The debian-private mailing list leak, part 1. Volunteers have complained about Blackmail. Lynchings. Character assassination. Defamation. Cyberbullying. Volunteers who gave many years of their lives are picked out at random for cruel social experiments. The former DPL's girlfriend Molly de Blanc is given volunteers to experiment on for her crazy talks. These volunteers never consented to be used like lab rats. We don't either. debian-private can no longer be a safe space for the cabal. Let these monsters have nowhere to hide. Volunteers are not disposable. We stand with the victims.

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Re: Bug#11120: Fwd: [linux-security] so-called snprintf() in db-1.85.4



On Jul 9, Mark W. Eichin wrote
> > consequences of this bug are obvious: Any program which is
> > linked with libdb.so.1.85.4 and relies on snprintf(3) to do
> > it's bounds checking doesn't have any bounds checking at all.
> 
> yep, appears to be in the libdb package.  I'll fix it tonight; shall I
> squeak it in with a "stable" distribution?  And can someone double
> check that the libc6 db doesn't have this bug? (it probably doesn't,
> but it's worth checking.)
> 
> % nm -por /usr/lib/libdb.a | grep snp
> /usr/lib/libdb.a:bt_open.o:         U snprintf
> /usr/lib/libdb.a:snprintf.o:00000000 t gcc2_compiled.
> /usr/lib/libdb.a:snprintf.o:00000000 T snprintf
> /usr/lib/libdb.a:snprintf.o:         U vsprintf
> /usr/lib/libdb.a:snprintf.o:00000020 T vsnprintf

Ick!!

Yes, please tag it stable. And don't forget to fix both the dynamic and the
static libraries. And the change should be <ahem> propagated back to the
upstream author. He's probably heard about it by now, but it never hurts to
make sure.

Hopefully not too many suid root programs use libdb. And hopefully none of
those programs were linked statically with libdb.

I checked libc6's libdb and it doesn't suffer from that bug.

Thanks,

  Christian
  Debian Security Officer.

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