08.02.20

IBM and the Bomb – Part V: Arms Control by Company That Profits From Nuclear Arms? World War II Mistakes Repeated?

Posted in IBM at 7:58 am by Dr. Roy Schestowitz

Watson Jr. fought for his country, but he also profited from the military–industrial complex (state monopoly capitalism)

Summary: A decade after the end of the deadliest war his father died and two decades later he repeated the same mistake — the error of conflating business with politics, as if maximising revenue would miraculously achieve the best outcome for nations as well

THE series may not culminate in this part which is longer than the rest (see introduction; part 1; part 2; part 3; part 4). Based on documents declassified/released after a review 6 years ago we see “arms control” talks that involve Watson Jr. from IBM, a company that profited from nuclear stockpiling (see prior parts). Here’s the raw document:

The key part is highlighted below:

1. PLEASE ACCREDIT USDEL TO SUBJECT MEETING AS FOLLOWS:
REPRESENTATIVES
THE HONORABLE
ADRIAN FISHER
AMBASSADOR
U.S. REPRESENTATIVE TO THE COMMITTEE ON DISARMAMENT
GEORGE M. SEIGNIOUS II
DIRECTOR
ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY
(HEAD OF DELEGATION, EX OFFICIO WHEN IN ATTENDANCE)
UNCLASSIFIED
UNCLASSIFIEDSTATE 011288

ALTERNATE REPRESENTATIVE
CHARLES FLOWERREE
ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY
ADVISERS
ALEXANDER AKALOVSKY
ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY

Sheryl P. Walter Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 20 Mar 2014

Sheryl P. Walter Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 20 Mar 2014

CHARLES BAY, COLONEL
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
THOMAS F. BARTHELEMY (JANUARY 24 – FEBRUARY 9)
ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY
MATTHEW DALEY (MARCH 5 – APRIL 13)
ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY
ROGER HAGENGRUBER
DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY
ROBERT P. MIKULAK (MARCH 5 – APRIL 13)
ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY
BLAIR L. MURRAY (JANUARY 24 – MARCH 2)
ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY
MANUEL L. SANCHES, COLONEL
JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
THOMAS WATSON
CHAIRMAN OF THE GENERAL ADVISORY COMMITTEE
UNCLASSIFIED
UNCLASSIFIED
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STATE 011288

ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY
ADAM YARMOLINSKY
COUNSELOR
ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY
2. MISSION IS REMINDED THAT ONLY OFFICIALLY
ACCREDITED MEMBERS OF THE DELEGATION ARE AUTHORIZED TO
PARTICIPATE IN CONFERENCE SESSIONS (11 FAM 633.1).
3. HEAD OF DELEGATION SHOULD BE REMINDED BEFORE
DEPARTURE THAT A TELEGRAPHIC SUMMARY REPORT OF
CONFERENCE RESULTS IS REQUIRED. VANCE

UNCLASSIFIED

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Sheryl P. Walter Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 20 Mar 2014

Sheryl P. Walter Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 20 Mar 2014

Sheryl P. Walter Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 20 Mar 2014

Sheryl P. Walter Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 20 Mar 2014

This may not seem like much, but remember there’s conflict between IBM’s interests and disarmament. At the same time, understandably, Mr. Watson may not want nuclear war (just buildup), as he had fathered 6 children (Thomas John Watson III, Jeanette Watson, Olive F. Watson, Lucinda Watson, Susan Watson, and Helen Watson) and likely had a lot of grandchildren.

ASAT was already mentioned here before (named and explained first in part 2). The following long document teaches us very little about what Watson had to do with ASAT. He was involved in these talks.

Notice that they keep “secret” the part about Watson. It was the fifth plenary meeting.

