572/15, where the CJEU held that it was not even competent to rule on the validity of a provision of a treaty of accession to the EU. [15:15] schestowitz Thus, not even the CJEU would be capable of interpreting any provision of the UPCA or the PPA as being null and void. This means that the treaties must be interpreted (only) according to the principles of the VCLT. There is simply nothing in those principles that would support your desired (re-)interpretation of the UPCA and PPA. [15:16] schestowitz Leo Steenbeek [15:16] schestowitz MAY 20, 2022 AT 10:47 AM [15:16] schestowitz Dear Concerned Observer, [15:16] schestowitz The UPC Agreement and the PPA are treaties between EU member states, and their wording clarifies that they are meant to be treaties between EU member states only. The UPC Agreement itself states that it respects the primacy of EU law. Then Art. 30(2) VCLT applies: When a treaty specifies that it is subject to, or that it is not to be considered as incompatible with, an earlier or later treaty, the provisions of that other treaty prevail. [15:16] schestowitz In such a case, there is no reason why the CJEU would not have jurisdiction to rule on the effects of any lack of compliance of those treaties with EU law. [15:16] schestowitz But even without a CJEU decision, because of their EU Treaty obligations, the EU member states involved are bound to only apply the UPC Agreement and the PPA to the extent that they are compatible with EU law, and thus to refrain from applying provisions that are incompatible with EU law, such as the PPA provision that the PPA must be ratified by the UK, and the UPC Agreement provisions about a Central Division seat in London. [15:16] schestowitz The UPC Agreement is thus clearly different from an EU accession treaty, which is part of the EUs primary law. The CJEU can indeed not rule on the validity of primary EU law. [15:16] schestowitz Concerned observer [15:16] schestowitz MAY 20, 2022 AT 2:10 PM [15:16] schestowitz Leo, you are conflating the legal obligations of EU Member States with the interpretation of international treaties concluded by one or more of those states. [15:16] schestowitz EU Member States are indeed obliged to avoid contravening EU laws. But this does not prevent such contraventions happening. The situation regarding Poland and Hungary have made this abundantly clear. [15:16] schestowitz Thus, despite being obliged not to do so, one or more EU Member States are perfectly capable of signing and ratifying international treaties that do not comply with EU law. If this happens, the Commission (under Article 258 TFEU) or another Member State (under Article 259 TFEU) may bring the matter before the CJEU. The CJEU may then decide the matter, and instruct the Member State(s) concerned to take the necessary measures to comply with EU [15:16] schestowitz law. [15:16] schestowitz Thus, whilst the EU legal system may provide remedies for breaches of the Member States EU law obligations, NONE of this affects the interpretation of international treaties signed by those Member States. [15:16] schestowitz Whilst the UPC Agreement mentions the TEU and TFEU, it does not in any way indicate that the AGREEMENT (as opposed to decisions / actions of the Court that it establishes) is either subject to or not to be considered as incompatible with the TEU and/or TFEU. There is therefore no basis for (re-)interpreting the UPC Agreement based upon an assumption that it must be compatible with EU law. [15:16] schestowitz Regarding the alleged prohibition of the participation of non-EU States, I am guessing that you never agreed with arguments (made by certain of the UPCs proponents between 2016 and 2019) that Brexit was no barrier to the UKs participation in the UPC. In any event, I encourage you to consider the points made below regarding the manner (and uncertain legal effect) of the UKs withdrawal of its ratifications. [15:16] schestowitz In doubt [15:16] schestowitz MAY 20, 2022 AT 3:17 PM [15:16] schestowitz I am not a specialist in EU law, but this reading by Concerned Observer of the legal provisions applying to the existence and nature of the the UPCA is convincingly making sense to me. [15:16] schestowitz Something