THE series may not culminate in this part which is longer than the rest (see introduction; part 1; part 2; part 3; part 4). Based on documents declassified/released after a review 6 years ago we see "arms control" talks that involve Watson Jr. from IBM, a company that profited from nuclear stockpiling (see prior parts). Here's the raw document:
The key part is highlighted below:
1. PLEASE ACCREDIT USDEL TO SUBJECT MEETING AS FOLLOWS: REPRESENTATIVES THE HONORABLE ADRIAN FISHER AMBASSADOR U.S. REPRESENTATIVE TO THE COMMITTEE ON DISARMAMENT GEORGE M. SEIGNIOUS II DIRECTOR ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY (HEAD OF DELEGATION, EX OFFICIO WHEN IN ATTENDANCE) UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIEDSTATE 011288
ALTERNATE REPRESENTATIVE CHARLES FLOWERREE ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY ADVISERS ALEXANDER AKALOVSKY ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY
Sheryl P. Walter Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 20 Mar 2014
Sheryl P. Walter Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 20 Mar 2014
CHARLES BAY, COLONEL OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE THOMAS F. BARTHELEMY (JANUARY 24 - FEBRUARY 9) ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY MATTHEW DALEY (MARCH 5 - APRIL 13) ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY ROGER HAGENGRUBER DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY ROBERT P. MIKULAK (MARCH 5 - APRIL 13) ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY BLAIR L. MURRAY (JANUARY 24 - MARCH 2) ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY MANUEL L. SANCHES, COLONEL JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE THOMAS WATSON CHAIRMAN OF THE GENERAL ADVISORY COMMITTEE UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED PAGE 03
STATE 011288
ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY ADAM YARMOLINSKY COUNSELOR ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY 2. MISSION IS REMINDED THAT ONLY OFFICIALLY ACCREDITED MEMBERS OF THE DELEGATION ARE AUTHORIZED TO PARTICIPATE IN CONFERENCE SESSIONS (11 FAM 633.1). 3. HEAD OF DELEGATION SHOULD BE REMINDED BEFORE DEPARTURE THAT A TELEGRAPHIC SUMMARY REPORT OF CONFERENCE RESULTS IS REQUIRED. VANCE
UNCLASSIFIED
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Sheryl P. Walter Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 20 Mar 2014
Sheryl P. Walter Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 20 Mar 2014
Sheryl P. Walter Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 20 Mar 2014
Sheryl P. Walter Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 20 Mar 2014
1. SUMMARY: US DEL PRESENTED TEXT OF INFORMAL, PRELIMINARY IDEAS FOR INITIAL AGREEMENT AND ASKED FOR SOVIET IDEAS. REMAINDER OF PLENARY TAKEN UP BY DISCUSSION OF POINTS IN U.S. TEXT. END SUMMARY. 2. FIFTH PLENARY MEETING HELD AT U.S. EMBASSY ON FEBRUARY 2, 1979, FROM 1500 TO 1815. THOMAS WATSON, SECRET SECRET PAGE 02