1. SUMMARY: US DEL PRESENTED TEXT OF INFORMAL, PRELIMINARY IDEAS FOR INITIAL AGREEMENT AND ASKED FOR SOVIET IDEAS. REMAINDER OF PLENARY TAKEN UP BY DISCUSSION OF POINTS IN U.S. TEXT. END SUMMARY.
2. FIFTH PLENARY MEETING HELD AT U.S. EMBASSY ON FEBRUARY 2, 1979, FROM 1500 TO 1815. THOMAS WATSON,
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CHAIRMAN, GENERAL ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON ARMS CONTROL
AND DISARMAMENT, AND WILLIAM JACKSON, ACDA, ATTENDED
FIRST PART OF MEETING.
3. BUCHHEIM STATED U.S. HAD PUT SOME PRELIMINARY,
TENTATIVE IDEAS ON PAPER FOR DISCUSSION BY BOTH SIDES,
ALONG THE LINES OF EXAMPLE OF SOVIET SIDE. HE THEN

Sheryl P. Walter Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 20 Mar 2014

Sheryl P. Walter Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 20 Mar 2014
PASSED COPIES OF NON-PAPER TO KHLESTOV. TEXT WAS ON
ONE PAGE, UNLABELED, UNDATED, WITH TWO ELEMENTS SEPARATED.
A. TEXT OF FIRST ELEMENT FOLLOWS: BEGIN TEXT.
EACH PARTY UNDERTAKES NOT TO DESTROY, DAMAGE, OR
CHANGE THE TRAJECTORY OF, AND OBJECT WHICH HAS BEEN
PLACED IN ORBIT AROUND THE EARTH OR ON ANY OTHER TRAJECTORY INTO OUTER SPACE UNLESS SUCH OBJECT HAS BEEN
ENTERED ON THE REGISTRY OF THAT PARTY IN ACCORDANCE
WITH THE CONVENTION ON REGISTRATION OF OBJECTS LAUNCHED
INTO OUTER SPACE, EXCEPT THAT EITHER PARTY OR THE
PARTIES ACTING TOGETHER MAY CHANGE THE TRAJECTORY OF
AN OBJECT WHICH HAS BEEN PLACED IN ORBIT AROUND THE
EARTH OR ON ANY OTHER TRAJECTORY INTO OUTER SPACE WITH
THE AGREEMENT OF THE STATE ON WHOSE REGISTRY SUCH
OBJECT HAS BEEN ENTERED. END TEXT.
B. TEXT OF SECOND ELEMENT FOLLOWS: BEGIN TEXT.
EACH PARTY UNDERTAKES, FOR A PERIOD OF ONE YEAR
FROM THE DATE OF THIS AGEEMENT, NOT TO LAUNCH, FOR
TEST OR ANY OTHER PURPOSES,AN INTERCEPTOR MISSILE
FOR DESTROYING OR DAMAGING OBJECTS WHICH HAVE BEEN
PLACED IN ORBIT AROUND THE EARTH OR ON ANY OTHER TRASECRET
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JECTORIES INTO OUTER SPACE. END TEXT.
4. IDENTITY OF OBJECTS. KHLESTOV’S OPENING QUESTIONS
CONCERNED IDENTITY OF OBJECTS COVERED (NOT TO CARRY
OUT ACTS “UNLESS SUCH OBJECT HAS BEEN ENTERED ON THE
REGISTRY OF THAT PARTY”). BUCHHEIM EXPLAINED THAT
ESSENCE OF IDEA WAS THAT U.S. WOULD UNDERTAKE NOT TO
CARRY OUT CERTAIN ACTS AGAINST ANY OBJECT, EXCEPT THAT
U.S. WOULD RETAIN RIGHT TO CARRY OUT SUCH ACTS AGAINST
OBJECTS ON U.S. REGISTRY, AND USSR WOULD UNDERTAKE CORRESPONDING OBLIGAIONS. HE SAID, AS AN ILLUSTRATION,
THAT IT IS NOT UNUSUAL TO PLACE AN OBJECT IN ORBIT AND
SOMETIME LATER USE ON-BOARD PROPULSION UNIT TO CHANGE
OBJECT’S ORBIT. THIS IS A LEGITIMATE AND COMMON PRACTICE WHICH SHOULD BE RECOGNIZED AND NOT PROHIBITED.
KHLESTOV INDICATED THE SOVIET SIDE UNDERSTOOD.
5. DAMAGE AND DESTRUCTION. KHLESTOV THEN QUESTIONED
EXACTLY WHAT U.S. SIDE MEANT BY TERM “NOT TO DESTROY,
DAMAGE…ANY OBJECT.” HIS PRINCIPAL QUESTION, ARTICULATED IN VARIOUS FORMS, WAS WHETHER U.S. TEXT MEANT
SAME AS SOVIET TERMS “DAMAGE TO THE INTEGRITY OF A