wonders me still, but sorry thta I am not an expert in EU law, I always was under the understanding that the UPCA was made possible between EU Member States because of a special provision of the TFEU allowing it. If that understanding is correct (but maybe that was a misunderstanding at my end), could it be that this link to the TFEU makes the UPCA also subject to EU law, then the CJEU competent to review its validity ? [15:16] schestowitz Leo Steenbeek [15:16] schestowitz MAY 20, 2022 AT 3:27 PM [15:16] schestowitz CJEU case law shows that provisions in treaties between EU member states that violate EU law are void. See the CJEU case law (e.g. C109/20, C638/19, C284/16, C109/20) on the validity of arbitration clauses in investment agreements: from the date that the states that are a party to those investment agreements have become EU member states, the arbitration clauses are no longer valid, and investors who invoke a violation of the investment [15:16] schestowitz agreement have to go to a regular court. [15:16] schestowitz Indeed, I have always believed that Brexit implies that the UK can no longer participate in the UPC. By withdrawing its ratification, the UK has nicely allowed the remaining UPC states to move on without violating EU law. [15:16] schestowitz Concerned observer [15:16] schestowitz MAY 23, 2022 AT 12:38 PM [15:16] schestowitz Leo, the case law that you cite does not support your views. This is because there is nothing in the rulings of the CJEU relating to the INTERPRETATION of international treaties between EU Member States. Instead, the rulings simply recognise the supremacy of EU law, in particular over international agreements that are inconsistent with the EU legal order. [15:16] schestowitz C 109/20: NATIONAL legislation (based upon a clause in an international agreement) invalid due to inconsistency with Articles 267 and 344 TFEU [15:16] schestowitz C-638/19 P: competence of the Commission to take a decision under Article 108 TFEU [15:16] schestowitz C 284/16: an arbitration clause in an international agreement is precluded by Articles 267 and 344 TFEU, meaning that a national court is competent to decide a matter covered by that clause. [15:16] schestowitz It is interesting to consider how this line of case law might apply to the UPCA. This is because the case law would support the conclusion that a challenge (at a national court) to the jurisdiction of the UPC would be upheld by the CJEU if it could be demonstrated that the UPCA is inconsistent with the EU legal order. The result of this would be that a national court, and NOT the UPC, would be competent to hear the matter in question. [15:16] schestowitz Such a ruling would, of course, effectively kill the UPC. However, it would not require the CJEU to interpret (let alone reinterpret) the meaning of any provisions of the UPCA. All that the CJEU would need to do is to consider the practical effects of the UPCA and decide whether those are compatible with EU law. [15:16] schestowitz In the light of the above, I find it impossible to understand why you believe that any alleged inconsistency with the EU legal order would be somehow (automatically) remedied by reinterpretation of provisions of the UPCA (such as Art 7(2)) that have a crystal-clear meaning. I repeat, there is simply no legal basis for such a reinterpretation. [15:16] schestowitz Patent robot [15:16] schestowitz MAY 20, 2022 AT 9:49 AM [15:16] schestowitz Art 87(2) UPCA The Administrative Committee may amend this Agreement to bring it into line with [15:16] schestowitz an international treaty relating to patents or Union law. [15:16] schestowitz The EU-UK Brexit agreement is neither an international treaty relating to patents nor Union law, so Art 87(2) cannot be used to amend Art 7(2). [15:16] schestowitz Moreover, are you all sure that all UPC member states will agree on any possible amendment of Art 7(2)? [15:17] schestowitz For example, if Italy disagreed on such an amendment, then it could withdraw its ratification like UK did, so what would happen then? Its not just Art. 87(3) but also Art. 89(1) [15:17] schestowitz Not amending UPCA and the PPA before their (illegal) entry into force is an act of arrogance greater than