Robbery at the European Patent Office (EPO), Office Staff as 'Prisoners'
Lies and more; we're looking at a staged 'crisis' (not the crimes) and Wyman & Mercer 'studies' as pretext for financialization of the EPO.
YESTERDAY the Central Staff Committee of the EPO published and disseminated a worrying document, outlining yet another attack by corrupt dictators (who attack EPO staff with impunity, owing to diplomatic immunity). After Benoît Battistelli had committed countless crimes and left the Office at the hands of his friend António Campinos we see that Campinos is just relentlessly crushing and robbing those who do all the real work at the Office (shouting the "F" word at staff and sending money to Belarus isn't real work, Mr. Campinos). He's eager to break laws to fake "success", e.g. by promoting European software patents (both illegal and undesirable) and he speaks in buzzwords because he has zero background in science and/or technology. He's just a very corrupt man who knows how to buy elections (bribe the voters) or participate in election-rigging ploys. Now he's going after staff's ability to retire (with the essential ability to fund the retirement and dependants). He's in effect stealing money, having already broken many laws to profit by granting/selling invalid/prohibited "products". While all the outrage is directed at Putin and 'American Putin' perhaps we should all pay closer attention to what goes at EPOnia too. It's also attacking the press*, hence it's hard to find media coverage about it. They're robbing billions of euros and the media focuses on poor people cheating the system to get a euro or two. Because those poor people aren't going to sue the media, they simply cannot afford it.
Here's the publication from the Central Staff Committee, dated yesterday.
Zentraler Personalausschuss
Central Staff Committee
Le Comité Central du PersonnelMunich, 23-01-2025
sc25007cpActuarial Study 2025
“Impact” on early retirement factors and pension ageOn 19 December 2024, the administration invited the staff representation to a meeting on the mandate given by Mr Campinos to the Actuarial Advisory Group for their 2025 study. For 2025, the mandate is updated in line with the overconservative layers of assumptions and targets resulting from the Financial Study 2023- 2024 by Oliver Wyman & Mercer. The administration expects the actuaries to find a funding gap, to recommend at least a “review” (change) of the early retirement factors and to consider an impact on the pension age.
Actuarial Study 2025: Mandate to be given to the Actuaries
The Actuarial Advisory Group (AAG) was established in 1992 and consists of three external actuaries mandated to advise the Office on the conditions to be met in order to ensure the equilibrium of its pension scheme. Since 1993, the Actuarial Advisory Group has reported every 2-3 years, for the last time in 2023.
On 19 December 2024, the administration convened a meeting of the sub-group of the General Consultative Committee on Social Security, Pensions and Remuneration (GCC- SSPR) with staff representatives. On the agenda was the mandate to be given by Mr Campinos to the actuaries for the Actuarial Study 2025. In the meeting, the administration explained that the mandate had to be updated in view of the latest Financial Study of Oliver Wyman & Mercer.
Indeed, since 2023, Mr Campinos had commissioned Oliver Wyman & Mercer to perform a Financial Study 2023-2024 Phase II1 and submitted the Office opinion on the recommendations2 to the Council. Back in May 2024, in an open letter3 to the Administrative Council, the staff representation demonstrated how Oliver Wyman & Mercer again relied on a base scenario with overconservative layers of assumptions and targets. At the time, the staff representation already strongly advised against any adversarial change to the pension benefits, tax compensation, family allowances, healthcare insurance and long-term care insurance. Nevertheless, Mr Campinos is now requesting from the AAG actuaries to perform their study along the same overconservative approach as Oliver Wyman & Mercer.
What the administration explained it will request from the AAG actuaries
A more “prudent” discount rate to align with the “risk appetite” of the Council
The discount rate is the most essential parameter of an actuarial valuation. It can be defined as what the Organisation predicts to gain in terms of interests from the investments of the
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1 CA/23/24
2 CA/39/24
3 “Comments from the staff representation on Financial Study Phase II”, CSC letter of 16-05-2024 (sc24027cl)
Reserve Funds for Pensions and Social Security (RFPSS), currently valued at 13 554 M€4. The value of the discount rate is defined with a margin of risk based on a probability rate of meeting the long-term liabilities: the higher the probability rate, the lower the discount rate.
Since 1993, the discount rate chosen by the AAG evolved as follows:
Since 2015, the administration consistently forced the AAG actuaries to lower the discount rate. The lower the discount rate, the lower the expected returns from investments and the higher the need for financial reforms.