Sheryl P. Walter Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 20 Mar 2014

Sheryl P. Walter Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 20 Mar 2014

SPACE OBJECT” AND “DISABLEMENT OF ITS ON-BOARD EQUIPMENT” (SEE ASAT TWO 005, BERN 528, PARA 11).
A. BUCHHEIM SAID “DESTROY” MEANS TOTAL DESTRUCTION AND “DAMAGE” MEANS PARTIAL DESTRUCTION. FOR PURPOSES OF CLARITY AND COMPETENESS U.S. SIDE INCLUDED
BOTH TERMS; ALTHOUGH “DAMAGE” BY ITSELF MIGHT BE SUFFICIENT, U.S. WOULD PREFER NOT TO SEEM TO LEAVE A “LOOPHOLE” BY PROHIBITING DAMAGE AND NOT PROHIBITING TOTAL
DESTRUCTION. U.S. SEES AN OBJECT IN SPACE AS A WHOLE
UNIT, AND DAMAGE TO ANY PART IS DAMAGE TO THE OBJECT.
AS EXAMPLE, BUCHHEIM SAID THAT IF HE WERE TO PUT AN
EGG IN THE DRINKING GLASS BEFORE HIM AND PUT THE COMBINATION IN ORBIT, “DAMAGE TO THE OBJECT” WOULD MEAN
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BREAKING THE GLASS, OR CHIPPING THE RIM, OR BREAKING
THE EGG IN IT.
B. KHLESTOV STILL WAS NOT CONVINCED HE CLEARLY
UNDERSTOOD U.S. CONCEPT. HE SAID SOVIET APPROACH WAS
THAT NOTHING CAN BE DONE TO THE OBJECT–NOT TO DAMAGE
IT, NOT TO DESTROY IT, OR NOT TO DISABLE ON-BOARD

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ACTION SS-25
INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 /026 W
——————052249 031502Z /50
O 031205Z FEB 79
FM AMEMBASSY BERN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC NIACT IMMEDIATE 7741
INFO NSC WASHDC NIACT IMMEDIATE
SECDEF WASHDC NIACT IMMEDIATE
JSC WASHDC NIACT IMMEDIATE
CIA WASHDC NIACT IMMEDIATE
NASA WASHDC IMMEDIATE
S E C R E T SECTION 2 OF 3 BERN 0678

Sheryl P. Walter Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 20 Mar 2014

Sheryl P. Walter Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 20 Mar 2014

EXDIS
EQUIPMENT. IN RESPONSE TO HIS QUESTION OF HOW U.S.
CONSIDERS A PIECE BROKEN OFF THE SIDE OF AN OBJECT,
BUCHHEIM SAID U.S. VIEWS ON THAT ARE SAME AS SOVIET
VIEWS AND SUCH DAMAGE WOULD NOT BE ALLOWED. KHLESTOV
CONTINED TO ASK QUESTIONS AS TO WHETHER EQUIPMENT ON
OUTSIDE AS WELL AS “STUFFING” INSIDE SHELL OF OBJECT
WOLD BE COVERED.
C. BUCHHEIM ELABORATED ON EGG IN GLASS EXAMPLE
BY SAYING THAT IF OBJECT WERE ORBITED WHICH CONSISTED
OF A TIN CAN WITH WALNUT ON ITS OUTSIDE AND DRINKING
GLASS WERE INSIDE CAN AND CONTAINED AN EGG WITH A CHICK
INSIDE, THEN ALL WOULD BE COVERED UNDER AGREEMENT AND
NO DAMAGE COULD BE DONE TO ANY OF THESE.
KHLESTOV STILL CONTINUED TO
PROBE U.S. INTENT BY ASKING IF U.S. FORMULATION WOULD
PROHIBIT NOT ONLY PHYSICAL DAMAGE TO OUTER SHELL OF
OBJECT BUT ALSO THOSE ACTIVITIES WHICH WOULD LEAD TO
DISRUPTION OF NORMAL FUNCTIONING OF INTERNAL EQUIPMENT.
(KHLESTOV ASKED ABOUT FUNCTIONING OF INTERNAL EQUIPMENT
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IN A VARIETY OF WAYS.) BUCHHEIM ASKED IF KHLESTOV MEANT
ONE WAS NOT ALLOWED TO SHAKE GLASS AND BREAK THE EGG
INSIDE. MAYORSKY INTERJECTED A QUESTION IN ENGLISH,
“HOW ABOUT SHAKING THE GLASS AND GIVING THE CHICKEN A
HEADACHE?” BUCHHEIM ASKED IF THAT WAS WHAT THE SOVIET
SIDE MEANT. MAYORSKIY SAID, “MORE OR LESS.” BUCHHEIM
SIAD THAT THE SOVIET SIDE SHOULD SAY WHETHER THAT IS
WHAT THEY MEANT SINCE THERE SEEMS TO BE SOME UNCERTAINTY IN THEIR MEANING. KHLESTOV SAID THE MOST
IMPORTANT WORD WAS “DAMAGE” AND IT WAS NECESSARY TO BE
CLEAR ON IT. BUCHHEIM SAID KHLESTOV SHOULD TELL HIM
WHAT THE WORD “DISABLE” MEANT.
D. FOLLOWING THIS PRELIMINARY EXCHANGE, KHLESTOV
CHANGED THE CHARACTER OF HIS QUESTIONS AND DESCRIBED
TWO SPECIFIC SITUATIONS. THE FIRST SITUATION IS WHEN A
PIECE HAS BEEN BROKEN OFF THE OBJECT, PIECES HAVE BEEN
BROKEN OFF OBJECTS ON THE SURFACE OF THAT OBJECT, OR
WHEN THE SURFACE OF THE OBJECT IS DAMAGED IN SUCH A
WAY THAT CONTENTS HAVE BEEN DAMAGED-THAT IS ONE STATE.
KHLESTOV SAID THE SECOND SITUATION WAS ONE WHEN PHYSICALLY THE OBJECT IS INTACT–THE SURFACE OF THE OBJECT
IS INTACT–BUT THE CONTENTS START MALFUNCTIONING, THEY
CEASE TO FUNCTION NORMALLY, ON-BOARD EQUIPMENT IS NOT
FUNCTIONING. ALTHOUGH YOU HAVE STRUCTURAL INTEGRITY
INTACT, THE ON-BOARD EQUIPMENT IS NOT FUNCTIONING, THE

Sheryl P. Walter Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 20 Mar 2014

Sheryl P. Walter Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 20 Mar 2014

