The debian-private mailing list leak, part 1. Volunteers have complained about Blackmail. Lynchings. Character assassination. Defamation. Cyberbullying. Volunteers who gave many years of their lives are picked out at random for cruel social experiments. The former DPL's girlfriend Molly de Blanc is given volunteers to experiment on for her crazy talks. These volunteers never consented to be used like lab rats. We don't either. debian-private can no longer be a safe space for the cabal. Let these monsters have nowhere to hide. Volunteers are not disposable. We stand with the victims.
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Re: Buffer overruns etc.

On Monday, July 21, Thomas Koenig wrote
> Folks,
> 
> as the recent ld.so thing shows, we have too many buffer overruns
> in our code.  I think it's time to really start looking into this
> kind of problem seriously.
> 
> I propose that we form a group which goes through all security-relevant
> source code with a fine comb, looks for possible weaknesses, and then
> takes appropriate action.  Could somebody please create an appropriate
> mailing list, and subscribe me?

I've been jealous of the OpenBSD security code reviews ever since I heard
about them. It'd be great if Debian could get something similar
going. Pete's not at his office these days, but if there's enough interest
I'll ask him for a debian-security list when he gets back. (It'd fit nicely
between debian-security-announce and debian-security-private, too.) 

Does someone here know people that work on OpenBSD? It'd be nice if we
could benefit from their experience in running a security review. (It'd be
even nicer if we could have access to their security patches, of course.)
Any other resources on the net for security reviews?

Another idea, how hard would it be to write a wrapper around libc that logs
calls to known problem functions (say, strcpy). It could give us an idea of
where to start... if we see that a setuid root program is doing truckloads
of calls to strcpy and none to strncpy, we might want to start looking
there for potential buffer overflow problems. Or calls to
fopen("/tmp/something"), etc.

  Christian

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