In the last Actuarial Study 2023, the actuaries increased the discount rate from 3.00% to 3.25%5 (above the German CPI (Consumer Price Inflation)) as interest rates increased on the markets. At the time, the probability rate of meeting the long-term liabilities was set at 50%. Consequently, the actuaries recommended a decrease of the pension contributions. However, the latter did not match the narrative of management on “sustainability” to justify cuts on benefits.
For 2025, the actuaries are requested to align with the “risk appetite” of the Council. The “risk appetite” is now set at a historically low level and justified by the fact that the Member States do not accept any financial risk for them and want to impose the highest guarantees from the Office. The probability rate of meeting the long-term liability is now increased from 50% to 66%6. Although interest rates continue to rise on the markets, the “risk appetite” is the excuse for forcing a decrease of the discount rate gain.
A target funding ratio of 105% for all benefit liabilities
The funding ratio is also an essential parameter. It can be defined as the value of assets (i.e. how much is in the RFPSS) divided by past service liability7.(i.e. the rights accrued by staff up to date of valuation). In general, only a funding ratio of 80% or less shall trigger financial measures. A target funding of 100% is necessary only if one wants to be in a position to close an Organisation suddenly and to be to pay the past service liabilities of staff from the fund without any additional income.
In the last Actuarial Study 2023, the actuaries calculated a funding ratio of 96.5%8 and warned of a risk of overfunding.
For 2025, the actuaries are requested to adopt the new objective of overfunding at 105% and
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4 RFPSS/SB 67/24, p. 3/8
5 CA/52/23, par. 92
6 CA/39/24, p. 8/14, par. 12
7 CA/52/23, page 68/70
8 CA/52/23, par. 133
forced to specify any gap with the calculated funding level.
Monitor the “actuarial neutrality” of early retirement factors
Early retirement reduction factors are meant to offset the impact of the longer payment period of pensions starting at an earlier age. An early retirement factor is considered actuarially neutral if the cost of retiring at the corresponding earlier age is broadly equivalent to the cost of retiring at age 60.
In the last Actuarial Study 2023, the actuaries considered9 that the early retirement factors between 49 and 54 are lower than necessary to be actuarially neutral (i.e. bring a greater reduction than necessary) and that the ones between 55 and 59 are broadly neutral.
What the administration explained it expects to be in the report of the AAG actuaries
The combination of overconservative assumptions and targets imposed on the AAG actuaries predefines the scope of their “independence” and the administration can already anticipate the outcome of the AAG study. In the meeting of 19 December 2024, the administration explained that:
1. The actuaries will be forced to lower the discount rate below the current value of 3.25% and hence underestimate the expected returns on investment of the RFPSS although interest rates remain high on the markets
2. The actuaries are expected to find a funding gap although their last Actuarial Study 2023 had identified a risk of overfunding. The actuaries had even recommended at the time a decrease in the contributions rates for the Old Pension Scheme (OPS) and the New Pension Scheme (NPS).
3. The actuaries are expected to recommend an increase of the contribution rates for the OPS and for the NPS. Conversely, the contribution rate into the Salary Savings Plan (SSP) below the cap of 2 x G1(4) (around G8(1)) is expected to be decreased again at the expense of NPS/SSP members in the lower grades while the global increase in the contribution rate will benefit the SSP of high managers, coincidentally, the same managers who choose the very assumptions that drive the contribution rate changes.
The matter was brought by SUEPO to the attention of the Appeals Committee which provided unanimous opinions in favour of NPS/SSP members but Mr Campinos rejected
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9 CA/52/23, par. 81 to 82
the opinions and the appellants have now continued with a complaint in front of the Tribunal.
4. The actuaries are expected to find out that the early retirement factors between 55 to 59 are not actuarially neutral anymore and are expected to recommend a change of the early retirement factors. The administration even added that “when there is a change in the early retirement factors, there is a change in the pension age”
Whoever decides on the discount rate is actually the one who decides on the outcome of the Actuarial Study. The decision is in the hand of high managers in charge of financial reforms. They can therefore steer the behaviour of EPO staff on their decision to retire by changing the early retirement factors and increase the amount of cash injected into their own SSP by increasing the global contribution rate.
Did Mr Campinos ever commit not to do a pension reform?
Back in 2019, the flawed Financial Study of Oliver Wyman & Mercer proposed a list of financial measures affecting the pensions10. At the time, the CSC insisted11 that Mr Campinos clarifies his intentions concerning a pension reform and sought12 a legally binding instrument on the minimum notice period for retirement.
Mr Campinos replied by letter of 22 February 2020 and via Communiqué that “proposals to be submitted to the AC in relation to our financial future could include, for instance, transitory measures in 2020 providing for a shorter notice period of retirement”.