INTERNAL EQUIPMENT CEASES TO FUNCTION NORMALLY. DID
U.S. MEAN BOTH CASES WOULD NOT BE ALLOWED WHEN IT USED
TERM “DAMAGE” IN ITS FORMULATION? BUCHHEIM SAID HE
WOULD REPEAT BACK TO SEE IF HE UNDERSTOOD WHAT KHLESTOV
HAD JUST SAID. THE FIRST CASE WAS ONE IN WHICH THE
PHYSICAL STATE OF THE SURFACE OF AN OJBECT, OR OF THE
EQUIPENT MOUNTED ON THE OUTSIDE OF THE OBJECT, OR OF
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THE EQUIPMENT INSIDE THE OBJECT WAS CHANGED. DID
KHLESTOV MEAN THAT? KHLESTOV AGREED. BUCHHEIM CONTINUED BY SAYING THE SECOND CASE WAS ONE IN WHICH THE
OBJECT AND ITS PARTS REMAINED PNYSICALLY INTACT BUT
THE EQUIPMENT MOUNTED OUTSIDE OR INSDE CEASED TO
FUNCTION NORMALLY. WAS THAT CORRECT? KHLESTOV SAID
YES. BUCHHEIM SAID THAT THOSE TWO CASES TOGETHER
WAER A GOOD ESCRIPTION OF WHAT WE MEANT BY DAMAGE.
KHLESTOV REPLIED THAT WE HAVE IDENTICAL UNDERSTANDINGS.
E. KHLESTOV STATED THAT SOVIET FORMULATION
“DAMAGE TO THE INTEGRITY” AND “DISABLEMENT OF ITS ONBOARD EQUIPMENT” WERE BETTER. THE “INTEGRITY” FORMULATION MEANS THT PHYSICAL STATE. THE LATTER PHRASE,
“DISABLEMENT,” SPEAKS TO THE SECOND CASE–THAT THE
EQUIPMENT INSIDE OR OUT CEASES TO FUNCTION NORMALLY,
HAS BEEN MADE UNOPERATIONAL.
6. TRAJECTORY – DISPLACEMENT. KHLESTOV BEGAN DISCUSSION ON COMPARISION OF U.S. GERM “NOT TO…CHANGE THE
TRAJECTORY OF ANY OBJECT WHICH HAS BEEN PLACED IN ORBIT
AROUND THE EARTH OR ON ANY OTHER TRAJECTORY INTO OUTER
SPACE” WITH SOVIET TERM PROHIBITING “DISPLACEMENT FROM
ORBIT” (ASAT TWO 005, PARA 11).
A. BUCHHEIM STATED THAT ESSENCE IS WE SHOULD NOT
DISTURB THE ORBIT OF OBJECT IN ORBIT AND ALSO SHOULD
NOT DISTURB TRAJECTORY OF OBJECT GOING OFF INTO DEEP SPACE;
AND THAT U.S. SIDE HAD USED “NOT TO…CHANGE THE
TRAJECTORY” BECAUSE “TRAJECTORY”IS THE GENERAL TERM
WHICH INCLUDES “ORBIT.” HE ADDED THAT SOVIET LANGUAGE
WOULD PROHIBIT CHANGING THE ORBIT OF AN OBJECT IN ORBIT
BUT WOULD NOT PROHIBIT CHANGING TRAJECTORIES OF OBJECTS IN OTHER KINDS OF FLIGHT PATHS IN OUTER SPACE.
SUBSEQUENT CONVERSATION CLARIFIED NUANCE IN ENGLISH
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Sheryl P. Walter Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 20 Mar 2014

Sheryl P. Walter Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 20 Mar 2014

TEXT (“ANY OBJECT WHICH HAS BEEN PLACED”) TO MAKE CLEAR
TO KHLESTOV THAT ANY OBJECT WHICH HAD LANDED ON MOON
OR ANY OTHER CELESTIAL BODY WOULD COME UNDER COVERAGE
OF U.S. FORMULATION BECAUSE IT HAD PREVIOUSLY BEEN
“PLACED…ON…(/) TRAJECTORY INTO OUTER SPACE.” BOTH
AGREED THAT OBJECTS IN ORBIT AROUND THE EARTH AND ON
OTHER TRAJECTORIES IN OUTER SPACE WERE TO BE COVERED
UNDER THE POTENTIAL AGREEMENT.
B. VIGOROUS DISCUSSION ENSUED CONCERNING AT WHAT
POINT AN OBJECT “HAS BEEN PLACED…ON ANH OTHER TRAJECTORY INTO OUTER SPACE.” SOVIETS WOULD EXCLUDE ANY
OBJECT WHICH HAD NOT ENTERED INTO EARTH ORBIT OR HAD
NOT YET ACHIEVED THE ALTITUDE OF THE LOWEST POSSIBLE
ORBIT IF ON A TRAJECTORY INTO OUTER SPACE. MAYORSKIY

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FM AMEMBASSY BERN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC NIACT IMMEDIATE 7742
INFO NSC WASHDC NIACT IMMEDIATE
SECDEF WASHDC NIACT IMMEDIATE
JSC WASHDC NIACT IMMEDIATE
CIA WASHDC NIACT IMMEDIATE
NASA WASHDC IMMEDIATE
S E C R E T SECTION 3 OF 3 BERN 0678
EXDIS
INTERJECTED “90 KILOMTTERS” AS THAT ALTITUDE. BUCHHEIM SAID HE WAS NOT INTERESTED IN USING SPECIFIC
NUMBERS. KHLESTOV USED AS JUSTIFICATION FOR THEIR VIEW
THAT OTHER SPACE CONVENTIONS DEFINED “SPACE OBJECTS”
AS HAVING BEEN PLACED IN EARTH ORBIT OR BEYOND, AND
THOSE CONVENTIONS DID ONT COVER OBJECTS BETWEEN EARTH
AND THE LOWEST POSSIBLE EARTH ORBIT, INCLUDING AN
OBJECT ON A TRAJECTORY GOING INTO OUTER SPACE.

