European Patent Office (EPO) Series: The Importance of Having "Pals from the Palacete"
Part 9
Antonio Costa in his capacity as caretaker Prime Minister receives his successor elect, Luís Montenegro, for a meeting at the Sao Bento Mansion in March 2024.
In the preceding parts we took a detour to explore the Portuguese party political landscape, focusing primarily on the roles of two prominent members of the "Brotherhood of São Bento", namely the former Prime Minister, António Costa, and his successor, Luís Montenegro.
In the decades following the Carnation Revolution of 1974, Portuguese politics have essentially been characterised by a bipartisan system in which the reins of power have alternated between the centre-left PS and the centre-right PSD apart from one occasion when the two parties shared power in a "grand coalition" that governed for a relatively short period between 1983 and 1985.
The surge in support for the right-wing populist Chega in the most recent May 2025 election may be indicative of a shift towards a tripartite parliamentary landscape, with the centre-left, the centre-right, and the populist-right forming three distinct and competing blocs. But it is too early to draw any firm conclusions in this regard and we do not need to concern ourselves with it here. For the immediate future, the traditional bipartisan system still remains more or less intact, even if it may be under threat in the longer term.
The two main established centrist parties — the PS and the PSD — compete intensely for power on the domestic stage. But when it comes to matters of international policy, including European affairs, bipartisan co-operation tends to be the order of the day, with both parties typically following a common line where Portuguese interests are perceived to be at stake. Indeed, the results of the May 2025 election could act as an incentive for these parties to co-operate more closely with each other as part of a joint strategy to counter the perceived threat from the populist-right.
But what is the significance of all this for António Campinos and his reappointment bid at the European Patent Office?
To answer this question we have to start by looking at what Campinos needs in terms of political support if he wants to secure his reappointment.
In order to be eligible to seek reappointment, Campinos first of all needs an endorsement from the government of the country of his officially declared nationality, i.e. Portugal.
This means that as long as Luís Montenegro's minority centre-right government remains in power in Lisbon, Campinos needs to be able to count on the backing of Montengro and his cabinet.
In addition to obtaining endorsement from the government of his "home country", Campinos also requires the support of three-quarters of the EPO contracting states.
The European Patent Organisation currently has 39 contracting states. This means that Campinos would need 29 votes to secure a three-quarters majority on the Administrative Council and this is where António Costa could prove to be a vital ally.
As is generally known, the European Patent Organisation (EPOrg) is not an EU institution. Nevertheless, the 27 member states of the European Union are contracting states of the EPOrg. To the extent that these EU states are prepared to act in concert they can effectively command a majority on the Administrative Council of the EPOrg.
As President of the European Council, Costa enjoys significant political "clout" among the leaders of the member states of the EU. If Costa were sympathetic to Campinos and could be persuaded to support his reappointment bid, then he could play an important role as an influential "sponsor" for Campinos in the corridors of power at Brussels.
Assuming that Costa was able to prevail upon all (or most) of the 27 EU member states to agree to support Campinos, then this would bring the EPO President very close to the 29 votes that he needs to secure reappointment.
Assuming that Campinos – with the support of Costa – could count on bagging all (or most) of the 27 EU votes on the EPO's Administrative Council, then it would be relatively trivial task for him to top this up with a few extra votes from "microstates", such as Monaco and San Marino, or from some of the non-EU "captured states" of the EPO's "Balkan League", such as Northern Macedonia, Montenegro, or Albania.
The essential point here is that, for his reappointment bid to succeed, Campinos will need to be able to rely on the support of both the Portuguese Prime Minister, Luís Montenegro, and the President of the European Council, António Costa.
In the next part, we will consider to what extent these "Pals from the Palacete" are likely to support Campinos. █
Previously: