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Lastly, we address a possible misunderstanding of our decision in Comiskey.  
Some may suggest that Comiskey implicitly applied a new § 101 test that bars any 
claim reciting a mental process that lacks significant "physical steps."  We did not so 
hold, nor did we announce any new test at all in Comiskey.  Rather, we simply 
recognized that the Supreme Court has held that mental processes, like fundamental 
principles, are excluded by § 101 because "'[p]henomena of nature, though just 
discovered, mental processes, and abstract intellectual concepts . . . are the basic tools 
of scientific and technological work.'"  Comiskey, 499 F.3d at 1377 (quoting Benson, 
409 U.S. at 67) (emphasis added).  And we actually applied the machine-or-
transformation test to determine whether various claims at issue were drawn to patent-
eligible subject matter.
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  Id. at 1379 ("Comiskey has conceded that these claims do not 
require a machine, and these claims evidently do not describe a process of manufacture 
or a process for the alteration of a composition of matter.").  Because those claims failed 
the machine-or-transformation test, we held that they were drawn solely to a 
fundamental principle, the mental process of arbitrating a dispute, and were thus not 
patent-eligible under § 101.  Id. 
                                                                                                                                             
See, e.g., Br. of Amicus Curiae End Software Patents; Br. of Amicus Curiae Red Hat, 
Inc. at 4-7.  We also note that the process claim at issue in this appeal is not, in any 
event, a software claim.  Thus, the facts here would be largely unhelpful in illuminating 
the distinctions between those software claims that are patent-eligible and those that 
are not. 
 
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Our statement in Comiskey that "a claim reciting an algorithm or abstract 
idea can state statutory subject matter only if, as employed in the process, it is 
embodied in, operates on, transforms, or otherwise involves another class of statutory 
subject matter, i.e., a machine, manufacture, or composition of matter," 499 F.3d at 
1376, was simply a summarization of the Supreme Court's machine-or-transformation 
test and should not be understood as altering that test. 
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