Sheryl P. Walter Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 20 Mar 2014

Sheryl P. Walter Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 20 Mar 2014

C. BUCCHEIM SAID HE DID NOT BELIEVE IT NECESSARY
TO DEAL WITH QUESTION OF WHERE AN OBJECT “BEGINS” ITS
TRAJECTORY INTO OUTER SPACE. HE STATED THAT THE MOMENT
WHEN AN OBJECT HAS BEEN PLACED ON A TRAJECTORY INTO
OUTER SPACE IS UNIQUE IN EVERY CASE AND NOT HARD TO
UNDERSTAND. OPERATORS ON GROUND CAN DETERMINE THE
MOMENT IN TIME WHEN AN OBJECT HAS BEEN PLACED IN ORBIT
AND WHEN AN OBJECT HAS BEEN PLACED IN A “TRAJECTORY INTO
OUTER SPACE.” HOWEVER, BUCHHEIM SAID, THE SOVIET VIEWPOINT INVOLVES AN ARBITRARY FORMULATION OF WHERE A
TRAJECTORY INTO OUTER SPACE BEGINS.
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7. EXTENT OF COVERAGE. KHLESTOV NOTED THAT U.S. TEXT
HAS COMPLETELY DIFFERENT APPROACH REGARDING THOSE
OBJECTS COVERED BY THE REGIME OF THE POTENTIAL AGREEMENT. (COMMENT: U.S.-SUGGESTED TEXT WOULD PROHIBIT
ACTS BY A PARTY AGAINST “ANY OBJECT” NOT ITS OWN BUT
USSR WOULD PROHIBIT ACTS AGAINST ONLY EACH OTHER’S
OBUECTS.) KHLESTOV BREEFLY REPEATED PREVIOUSLY EXPRESSED VIEWS CONCERNING THE OBLIGATIONS OF A PARTY
TO A BILATERAL AGREEMENT WITH RESPECT TO OBJECTS OF
THIRD PARTIES (SEE ASAT TWO 014 BERN 627). HE INDICATED SOVDEL WOULD FURTHER ANALYZE U.S. TEXT AND
REPLY IN FUTURE.
8. TEST SUSPENSION.
A. KHLESTOV BEGAN DISCUSSIONS ON THIS TOPIC BY
STATING U.S. SIDE IN VARIOUS STATEMENS HAD USED FOUR
DIFFERENT TERMS IN REGARD TO TESTING: (1) “TO SUSPEND TESTING ANTI-SATELLIGE SYSTEMS”; (2) “TO CEASE OR
STOP TESTING ANTI-SATELLITE INTERCEPTOR SYSTEMS”;
(3) “ANTI-SATELLITE MISSILE INTERCEPTORS” OR “INTERCEPTOR MISSILE” USED IN TEXT TODAY, AND (4) “TO REFRAIN
FROM LAUNCHING MISSILES REGARDLESS OF WHETHER THEY ARE
INTERCEPTORS OR NOT.” WHICH IS THE CLEAREST FORMULATION OF THE U.S., SHOWING ITS APPROACH?
B. BUCHHEIM RESPONDED THAT THE TERMS “INTERCEPTOR”
AND “INTERCEPTOR MISSILE” ARE PRECISELY IDENTICAL IN
AMERICAN USAGE. U.S. HAD SAID AT FEBRUARY 1, 1979,
PLENARY (ASAT TWO 015, PARA 12) THAT PROHIBITION ON
TESTING ASAT SYSTEMS SHOULD BE AN ELEMENT OF A COMPREHENSIVE AGREEMENT. IDEA OF SUSPENDING TESTS FOR
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Sheryl P. Walter Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 20 Mar 2014