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CHAIRMAN, GENERAL ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT, AND WILLIAM JACKSON, ACDA, ATTENDED FIRST PART OF MEETING. 3. BUCHHEIM STATED U.S. HAD PUT SOME PRELIMINARY, TENTATIVE IDEAS ON PAPER FOR DISCUSSION BY BOTH SIDES, ALONG THE LINES OF EXAMPLE OF SOVIET SIDE. HE THEN
Sheryl P. Walter Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 20 Mar 2014
Sheryl P. Walter Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 20 Mar 2014 PASSED COPIES OF NON-PAPER TO KHLESTOV. TEXT WAS ON ONE PAGE, UNLABELED, UNDATED, WITH TWO ELEMENTS SEPARATED. A. TEXT OF FIRST ELEMENT FOLLOWS: BEGIN TEXT. EACH PARTY UNDERTAKES NOT TO DESTROY, DAMAGE, OR CHANGE THE TRAJECTORY OF, AND OBJECT WHICH HAS BEEN PLACED IN ORBIT AROUND THE EARTH OR ON ANY OTHER TRAJECTORY INTO OUTER SPACE UNLESS SUCH OBJECT HAS BEEN ENTERED ON THE REGISTRY OF THAT PARTY IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE CONVENTION ON REGISTRATION OF OBJECTS LAUNCHED INTO OUTER SPACE, EXCEPT THAT EITHER PARTY OR THE PARTIES ACTING TOGETHER MAY CHANGE THE TRAJECTORY OF AN OBJECT WHICH HAS BEEN PLACED IN ORBIT AROUND THE EARTH OR ON ANY OTHER TRAJECTORY INTO OUTER SPACE WITH THE AGREEMENT OF THE STATE ON WHOSE REGISTRY SUCH OBJECT HAS BEEN ENTERED. END TEXT. B. TEXT OF SECOND ELEMENT FOLLOWS: BEGIN TEXT. EACH PARTY UNDERTAKES, FOR A PERIOD OF ONE YEAR FROM THE DATE OF THIS AGEEMENT, NOT TO LAUNCH, FOR TEST OR ANY OTHER PURPOSES,AN INTERCEPTOR MISSILE FOR DESTROYING OR DAMAGING OBJECTS WHICH HAVE BEEN PLACED IN ORBIT AROUND THE EARTH OR ON ANY OTHER TRASECRET SECRET PAGE 03
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JECTORIES INTO OUTER SPACE. END TEXT. 4. IDENTITY OF OBJECTS. KHLESTOV'S OPENING QUESTIONS CONCERNED IDENTITY OF OBJECTS COVERED (NOT TO CARRY OUT ACTS "UNLESS SUCH OBJECT HAS BEEN ENTERED ON THE REGISTRY OF THAT PARTY"). BUCHHEIM EXPLAINED THAT ESSENCE OF IDEA WAS THAT U.S. WOULD UNDERTAKE NOT TO CARRY OUT CERTAIN ACTS AGAINST ANY OBJECT, EXCEPT THAT U.S. WOULD RETAIN RIGHT TO CARRY OUT SUCH ACTS AGAINST OBJECTS ON U.S. REGISTRY, AND USSR WOULD UNDERTAKE CORRESPONDING OBLIGAIONS. HE SAID, AS AN ILLUSTRATION, THAT IT IS NOT UNUSUAL TO PLACE AN OBJECT IN ORBIT AND SOMETIME LATER USE ON-BOARD PROPULSION UNIT TO CHANGE OBJECT'S ORBIT. THIS IS A LEGITIMATE AND COMMON PRACTICE WHICH SHOULD BE RECOGNIZED AND NOT PROHIBITED. KHLESTOV INDICATED THE SOVIET SIDE UNDERSTOOD. 5. DAMAGE AND DESTRUCTION. KHLESTOV THEN QUESTIONED EXACTLY WHAT U.S. SIDE MEANT BY TERM "NOT TO DESTROY, DAMAGE...ANY OBJECT." HIS PRINCIPAL QUESTION, ARTICULATED IN VARIOUS FORMS, WAS WHETHER U.S. TEXT MEANT SAME AS SOVIET TERMS "DAMAGE TO THE INTEGRITY OF A
Sheryl P. Walter Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 20 Mar 2014
Sheryl P. Walter Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 20 Mar 2014