Art. 89(1) itself (3 EU member states having veto power on the other EU states: is this democratic at all?). [15:17] schestowitz A. Nonymous [15:17] schestowitz MAY 19, 2022 AT 9:45 PM [15:17] schestowitz ARTICLE 89 [15:17] schestowitz Entry into force [15:17] schestowitz (1) This Agreement shall enter into force [] on the first day of the fourth month after the deposit of the thirteenth instrument of ratification or accession in accordance with Article 84, including the three Member States in which the highest number of European patents had effect in the year preceding the year in which the signature of the Agreement takes place [] [15:17] schestowitz Member State is defined in Art 2(b) UPCA as EU Member State. [15:17] schestowitz In my opinion, the conditions required by Art 89 UPCA must be met at the date of entry into force. Thus, at the date of entry into force, the UK is no longer a Member State, and these three Member States are indeed Germany, France and Italy. QED [15:17] schestowitz Patent robot [15:17] schestowitz MAY 20, 2022 AT 9:51 AM [15:17] schestowitz Yes, provided that Italy does not withdraw its ratification like the UK did [15:17] schestowitz Anonymous [15:17] schestowitz MAY 19, 2022 AT 10:03 PM [15:17] schestowitz I wonder whether the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT) as such applies to the UPCA. In James Crawford, Brownlies Principles of Public International Law (9th ed., OUP 2019) at 354 (footnote 6) it says: Under Art.4, the VCLT only applies to treaties concluded between states all of which at that time were already parties to it. Since only 116 states are parties, this means in effect that the VCLT does not apply as such to most [15:17] schestowitz multilateral treaties. In practice,it is applied as customary international law in any event. In my understanding France is not a party to the VCLT https://treaties.un.org/pages/showdetails.aspx?objid=080000028003902f That would mean that only those provisions of the VCLT that are accpeted under customary international law, apply to the UPCA. To my best knowledge the rules on interpretation pursuant to Articles 31, 32 VCLT are accepted under [15:17] schestowitz customry international law. However, I am not sure whether other rules of the VCLT, e.g. with respect to the termination of treaties (see the UKs departure from the UPCA), are also part of customary international law. If this is not the case, it would be necessary to establish in the first place the applicable rules, e.g. regarding termination, in order to be able to come to valid conclusions with respect to a specific legal issue pertaining to [15:17] schestowitz the UPCA, e.g. the UKs status regarding the UPCA. [15:17] schestowitz Patent robot [15:17] -TechBytesBot/#techbytes-treaties.un.org | UNTC [15:17] schestowitz MAY 20, 2022 AT 9:28 AM [15:17] schestowitz Article 56 VCLT [15:17] schestowitz Denunciation of or withdrawal from a treaty containing no provision regarding termination, denunciation or withdrawal [15:17] schestowitz 1. A treaty which contains no provision regarding its termination and which does not provide for denunciation or withdrawal is not subject to denunciation or withdrawal unless: [15:17] schestowitz (a) it is established that the parties intended to admit the possibility of denunciation or withdrawal; or [15:17] schestowitz (b) a right of denunciation or withdrawal may be implied by the nature of the treaty. [15:17] schestowitz 2. A party shall give not less than twelve months notice of its intention to denounce or withdraw from a treaty under paragraph 1. [15:17] schestowitz IPfrog [15:17] schestowitz MAY 20, 2022 AT 9:30 AM [15:17] schestowitz Interestingly, the political motivation resurfaced towards the end of the post and helped understanding the agenda of the opponents to the UPC project. It is all about the rule of law unless ES gets its share [15:17] schestowitz Concerned observer [15:17] schestowitz MAY 20, 2022 AT 10:35 AM [15:17] schestowitz An interesting point. However, even if the UPCA were to be interpreted using all of the principles under the VCLT, there are doubts about whether the manner in which the UK announced the withdrawal of its ratification was strictly correct (or legally effective). [15:17] schestowitz Of course, it could be customary international law to not apply the rules too strictly, and thereby force a state to participate in an international treaty that it clearly wishes to disavow. Who knows? [15:17] schestowitz In any event, this is all academic. There is no (independent) court that is competent to decide these matters. [15:17] schestowitz Jan Van Hoey [15:17] schestowitz MAY 24, 2022 AT 10:39 AM [15:17] schestowitz Since the General Secretariat of the Council is being paid to declare this treaty into force against its reading, a maladministration complaint could/should be filed at the EU Ombudsman. [15:17] schestowitz And if there is political support, such the European Commission and Mr Breton, supporting this gross violation of the Rule of law, this should be disputed in court, for example, in a court of a Member State signatory of the VCLT. [15:17] schestowitz RO1 [15:17] schestowitz MAY 20, 2022 AT 11:30 AM [15:18] schestowitz I could not thank Mr. Montana enough for this post (and the previous one), being one of the few to give reasonned and substantiated arguments of possible issue on the UPC system, and here on the PPA specifically. [15:18] schestowitz If if I may add my two cents to the debate of the PPA, one thing that bothers me is the mere attempt of a PPA, provisional application of the UPC, as long as it has been taken only by a subset of the parties of the UPC (assuming it has even entered into force as contested by Mr. Montana). [15:18] schestowitz It is may be my private law education, but when a group of persons are bound by an agreement, how could a subset of those parties to the agreeement be allowed to decide that some part of the obligations of that agreement should enter into force at an early stage, while having legal effect for the time at which the agreement will fully enter into force for all parties thereof ? [15:18] schestowitz To try to give a UPC example in the present situation: lets refer to the jugde nomination proceedings and the case of the Portugal. [15:18] schestowitz Portugal has signed and ratified the UPC (according to GS: https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/documents-publications/treaties-agreements/agreement/?id=2013001&DocLanguage=en) but Portugal is NOT part of the PPA (same source: https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/documents-publications/treaties-agreements/agreement/?id=2015056&DocLanguage=en). [15:18] -TechBytesBot/#techbytes-www.consilium.europa.eu | Agreement - Consilium [15:18] schestowitz The fact that Portugal is not part of PPA is notably reflected on the fact that the Advisory Committee is not encompassing a PT member (since the list of the members of the Advisory Committee is public). Following the same logic, we may only assume that the Portugal has no member in the Administrative Committee either, since its list appears not to be public (if any has it, please feel welcome to share it) [15:18] -TechBytesBot/#techbytes-www.consilium.europa.eu | Agreement - Consilium [15:18] schestowitz Thanks to the PPA, Administrative Committee is instituted and one of its main tasks is to nominate judges (Art.16(2) UPCA) for an apointement of 6 years (Art.3(6) of the Statute of UPC) prior to the entry into force of the UPCA. Further one of the main task of the early nominated judges of the first instance, if not the only one, would be to elect among them the president of the first instance court (Art 14(1) of the Statute of UPC) for an [15:18] schestowitz appointement of 3 years. [15:18] schestowitz For all this process of nomination and election before the entry into force of the UPCA, the Portugal will have no say, without an Administrative Committee member, as PT is not part of the PPA that instituted a provisionnal and partial Adminstrative Committee. Yet when signing and ratifying the UPCA, Portugal agreed on this proceeding including its involvement, and not this very same proceeding being decided between only a subset of contracting [15:18] schestowitz member of the UPCA not including it. In sum, during PPA, among others, president of the first instance court will be elected without participation of Portugal, and the