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ONE YEAR WAS IN CONTEXT OF IDEA OF INITIAL AGREEMENT
OF LESSER SCOPE THAN COMPREHENSIVE AGREEMENT. REFERRING TO KHLESTOV’S QUESTION ON FEBRUARY 1 FOR SPECIFIC
U.S. IDEA IN PARCTICAL TERMS, U.S. SIDE HAD SAID IT
THOUGHT A PRACTICAL WAY TO IMPLEMENT THE OBJECTIVE OF
SUSPENDING ANTI-SATELLIGE SYSTEM TESTS WOULD BE TO
REFRAIN FROM LAUNCHING ANY ANTI-SATELLITE INTERCEPTOR
MISSILES FOR ONE YEAR AS AN ELEMENT IN AN INITIAL AGREEMENT, IF AN INITIAL AGREEMENT IS OF INTEREST TO SOVIET
SIDE. BUCHHEIM STRESSED THAT U.S. IS TALKING SPECIFICALLY ABOUT ANTI-SATELLITE INTERCEPTOR MISSILES AND
HAS NOT MACE REFERENCE TO ANY OTHER KINDS OF MISSILES
OTHER THAN ANTI-SATELLITE INTERCEPTOR MISSILES. IT IS
U.S. VIEW THAT NO ANTI-SATELLITE INTERCEPTOR MISSILES
SHOULD BE LAUNCHED FOR ANY REASON.
C. BUCHHEIM SAID THIS IDEA WAS SUGGESTED AS A
SPECIFIC NARROW UNDERTAKING FOR PURPOSE OF AN INITIAL
AGREEMENT–SHOULD THE SOVIET SIDE BE INTERESTED IN AN
INITIAL AGREEMENT.
9. EFFECTIVE DATE. KHLESTOV SAID HE UNDERSTOOD THAT
THE TWO PARTS OF THE TEXT WERE TWO ELEMENTSOF AN
INITIAL AGREEMENT WHICH THE U.S. SIDE HAD MENTIONED.
HE NOTED THAT THE DURATION OF A TEST SUSPENSION WAS
FOR ONE YEAR AND ASKED WHAT DATE THE U.S. SIDE HAD
IN MIND FOR THE BEGINNING OF A TEST SUSPENSION.
BUCHHEIM RESPONDED THAT THIS WAS OBVIOUSLY A MATTER
FOR THE TWO SIDES TO DECIDE TOGETHER. HE SAID THAT
HE PRESENTLY HAD NO VIEWS ON THE FORM OF AN AGREEMENT,
ON WHEN TO PLACE AN AGREEMENT INTO FORCE, NOR EVEN
WHEN THESE TALKS WOULD MATURE SUFFICIENTLY TO PRODUCE
A PRODUCT WHICH MIGHT BE PUT INTO FORCE. IT MIGHT,
FOR EXAMPLE, BE POSSIBLE TO PUT SOME KIND OF INITIAL
AGREEMENT INTO FORCE AS OF THE DATE OF SIGNATURE,
BUT THAT IS NOT CLEAR. REFERRING TO A TEST
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SUSEPNSION, KHLESTOV ASKED WHEN WOULD THE ONE YEAR
BEGIN. BUCHHEIM SAID HE COULD NOT ANSEWER AT PRESENT.
KHLESTOV ASKED WHAT OTHER ELEMENTS MIVHT BE IN AN
INITIAL AGREEMENT. BUCHHEIM RESPONDED THAT THE TWO
ELEMENTS WE HAVE DISCUSSED MIGHT BE INCLUDED, AS WELL
AS ARTICLES ON ENTRY INTO FORCE, ON INADVERTENT ACTS,
AND ON OTHERS KHLESTOV HAD MENTIONED. CROWLEY

Sheryl P. Walter Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 20 Mar 2014

Sheryl P. Walter Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 20 Mar 2014

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Sheryl P. Walter Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 20 Mar 2014

Sheryl P. Walter Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 20 Mar 2014

The next part, which is the last part, hopefully shows us that no lessons were learned since IBM’s darkest blunders. Government interventions that involve corporations never end too well; profits precede morality and ethical considerations. █

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