Dilbert on ISO 9000 Certification in 1996 (there are also 21 for ISO 9001)
THE past few days were spent explaining ISO certification in relation to Sirius. The next few days will be spent giving an example or a sub-set of examples of how Sirius handled sensitive data. It probably hasn't improved at all since I left last month.
"While I'm not going to report this as a former insider, I do wish to explain what's at stake here, at least as a cautionary tale."The problem here is that Sirius had British clients with their clients' data on the systems. Some was medical data. What does the law say about access from another country and why was Google (American company) getting/drowning in legal hot waters for involvement in the NHS?
What's more, it's not clear if ISO 9001 certifiation allows personal computers at home, purchased and maintained by staff along with many other uses and applications, to be used as work machines (deemed "Secure"? Really???). Remember that, as we noted repeatedly in the past, the managers never bothered supplying the staff with anything; the company does not even provide a chair and a desk, as already explained in length here (mostly back in December). Did that pass muster at ISO's cash register (ISO just wants the money)?
"ISO doesn't care; it has no quality control of its own; its workers are like corporate staff and they might not even care anyway; they got the money, and that's what's important to ISO."Well, maybe in the ISO forms the company can pretend that those computers were supplied by the company to staff when in fact the staff receives almost nothing from the company except a very old phone (Cisco-branded, Ethernet only; maybe 2 decades old).
While I'm not going to report this as a former insider, I do wish to explain what's at stake here, at least as a cautionary tale. ISO doesn't care; it has no quality control of its own; its workers are like corporate staff and they might not even care anyway; they got the money, and that's what's important to ISO. Many questions remain, e.g. which actual shell was the certification for? Do they realise they deal with a hydra or a polymorphous entity here (some of its shells are based in another continent, without actual boundaries within the company)? Even the pension schemes seem to be struggling to keep track and they need to be lectured on how the company splits and then illegally compels staff to sign papers without legal advice (nor proper understanding), as we noted here before. It was covered a lot roughly one week ago.
"To be clear, NHS was not a client, except indirectly (contractors)."And sure, many lessons are to be learned outside the company, too. If regulators could find E-mails, they would not struggle to see incriminating stuff (we plan to add examples to the wiki), including NHS medical data "oopsies" (admission on the record, too), even for people do not consent to data sharing. ISO probably doesn't care. As we said several times already, ISO only cares about money. With 'anonymisation' not working, accidents aside, there's a big scandal brewing under the surface, but then again the privatisation of the NHS would likely misplace the blame. The media has several examples of known incidents and it's a very big deal because the NHS has been pushing towards it, moreover offering to send some of this data abroad.
To be clear, NHS was not a client, except indirectly (contractors). But if someone wishes to find some major scandal/blunder, we welcome further investigation, i.e. people can do what ISO 'cannot' do because it would discredit ISO.
"There are 2 problems to track," an associate noted, "one is the scam of the ISO 9000 certification. The other is the destruction of ISO as an organisation by Microsoft." ⬆