SPACE OBJECT" AND "DISABLEMENT OF ITS ON-BOARD EQUIPMENT" (SEE ASAT TWO 005, BERN 528, PARA 11). A. BUCHHEIM SAID "DESTROY" MEANS TOTAL DESTRUCTION AND "DAMAGE" MEANS PARTIAL DESTRUCTION. FOR PURPOSES OF CLARITY AND COMPETENESS U.S. SIDE INCLUDED BOTH TERMS; ALTHOUGH "DAMAGE" BY ITSELF MIGHT BE SUFFICIENT, U.S. WOULD PREFER NOT TO SEEM TO LEAVE A "LOOPHOLE" BY PROHIBITING DAMAGE AND NOT PROHIBITING TOTAL DESTRUCTION. U.S. SEES AN OBJECT IN SPACE AS A WHOLE UNIT, AND DAMAGE TO ANY PART IS DAMAGE TO THE OBJECT. AS EXAMPLE, BUCHHEIM SAID THAT IF HE WERE TO PUT AN EGG IN THE DRINKING GLASS BEFORE HIM AND PUT THE COMBINATION IN ORBIT, "DAMAGE TO THE OBJECT" WOULD MEAN SECRET SECRET PAGE 04
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BREAKING THE GLASS, OR CHIPPING THE RIM, OR BREAKING THE EGG IN IT. B. KHLESTOV STILL WAS NOT CONVINCED HE CLEARLY UNDERSTOOD U.S. CONCEPT. HE SAID SOVIET APPROACH WAS THAT NOTHING CAN BE DONE TO THE OBJECT--NOT TO DAMAGE IT, NOT TO DESTROY IT, OR NOT TO DISABLE ON-BOARD
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Sheryl P. Walter Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 20 Mar 2014
Sheryl P. Walter Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 20 Mar 2014
EXDIS EQUIPMENT. IN RESPONSE TO HIS QUESTION OF HOW U.S. CONSIDERS A PIECE BROKEN OFF THE SIDE OF AN OBJECT, BUCHHEIM SAID U.S. VIEWS ON THAT ARE SAME AS SOVIET VIEWS AND SUCH DAMAGE WOULD NOT BE ALLOWED. KHLESTOV CONTINED TO ASK QUESTIONS AS TO WHETHER EQUIPMENT ON OUTSIDE AS WELL AS "STUFFING" INSIDE SHELL OF OBJECT WOLD BE COVERED. C. BUCHHEIM ELABORATED ON EGG IN GLASS EXAMPLE BY SAYING THAT IF OBJECT WERE ORBITED WHICH CONSISTED OF A TIN CAN WITH WALNUT ON ITS OUTSIDE AND DRINKING GLASS WERE INSIDE CAN AND CONTAINED AN EGG WITH A CHICK INSIDE, THEN ALL WOULD BE COVERED UNDER AGREEMENT AND NO DAMAGE COULD BE DONE TO ANY OF THESE. KHLESTOV STILL CONTINUED TO PROBE U.S. INTENT BY ASKING IF U.S. FORMULATION WOULD PROHIBIT NOT ONLY PHYSICAL DAMAGE TO OUTER SHELL OF OBJECT BUT ALSO THOSE ACTIVITIES WHICH WOULD LEAD TO DISRUPTION OF NORMAL FUNCTIONING OF INTERNAL EQUIPMENT. (KHLESTOV ASKED ABOUT FUNCTIONING OF INTERNAL EQUIPMENT SECRET SECRET PAGE 02
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IN A VARIETY OF WAYS.) BUCHHEIM ASKED IF KHLESTOV MEANT ONE WAS NOT ALLOWED TO SHAKE GLASS AND BREAK THE EGG INSIDE. MAYORSKY INTERJECTED A QUESTION IN ENGLISH, "HOW ABOUT SHAKING THE GLASS AND GIVING THE CHICKEN A HEADACHE?" BUCHHEIM ASKED IF THAT WAS WHAT THE SOVIET SIDE MEANT. MAYORSKIY SAID, "MORE OR LESS." BUCHHEIM SIAD THAT THE SOVIET SIDE SHOULD SAY WHETHER THAT IS WHAT THEY MEANT SINCE THERE SEEMS TO BE SOME UNCERTAINTY IN THEIR MEANING. KHLESTOV SAID THE MOST IMPORTANT WORD WAS "DAMAGE" AND IT WAS NECESSARY TO BE CLEAR ON IT. BUCHHEIM SAID KHLESTOV SHOULD TELL HIM WHAT THE WORD "DISABLE" MEANT. D. FOLLOWING THIS PRELIMINARY EXCHANGE, KHLESTOV CHANGED THE CHARACTER OF HIS QUESTIONS AND DESCRIBED