effect of the nomination of this elected president will nonetheless last when the UPCA will enter into force [15:18] schestowitz Trying to shorten the example : assuming that I with a group of friends, had decided to meet for a party at 8pm, during which an election of the king of the hill is supposed to take place. If a subgroup of these friends, not including me, sub-agree to meet early at 7pm and proceed to the election of the king of the hill of the party before 8pm, I may felt that the election is not exactly fair or legal (not that I wanted to be the king of the hill [15:18] schestowitz myself, because I am a state and not a person). [15:18] schestowitz And that is only to take one example, but I suppose that a all bench of other decisions are to be taken during PPA and that will have significant effect after (otherwise there is no use of such a PPA) : [15:18] schestowitz Rules of Procedure (Art. 41 UPCA is subject to PPA) that will possibly be adopted by the Adminstrative Committee before UPCA, [15:18] schestowitz Budget Committee and other budget decision among others [15:18] schestowitz establishment of the patent mediation and arbitration centre which is then already established by virtue of the PPA, with its seats in Ljubljana and Lisbon. Its rules and list of mediators may possibly be decided by parties of the PPA (including Slovenia) but not by Portugal (Art. 35(1), (3) and (4) UPCA are subjet to PPA). [15:18] schestowitz Then why the PPA is even at all legal, if it does involve all the Contrating Members having ratified UPCA (not to mention the ones that have signed and not yet ratified, e.g. Ireland) ? [15:18] schestowitz In doubt [15:18] schestowitz MAY 20, 2022 AT 3:30 PM [15:18] schestowitz Assuming for the sake of my comment and question that the UPCA would be subject to EU law and the competency of the CJEU, how likely could it be that the CJEU may apply a dynamic interpretation of the A. 89 UPCA, i.e. an interpretation in light of the new context (Brexit) and of the will of the participating member states ? [15:18] schestowitz I was personally unaware of this type of interpretation, which may go against the initial intent of the legislator, until I saw it applied by the Enlarged Board of Appeal in decision G3/19. [15:18] schestowitz Concerned observer [15:18] schestowitz MAY 23, 2022 AT 12:59 PM [15:18] schestowitz G3/19 is a farce. It applies a type of dynamic interpretation that was invented by the EBA for the sole purpose of delivering a result that was desired by certain individuals but that flew in the face of established EBA case law. [15:18] schestowitz The dynamic interpretation invented by the EBA was based upon an alleged legislative intent. The problem in G 3/19 is that the intent was demonstrated by a body (the AC) that was NOT the legislator for the provision in question. Thus, the alleged intent simply did not exist, at least not in the circumstances of the case. [15:18] schestowitz Personally, I find the concept of legislative intent to be highly problematic. This is because the intent of legislators is expressed in LEGISLATION, and in the preparatory materials leading to that legislation. Thus, where there is no legislation there can be no legislative intent. There can, however, be an attempt by a rule-making (as opposed to legislation-passing) body to circumvent the rules by acting as if it has legislative [15:18] schestowitz powers not granted to it under the EPC. [15:18] schestowitz Regarding your point that the UPCA was made possible between EU Member States because of a special provision of the TFEU allowing it, I believe that you are referring to Article 118 TFEU (https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A12016E118). That power was exercised by the European Parliament and the Council when it passed the EU Regulations governing unitary patents. As that power cannot be exercised by the Member States, I [15:18] schestowitz do not see Art 118 TFEU as any kind of gateway to a review by the CJEU of an international agreement (such as the UPCA) concluded by such Member States. In any event, the competence of the CJEU is limited to the matters defined in the TFEU, and does not include international agreements