1237 (CCPA 1978); In re Walter, 618 F.2d 758 (CCPA 1980); and In re Abele, 684 F.2d
902 (CCPA 1982). This test, in its final form, had two steps: (1) determining whether
the claim recites an "algorithm" within the meaning of Benson, then (2) determining
whether that algorithm is "applied in any manner to physical elements or process steps."
Abele, 684 F.2d at 905-07.
Some may question the continued viability of this test, arguing that it appears to
conflict with the Supreme Court's proscription against dissecting a claim and evaluating
patent-eligibility on the basis of individual limitations. See Flook, 437 U.S. at 594
(requiring analysis of claim as a whole in ยง 101 analysis); see also AT&T, 172 F.3d at
1359; State St., 149 F.3d at 1374. In light of the present opinion, we conclude that the
Freeman-Walter-Abele test is inadequate. Indeed, we have already recognized that a
claim failing that test may nonetheless be patent-eligible. See In re Grams, 888 F.2d
835, 838-39 (Fed. Cir. 1989). Rather, the machine-or-transformation test is the
applicable test for patent-eligible subject matter.
The second articulation we now revisit is the "useful, concrete, and tangible
result" language associated with State Street, although first set forth in Alappat. State
St., 149 F.3d at 1373 ("Today, we hold that the transformation of data, representing
discrete dollar amounts, by a machine through a series of mathematical calculations
into a final share price, constitutes a [patent-eligible invention] because it produces 'a
useful, concrete and tangible result' . . . .");
Alappat, 33 F.3d at 1544 ("This is not a
17
Therefore, in Abele, Meyer, Grams, Arrhythmia Research Technology, Inc.
v. Corazonix Corp., 958 F.2d 1053 (Fed. Cir. 1992), and other decisions, those portions
relying solely on the Freeman-Walter-Abele test should no longer be relied on.
18
In State Street, as is often forgotten, we addressed a claim drawn not to a
process but to a machine. 149 F.3d at 1371-72 (holding that the means-plus-function
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