TWO SPECIFIC SITUATIONS. THE FIRST SITUATION IS WHEN A PIECE HAS BEEN BROKEN OFF THE OBJECT, PIECES HAVE BEEN BROKEN OFF OBJECTS ON THE SURFACE OF THAT OBJECT, OR WHEN THE SURFACE OF THE OBJECT IS DAMAGED IN SUCH A WAY THAT CONTENTS HAVE BEEN DAMAGED-THAT IS ONE STATE. KHLESTOV SAID THE SECOND SITUATION WAS ONE WHEN PHYSICALLY THE OBJECT IS INTACT--THE SURFACE OF THE OBJECT IS INTACT--BUT THE CONTENTS START MALFUNCTIONING, THEY CEASE TO FUNCTION NORMALLY, ON-BOARD EQUIPMENT IS NOT FUNCTIONING. ALTHOUGH YOU HAVE STRUCTURAL INTEGRITY INTACT, THE ON-BOARD EQUIPMENT IS NOT FUNCTIONING, THE
Sheryl P. Walter Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 20 Mar 2014
Sheryl P. Walter Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 20 Mar 2014
INTERNAL EQUIPMENT CEASES TO FUNCTION NORMALLY. DID U.S. MEAN BOTH CASES WOULD NOT BE ALLOWED WHEN IT USED TERM "DAMAGE" IN ITS FORMULATION? BUCHHEIM SAID HE WOULD REPEAT BACK TO SEE IF HE UNDERSTOOD WHAT KHLESTOV HAD JUST SAID. THE FIRST CASE WAS ONE IN WHICH THE PHYSICAL STATE OF THE SURFACE OF AN OJBECT, OR OF THE EQUIPENT MOUNTED ON THE OUTSIDE OF THE OBJECT, OR OF SECRET SECRET PAGE 03
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THE EQUIPMENT INSIDE THE OBJECT WAS CHANGED. DID KHLESTOV MEAN THAT? KHLESTOV AGREED. BUCHHEIM CONTINUED BY SAYING THE SECOND CASE WAS ONE IN WHICH THE OBJECT AND ITS PARTS REMAINED PNYSICALLY INTACT BUT THE EQUIPMENT MOUNTED OUTSIDE OR INSDE CEASED TO FUNCTION NORMALLY. WAS THAT CORRECT? KHLESTOV SAID YES. BUCHHEIM SAID THAT THOSE TWO CASES TOGETHER WAER A GOOD ESCRIPTION OF WHAT WE MEANT BY DAMAGE. KHLESTOV REPLIED THAT WE HAVE IDENTICAL UNDERSTANDINGS. E. KHLESTOV STATED THAT SOVIET FORMULATION "DAMAGE TO THE INTEGRITY" AND "DISABLEMENT OF ITS ONBOARD EQUIPMENT" WERE BETTER. THE "INTEGRITY" FORMULATION MEANS THT PHYSICAL STATE. THE LATTER PHRASE, "DISABLEMENT," SPEAKS TO THE SECOND CASE--THAT THE EQUIPMENT INSIDE OR OUT CEASES TO FUNCTION NORMALLY, HAS BEEN MADE UNOPERATIONAL. 6. TRAJECTORY - DISPLACEMENT. KHLESTOV BEGAN DISCUSSION ON COMPARISION OF U.S. GERM "NOT TO...CHANGE THE TRAJECTORY OF ANY OBJECT WHICH HAS BEEN PLACED IN ORBIT AROUND THE EARTH OR ON ANY OTHER TRAJECTORY INTO OUTER SPACE" WITH SOVIET TERM PROHIBITING "DISPLACEMENT FROM ORBIT" (ASAT TWO 005, PARA 11). A. BUCHHEIM STATED THAT ESSENCE IS WE SHOULD NOT DISTURB THE ORBIT OF OBJECT IN ORBIT AND ALSO SHOULD NOT DISTURB TRAJECTORY OF OBJECT GOING OFF INTO DEEP SPACE; AND THAT U.S. SIDE HAD USED "NOT TO...CHANGE THE TRAJECTORY" BECAUSE "TRAJECTORY"IS THE GENERAL TERM WHICH INCLUDES "ORBIT." HE ADDED THAT SOVIET LANGUAGE WOULD PROHIBIT CHANGING THE ORBIT OF AN OBJECT IN ORBIT BUT WOULD NOT PROHIBIT CHANGING TRAJECTORIES OF OBJECTS IN OTHER KINDS OF FLIGHT PATHS IN OUTER SPACE. SUBSEQUENT CONVERSATION CLARIFIED NUANCE IN ENGLISH SECRET SECRET PAGE 04
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Sheryl P. Walter Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 20 Mar 2014