between Member States. [15:18] -TechBytesBot/#techbytes-eur-lex.europa.eu | EUR-Lex - 12016E118 - EN - EUR-Lex [15:18] schestowitz Andre Frans [15:18] schestowitz MAY 24, 2022 AT 11:47 AM [15:18] schestowitz I do not see Art 118 TFEU as any kind of gateway to a review by the CJEU of an international agreement (such as the UPCA) concluded by such Member States. [15:18] schestowitz The CJEU could review the legality of the brute force made in the 2014 regulation (Brussels 1 recast), which falsely said that the Benelux Court of Justice AND the UPC are common courts, which is false for the UPC and true for the Benelux Court, according to the CJEU caselaw. [15:18] schestowitz The question is how to escalate this question to the CJEU, and if the deadline has not passed already (2 months after publication in the Official Journal). [15:18] schestowitz As far as I have read, this was attempted in the first constitutional complaint in Germany, but the Constitutional Court put it aside saying they dont deal with EU law problems, unless fundamental rights are involved. [15:18] schestowitz Normally when EU law questions are raised, the Court should escalate them to the CJEU. [15:18] schestowitz William Garry [15:18] schestowitz MAY 21, 2022 AT 9:21 AM [15:18] schestowitz The Legal Service of the Council already had doubts in 2011 about the design of the UPC, as revealed in this document: [15:18] schestowitz https://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-15856-2011-INIT/en/pdf [15:19] schestowitz Judith Perkins [15:19] schestowitz MAY 22, 2022 AT 12:03 PM [15:19] schestowitz it deleted footnote 23 to prevent European citizens from learning the reasons why the Legal Service had serious doubts regarding the compatibility of the UPCA with Opinion 1/09. [15:19] schestowitz Any trace of that? The whole document of the Council was LIMITE before (till when?), archive.org has the document only since 2016: [15:19] schestowitz https://web.archive.org/web/20160327190311/https://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-15856-2011-INIT/en/pdf [15:19] schestowitz Attentive Observer [15:19] schestowitz MAY 22, 2022 AT 3:30 PM [15:19] -TechBytesBot/#techbytes- ( status 500 @ https://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-15856-2011-INIT/en/pdf ) [15:19] schestowitz Coming now with the argument that the UPCA cannot be scrutinised under the VCLT is by no means convincing. [15:19] schestowitz Even in the accompanying notice for the second ratification of the UPCA by the German Parliament, the Federal Ministry of Justice mentioned that a declaration under Art 31/32 might be necessary for the provisional transfer of the duties allocated to London towards Paris and/or Munich. [15:19] schestowitz It might be possible to decide that IT replaces UK for the entry into force, but then a declaration under Art 31/32 VCLT it is certainly needed for the application of Art 89. This has been up to now been superbly ignored by the GS. [15:19] schestowitz In view of the crystal clear wording of Art 7(2) UPCA, a declaration under Art 31/32 VCLT can certainly not be used as far as the provisional transfer of the duties allocated to London towards Paris and/or Munich is concerned. It is difficult to see in how far it needs an interpreting declaration. [15:19] schestowitz In the UPCA as ratified London is mentioned expressis verbis as seat for one section of the central (?) division. No more but no less. [15:19] schestowitz I wonder by which legal gobbledygook Mr Steenbeck envisages this provisional transfer of duties. It is manifest that in its present wording the UPCA and the PPI/PPA are contrary to EU law [15:19] schestowitz If part of a ratified treaty is not in conformity with EU law, this part has to be amended and the amended version ratified anew. [15:19] schestowitz This does however not empower governments to come up with an interpreted version of the treaty so that are allowed to decide whatever they think fit just for the UPC to start. [15:19] schestowitz That Mr Montana comes from Spain does not alter in the slightest the pertinence of his comments and queries. What is at stake here is the rule of law and not what Spain wanted or not in order to participate to