There is hence no promise from Campinos that he will never do a pension reform. There is only a statement that he could have allowed for a shorter notice period of retirement for 2020.
What next?
Now in 2025, Mr Campinos has mandated the Actuarial Advisory Group (AAG) to produce a report which can allow him to change at least early retirement conditions. The actuarial valuations are to be performed during the first half of 2025 and the report shall be ready by the end of July 2025.
Such a change has obviously financial implications and would therefore need to be submitted first to the Budget and Finance Committee (BFC) at the earliest on 28/29 October 2025 and afterwards to the Administrative Council at the earliest on 10/11 December 2025 for an implementation on 1 January 2026.
Mr Campinos may also consider that an additional report from financial consultants is necessary for further detailed recommendations and therefore launch the discussions in 2026 only.
Sincerely yours,
The Central Staff Committee
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10 CA/18/20, p. 7/17
11 “Your intentions concerning a pension reform”, CSC letter of 22-03-2019 (sc19046cl)
12 “Legally binding instrument sought on minimum notice period for retirement”, CSC letter of 12-02-2020 (sc20026cl)
How can the Office expect to attract/recruit suitably qualified scientists (as demanded by the EPC)? Heck, it seems like it's sort of entrapping people who would typically be eligible to retire early**. Then again, the EPO nowadays has no concerns other than increasing the number of monopolies granted each year, irrespective of their full economic impact or their legal merit. Legal basis no longer exists at the EPO, only a lust for money. That's in violation of the EPC, so today's EPO has no right to exist (anymore). It's no more legitimate than "DOGE".
A person who worked for the EPO for nearly 40 years recently called the EPO (of today) "excrement", basically based on the simple observation that it's nothing like its former self.
Here are some past articles about EPO pensions:
- Willy Minnoye, Who Helped Benoît Battistelli Break the Law and Publicly Boasted About Immunity, Wants to be 'King' of EPO Pensions
- The Pension Money That EPO Employees Might Never See
- Do Not Assume Pensions Are Safe, Especially When Managed by Mr. EPOTIF Benoît Battistelli and António Campinos
- Staff Union of the EPO (SUEPO) is Taking the New Pension Scheme (NPS) to an International Tribunal (ILOAT)
- 'New Pension Scheme': EPO Staff Faces Stubborn and Mean-Spirited Managers While Trying to Take Money Out of British Pension Schemes, Escalation to International Tribunal Next
- Staff Union of the EPO (SUEPO) Says Almost 40% of Staff in Rijswijk Has Membership and It Developed Close Relationship With the EPO Pensioners’ Association
Pensions - like other "financial nets" or "financial products" or "pots" - aren't safe. We're meant or simply expected to presume integrity, regulation, full audits and general safety, but those are feelings, not reality. Last year there was a lot of discussion about insurance policies because of a high-profile murder. Those are basically the same "industries". They give empty, false, or semi-hearted assurances; promises are to be broken (much) later. Apathy or inaction can be considered enablers of the plunder (delayed betrayal). It's very much applicable in the EU (see French and German debt skyrocketing in a failed effort to fulfil or keep up with old promises).
It took me 12 years to discover that my colleagues and I had been subjected to pension fraud. The fraudster ran away, went into hiding in another continent, escaping prosecution/arrest.
Where will the Frenchmen who ran the EPO for nearly 25 years (sans a few years of Ms. Brimelow, a Brit) be when the EPO bubble bursts? █
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* For a very long time the EPO's response to critics has been illegality to hide the illegal (Microsoft benefits from this illegality). It has long been trying to send the critics potent and expensive threats (need to hire lawyers), even to official media organisations, and Team UPC did the same (they try to terrorise those who merely point out UPC is illegal and Team UPC gleefully promotes an illegality). Then there's the 'boomerang litigant' who thinks he can harass and defame a person for 13 years, then claim that his victim of harassment is somehow the problem [1, 2]. Maybe by year's end the 'boomerang litigant' will receive a 6-figure bill from us, not a 6-figure salary. Europe does not have 'free press'; no more than Russia has it, except it's buried under some additional layers of bureaucracy.
** It should be noted that, and perhaps needless to say, this is part of a global trend. In France they want people to work for longer and longer (till they die) while funding for retired people has not been keeping up with soaring inflation rates, which means people can sometimes not retire at all. On top of it, public health services deteriorate through defunding and/or privatisation, which means that a lack of money leads to earlier deaths or much worse lifestyles. New reports from the US indicate that the longevity gap grows based on one's financial situation. It's like "class-based" eugenics. They kill the poor.