Sheryl P. Walter Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 20 Mar 2014
TEXT ("ANY OBJECT WHICH HAS BEEN PLACED") TO MAKE CLEAR TO KHLESTOV THAT ANY OBJECT WHICH HAD LANDED ON MOON OR ANY OTHER CELESTIAL BODY WOULD COME UNDER COVERAGE OF U.S. FORMULATION BECAUSE IT HAD PREVIOUSLY BEEN "PLACED...ON...(/) TRAJECTORY INTO OUTER SPACE." BOTH AGREED THAT OBJECTS IN ORBIT AROUND THE EARTH AND ON OTHER TRAJECTORIES IN OUTER SPACE WERE TO BE COVERED UNDER THE POTENTIAL AGREEMENT. B. VIGOROUS DISCUSSION ENSUED CONCERNING AT WHAT POINT AN OBJECT "HAS BEEN PLACED...ON ANH OTHER TRAJECTORY INTO OUTER SPACE." SOVIETS WOULD EXCLUDE ANY OBJECT WHICH HAD NOT ENTERED INTO EARTH ORBIT OR HAD NOT YET ACHIEVED THE ALTITUDE OF THE LOWEST POSSIBLE ORBIT IF ON A TRAJECTORY INTO OUTER SPACE. MAYORSKIY
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Sheryl P. Walter Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 20 Mar 2014
Sheryl P. Walter Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 20 Mar 2014
C. BUCCHEIM SAID HE DID NOT BELIEVE IT NECESSARY TO DEAL WITH QUESTION OF WHERE AN OBJECT "BEGINS" ITS TRAJECTORY INTO OUTER SPACE. HE STATED THAT THE MOMENT WHEN AN OBJECT HAS BEEN PLACED ON A TRAJECTORY INTO OUTER SPACE IS UNIQUE IN EVERY CASE AND NOT HARD TO UNDERSTAND. OPERATORS ON GROUND CAN DETERMINE THE MOMENT IN TIME WHEN AN OBJECT HAS BEEN PLACED IN ORBIT AND WHEN AN OBJECT HAS BEEN PLACED IN A "TRAJECTORY INTO OUTER SPACE." HOWEVER, BUCHHEIM SAID, THE SOVIET VIEWPOINT INVOLVES AN ARBITRARY FORMULATION OF WHERE A TRAJECTORY INTO OUTER SPACE BEGINS. SECRET SECRET PAGE 02
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7. EXTENT OF COVERAGE. KHLESTOV NOTED THAT U.S. TEXT HAS COMPLETELY DIFFERENT APPROACH REGARDING THOSE OBJECTS COVERED BY THE REGIME OF THE POTENTIAL AGREEMENT. (COMMENT: U.S.-SUGGESTED TEXT WOULD PROHIBIT ACTS BY A PARTY AGAINST "ANY OBJECT" NOT ITS OWN BUT USSR WOULD PROHIBIT ACTS AGAINST ONLY EACH OTHER'S OBUECTS.) KHLESTOV BREEFLY REPEATED PREVIOUSLY EXPRESSED VIEWS CONCERNING THE OBLIGATIONS OF A PARTY TO A BILATERAL AGREEMENT WITH RESPECT TO OBJECTS OF THIRD PARTIES (SEE ASAT TWO 014 BERN 627). HE INDICATED SOVDEL WOULD FURTHER ANALYZE U.S. TEXT AND REPLY IN FUTURE. 8. TEST SUSPENSION. A. KHLESTOV BEGAN DISCUSSIONS ON THIS TOPIC BY STATING U.S. SIDE IN VARIOUS STATEMENS HAD USED FOUR DIFFERENT TERMS IN REGARD TO TESTING: (1) "TO SUSPEND TESTING ANTI-SATELLIGE SYSTEMS"; (2) "TO CEASE OR STOP TESTING ANTI-SATELLITE INTERCEPTOR SYSTEMS"; (3) "ANTI-SATELLITE MISSILE INTERCEPTORS" OR "INTERCEPTOR MISSILE" USED IN TEXT TODAY, AND (4) "TO REFRAIN FROM LAUNCHING MISSILES REGARDLESS OF WHETHER THEY ARE INTERCEPTORS OR NOT." WHICH IS THE CLEAREST FORMULATION OF THE U.S., SHOWING ITS APPROACH? B. BUCHHEIM RESPONDED THAT THE TERMS "INTERCEPTOR" AND "INTERCEPTOR MISSILE" ARE PRECISELY IDENTICAL IN AMERICAN USAGE. U.S. HAD SAID AT FEBRUARY 1, 1979, PLENARY (ASAT TWO 015, PARA 12) THAT PROHIBITION ON TESTING ASAT SYSTEMS SHOULD BE AN ELEMENT OF A COMPREHENSIVE AGREEMENT. IDEA OF SUSPENDING TESTS FOR SECRET SECRET