the UPC. [15:19] schestowitz As far as the CJEU is concerned it is to be hoped that it will not resort to something as ludicrous as a dynamic interpretation of its own case law just in order for the UPC to open its doors and works. It was bad enough at the EPO. [15:19] schestowitz I am waiting for the first defendant to argue when its comes to a PI to be executed in various member states to query the legality of the decision of the UPC. [15:19] schestowitz As in the UPCA it has been decided that it will also deal with national SPCs and in view of the numerous prejudicial questions raised by national courts on this topic, I am curious to see the reaction of the CJEU when the first prejudicial question on this topic will be forwarded by the UPC to the CJEU. [15:19] schestowitz We really live in interesting times and eventually it will have to be seen whether the UPC can go along as wished by all the lobbies supporting it. [15:19] schestowitz Patent robot [15:19] schestowitz MAY 23, 2022 AT 12:02 PM [15:19] schestowitz Juri Committee of the European Parliament The Unified Patent Court after Brexit (March 2020) [15:19] schestowitz https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/ATAG/2020/649575/IPOL_ATA(2020)649575_EN.pdf [15:19] schestowitz some consequences remain open and ultimately need a political decision: [15:19] schestowitz [] [15:19] schestowitz In case that the UK wanted to quit the UPCA, the section of the Central Division of the UPC with responsibility for life sciences, chemistry and metallurgy cases with seat in London, will have to be moved. The London section would NOT be replaced automatically with another seat, as this would need an amendment of the UPCA by UNANIMOUS agreement of all other Contracting Member States. [15:19] schestowitz Concerned observer [15:19] schestowitz MAY 24, 2022 AT 11:20 AM [15:19] schestowitz The JURI Committees assessment raises another interesting point: [15:19] schestowitz The problem is that Italy was not a signatory state in 2012 as it did not participate because of the restricted three language regime. [15:19] schestowitz As I understand it, the JURI Committee is pointing to the Article 89(1) UPCA requirement for the deposits of instruments of ratification to include those of the three Member States in which the highest number of European patents had effect IN THE YEAR PRECEDING THE YEAR IN WHICH THE SIGNATURE of the Agreement takes place. To me, this raises the question of whether there is a single, definitive year of signature of the Agreement and, if [15:19] schestowitz so, whether that is 2012 or 2016. [15:19] schestowitz Of course, revising and re-ratifying the UPCA would also solve this problem. But that will not happen because the architects of the UPC fear that such an exercise of democracy would at best further delay the arrival of, and at worst would kill, their pet project. Hence the strategy of pushing ahead regardless and kicking the can down the road with regard to serious questions regarding compliance with the rule of law. [15:19] schestowitz As recent developments regarding the Northern Ireland Protocol demonstrate, kicking troublesome cans down the road can have the effect of making it even harder to solve difficult problems. As I have previously commented, the UPC could effectively be killed by a CJEU decision in favour of a litigant challenging the jurisdiction of the UPC. If the UPC is brought into force according to the current plan, then is certain that such challenges will [15:19] schestowitz arise. Unless the architects of the UPC have a plan for persuading the CJEU not to apply its settled case law in connection with such challenges, it is hard to see how this will end in anything other than disaster. [15:19] schestowitz Andre Frans [15:19] schestowitz MAY 24, 2022 AT 10:32 AM [15:19] schestowitz It might be possible to decide that IT replaces UK for the entry into force, but then a declaration under Art 31/32 VCLT it is certainly needed for the application of Art 89. This has been up to now been superbly ignored by the GS. [15:19] schestowitz They will ignore the problems of Art89, replacing UK by Italy, as they ignored the problems on the PPI and PPA. [15:20] schestowitz " [15:37] schestowitz [02:27] [15:37] schestowitz [02:22] it irritates me to even think of people who do such stuff, horrifying [15:37] schestowitz [02:27] [02:23] btw, how much do you know about the circumstances surrounding Nat's removal? [15:37] schestowitz [02:27] [02:23] upside (side aspect), with this creep arrested his SLAPP lost teeth [15:37] schestowitz [02:27] [02:23] and he can do far less to demonise his exposers [15:37] schestowitz [02:27] [02:24] people don't believe a man in police custody [15:37] schestowitz [02:27] pasting due to disconnect [15:37] schestowitz [02:28] [02:21] Basically half of all men murder their partners previously strangled their partner [15:37] schestowitz [02:28] [02:27] The rumor is that azure is taking over github [15:40] schestowitz [02:28] maybe there was something in between those [15:42] schestowitz [02:28] yes, azure and vs code integration with github long in the making [15:42] schestowitz [02:28] vertical integration ● May 28 [17:28] *cenotaph (~sunrunner@freenode-vpo.ilk.c7v0c2.IP) has joined #techbytes ● May 28 [18:50] *cenotaph (~sunrunner@freenode-vpo.ilk.c7v0c2.IP) has left #techbytes ● May 28 [21:47] *MinceR has quit (Ping timeout: 2m30s) [21:50] *psydruid has quit (Ping timeout: 2m30s) [21:57] *psydruid (~psydruid@jevhxkzmtrbww.irc) has joined #techbytes ● May 28 [22:05] *MinceR (~mincer@bringer.of.light) has joined #techbytes [22:05] *irc.techrights.org sets mode +a #techbytes MinceR [22:38] *u-amarsh04 has quit (Quit: Konversation terminated!) ● May 28 [23:01] schestowitz https://mastodon.cloud/@Siucraym/108284777134787393 [23:01] -TechBytesBot/#techbytes-Patrick : "@tuxmachines@mastodon.technology Oh dear! " - mastodon.cloud [23:01] schestowitz "s Oh dear! " [23:01] schestowitz https://mastodon.cloud/@Siucraym/108283607021598636 [23:01] -TechBytesBot/#techbytes-Patrick : "@tuxmachines@mastodon.technology A timely congrat" - mastodon.cloud [23:01] schestowitz "A timely congrats! " [23:01] schestowitz https://infosec.exchange/@anthonyhove/108286564664033983 [23:02] -TechBytesBot/#techbytes-infosec.exchange | Anthony Hove: "@tuxmachines@mastodon.technology already! That wa" - Infosec Exchange [23:02] schestowitz "already! That was fast. [23:02] schestowitz https://mastodon.ar.al/@aral/108338771671262957 [23:02] -TechBytesBot/#techbytes-mastodon.ar.al | ar.al: "HP to release laptop running Pop!_OS. Could Syste" - Arals Mastodon [23:02] schestowitz " [23:02] schestowitz HP to release laptop running Pop!_OS. Could System76 be an acquisition target? [23:02] schestowitz (Heres hoping this doesnt go down the webOS route.) [23:02] schestowitz https://betanews.com/2022/05/20/hp-pop_os-linux-system76-dev-one/ [23:02] -TechBytesBot/#techbytes-betanews.com | HP chooses Ubuntu-based Pop!_OS Linux for its upcoming Dev One laptop -- could System76 be an acquisition target? [23:02] schestowitz Via @tuxmachines [23:02] schestowitz #system76 #hp #bigTech #linux #capitalism [23:02] schestowitz " [23:02] schestowitz https://mstdn.social/@epso/108338817268726130 [23:02] -TechBytesBot/#techbytes-mstdn.social | epso: "@aral@mastodon.ar.al @tuxmachines@mastodon.techno" - Mastodon [23:02] schestowitz let's not hope so..."" [23:02] schestowitz https://mastodon.social/@ianbetteridge/108338981247229399 [23:02] -TechBytesBot/#techbytes-mastodon.social | Ian Betteridge: "@aral@mastodon.ar.al @tuxmachines@mastodon.techno" - Mastodon [23:02] schestowitz "I still regret not getting an HP TouchPad" [23:03] schestowitz https://mastodon.tetaneutral.net/@r3vlibre/108339239773555274 [23:03] -TechBytesBot/#techbytes-mastodon.tetaneutral.net | Christophe S.IceEnchanter: "@epso@mstdn.social @aral@mastodon.ar.al @tuxmachi" - Mastodon Tetaneutral.net [23:03] schestowitz " [23:03] schestowitz @epso @aral @tuxmachines [23:03] schestowitz Oohhh, I wish not, I am glad to have them as a small independant reseller, they provide nice products. [23:03] schestowitz I like their #RightToRepair commitment, too :)b [23:03] schestowitz " [23:03] schestowitz https://mastodon.technology/@muzkore/108344904834640844 [23:03] -TechBytesBot/#techbytes-mastodon.technology | muzKore: "@aral@mastodon.ar.al @tuxmachines Agree!!!" - Mastodon for Tech Folks [23:03] schestowitz "Agree!!!"