The debian-private mailing list leak, part 1. Volunteers have complained about Blackmail. Lynchings. Character assassination. Defamation. Cyberbullying. Volunteers who gave many years of their lives are picked out at random for cruel social experiments. The former DPL's girlfriend Molly de Blanc is given volunteers to experiment on for her crazy talks. These volunteers never consented to be used like lab rats. We don't either. debian-private can no longer be a safe space for the cabal. Let these monsters have nowhere to hide. Volunteers are not disposable. We stand with the victims.
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Re: Digital sponsorship of Debian Linux on Alpha (fwd)

Craig Sanders writes ("Re: Digital sponsorship of Debian Linux on Alpha (fwd)"):
> On Fri, 17 May 1996, Ian Jackson wrote:
> > Note that with our current packaging scheme you really need to give
> > anyone who's developing root access, so it might be worth having one
> > `insecure' machine which is used for test installations and remote
> > development.  Reinstalling regularly will make it hard for hackers to
> > retain any foothold they might get :-).
> 
> sudo would be useful here.
>
> All debian developers are in group sudo & group developer, /etc/sudoers
> allows all in group developer to either do anything (possibly way too
> open but very flexible), or just a limited subset of functions such as
> "sudo ./debian.rules"

That's *extremely* silly.  This is just a way to make people jump
through hoops to break into root access rather than just giving it to
them sensibly.

If you make people jump through hoops they will either install a back
door over which you have no control, or (worse) need root access for
some other purpose in an emergency and then screw up because the hoop
got in the way.

If the developers need to run their own scripts as root it's best just
to give them root access.

> The only problem would be pgp-signing the dchanges files. i wouldn't put
> my private key on any public machine (actually, any machine which wasn't
> 100% under my control) for any reason.

So generate another key, or copy the files off the insecure system.
(Though signing something that was generated on an insecure system is
rather pointless.)

Ian.