Sheryl P. Walter Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 20 Mar 2014
Sheryl P. Walter Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 20 Mar 2014
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ONE YEAR WAS IN CONTEXT OF IDEA OF INITIAL AGREEMENT OF LESSER SCOPE THAN COMPREHENSIVE AGREEMENT. REFERRING TO KHLESTOV'S QUESTION ON FEBRUARY 1 FOR SPECIFIC U.S. IDEA IN PARCTICAL TERMS, U.S. SIDE HAD SAID IT THOUGHT A PRACTICAL WAY TO IMPLEMENT THE OBJECTIVE OF SUSPENDING ANTI-SATELLIGE SYSTEM TESTS WOULD BE TO REFRAIN FROM LAUNCHING ANY ANTI-SATELLITE INTERCEPTOR MISSILES FOR ONE YEAR AS AN ELEMENT IN AN INITIAL AGREEMENT, IF AN INITIAL AGREEMENT IS OF INTEREST TO SOVIET SIDE. BUCHHEIM STRESSED THAT U.S. IS TALKING SPECIFICALLY ABOUT ANTI-SATELLITE INTERCEPTOR MISSILES AND HAS NOT MACE REFERENCE TO ANY OTHER KINDS OF MISSILES OTHER THAN ANTI-SATELLITE INTERCEPTOR MISSILES. IT IS U.S. VIEW THAT NO ANTI-SATELLITE INTERCEPTOR MISSILES SHOULD BE LAUNCHED FOR ANY REASON. C. BUCHHEIM SAID THIS IDEA WAS SUGGESTED AS A SPECIFIC NARROW UNDERTAKING FOR PURPOSE OF AN INITIAL AGREEMENT--SHOULD THE SOVIET SIDE BE INTERESTED IN AN INITIAL AGREEMENT. 9. EFFECTIVE DATE. KHLESTOV SAID HE UNDERSTOOD THAT THE TWO PARTS OF THE TEXT WERE TWO ELEMENTSOF AN INITIAL AGREEMENT WHICH THE U.S. SIDE HAD MENTIONED. HE NOTED THAT THE DURATION OF A TEST SUSPENSION WAS FOR ONE YEAR AND ASKED WHAT DATE THE U.S. SIDE HAD IN MIND FOR THE BEGINNING OF A TEST SUSPENSION. BUCHHEIM RESPONDED THAT THIS WAS OBVIOUSLY A MATTER FOR THE TWO SIDES TO DECIDE TOGETHER. HE SAID THAT HE PRESENTLY HAD NO VIEWS ON THE FORM OF AN AGREEMENT, ON WHEN TO PLACE AN AGREEMENT INTO FORCE, NOR EVEN WHEN THESE TALKS WOULD MATURE SUFFICIENTLY TO PRODUCE A PRODUCT WHICH MIGHT BE PUT INTO FORCE. IT MIGHT, FOR EXAMPLE, BE POSSIBLE TO PUT SOME KIND OF INITIAL AGREEMENT INTO FORCE AS OF THE DATE OF SIGNATURE, BUT THAT IS NOT CLEAR. REFERRING TO A TEST SECRET SECRET PAGE 04
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SUSEPNSION, KHLESTOV ASKED WHEN WOULD THE ONE YEAR BEGIN. BUCHHEIM SAID HE COULD NOT ANSEWER AT PRESENT. KHLESTOV ASKED WHAT OTHER ELEMENTS MIVHT BE IN AN INITIAL AGREEMENT. BUCHHEIM RESPONDED THAT THE TWO ELEMENTS WE HAVE DISCUSSED MIGHT BE INCLUDED, AS WELL AS ARTICLES ON ENTRY INTO FORCE, ON INADVERTENT ACTS, AND ON OTHERS KHLESTOV HAD MENTIONED. CROWLEY
Sheryl P. Walter Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 20 Mar 2014
Sheryl P. Walter Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 20 Mar 2014
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Sheryl P. Walter Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 20 Mar 2014
Sheryl P. Walter Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 20 Mar 2014