EPO Technical Meetings Show no Breakthroughs, a Strike Goes Ahead This Friday
Apparently there was another (fourth) meeting today
In the interest of transparency (accountability by public participation) today we publish a couple of reports circulated among EPO staff this week.
The Central Staff Committee wrote to staff:
Future Orientations on the Salary Adjustment Procedure: Report on the Second and Third Technical Meetings of 19 and 20 January 2026
Dear Colleagues,
The first technical meeting on the “future orientations on the salary adjustment procedure” took place on 14 January 2026. On 16 January 2026 the administration provided the staff representation with an Excel sheet showing simulations of the new salary adjustment procedure over the 12-year period 2014–2025.
A second technical meeting took place on 19 January 2026 to discuss the simulations. The results show a severe loss of purchasing power in double digits for all sites.
A third technical meeting took place on 20 January 2026. The staff representation addressed the legal and social risks.
Read more in the second meeting report and the third meeting report.
We've codified the reports for GemText and text bulletins, aside from HTML.
This is the second meeting's report:
Zentraler Personalausschuss
Central Staff Committee
Le Comité Central du PersonnelMunich, 27-01-2026
sc26010cpFuture Orientations on the Salary Adjustment Procedure
Report on the Second Technical Meeting of
19 January 2026The first technical meeting on the “future orientations on the salary adjustment procedure” took place on 14 January 2026. On 16 January 2026 the administration provided the staff representation with an Excel sheet showing simulations of the new salary adjustment procedure over the 12-year period 2014–2025. The results show a severe loss of purchasing power in double digits for all sites. A second technical meeting took place on 19 January 2026 to discuss the simulations. This paper reports on the content of discussions.
The EPO departs from basic principles of remuneration
The two basic principles of remuneration policies among International Organisations are:
1) to maintain purchasing power i.e. the value of salaries and benefits, with purchasing power parities (PPPs) measuring the evolution of the prices of goods and services at specific locations relative to a reference (e.g. Brussels indexed on national HICP)
2) to ensure parallelism with wage inflation of civil servants (net of local inflation) via a specific indicator
No other International Organisation uses a “financial sustainability” principle on growth of salary mass with an arbitrary reference.
Loss of purchasing power in two digits
The staff representation pointed out that with such an adjustment formula the salary scales in Belgium are not linked to anything reflecting the evolution of the prices of goods and services at the reference country (i.e. HICP BE). The staff representation repeated that the aim of a salary adjustment procedure is to maintain purchasing power i.e. the value of salaries and benefits. According to the simulations, the new salary adjustment procedure produces over the period 2014–2025 Belgium scales which are –10.8 percentage points below the evolution of HICP BE1.
The administration explained the formula for the salary adjustments to arrive at a pre-determined target of an overall growth of salaries equal to Eurozone (EZ) inflation. They acknowledged that although the national inflation parameter for Belgium (HICP BE) is cited in the formula, the value of HICP BE does not impact the final result.
The administration argued that the application of the purchasing power parity (PPP) coefficients on the Belgium scale, which by definition are equal to 1 every year, ensures fairness among places of employment.
The staff representation repeated that the aim of a salary adjustment procedure is to maintain purchasing power i.e. the value of salaries and benefits. This differs from purchasing power parity,
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1 “Salary Erosion Procedure – More erosion from 20262 onwards”, SUEPO Munich paper of 20 January 2026 (su26002mp)
which is a sub-clause intended to ensure equal treatment across different places of employment. A procedure which violates it at the reference country (HICP BE) would violate the principle of maintaining purchasing power for any site. This is confirmed by the calculations showing a loss of purchasing power in double digits for all sites over the period 2014–2025. In addition, if the applied adjustment in one place of employment varies vastly from its reference parameter and the others have to follow, then the methodology can be considered to be unpredictable.
Decrease of the average growth of salaries from EZ inflation +0.2% to EZ inflation ±0.0%
The staff representation asked the administration to justify why the average growth of salaries should now be further limited from EZ inflation +0.2% to EZ inflation ±0.0%.
The administration replied that the Financial Study 2023 highlighted high inflation risks. In their view, having salary adjustments linked to inflation constitutes a financial risk and this risk should be limited. The administration added that any chosen salary adjustment procedure may cause problems and consider the procedure they propose to be acceptable.
The staff representation replied that this argument cannot be followed, since this method specifically follows the EZ inflation, and again reiterated the request for justification for the increase in cuts in long-term liabilities at the expense staff, to no avail. Staff representation pointed out that high inflation is already offset through fee indexation, making additional cuts on salaries unnecessary. Furthermore, it was emphasised that if high inflation is to be considered a risk, then the specific indicator is the right indicator to preserve. The specific indicator smoothens the adjustments by ensuring that wage evolution remains in parallel with government decisions on civil service pay. While it is true that any chosen salary adjustment procedure may cause problems, some cause much more problems than others.
Safeguard clause for limiting adjustments in case EZ inflation is high
The administration justified the introduction of a safeguard clause by the need to prevent double- digit adjustments in a single year. The Office calculates liabilities by taking account of the real increase (i.e. on top of inflation) of salaries and this has an immediate and visible impact on the balance sheet. According to them, the EPO stakeholders might then perceive that the Office is unable to control its liabilities.
The staff representation pointed out that the new procedure brings higher results than the underlying methodology only in 2022 and 2023, which were exceptional years of Covid and invasion of Ukraine during which inflation spiked. However, the comparison over the 12-year period shows that the trend is a very clear reduction of the adjustments.
When asked what was being considered regarding the design of the safeguard clause, the administration explained that it could consist of a postponement of all/part of the salary adjustment or a permanent cancellation of part of the adjustment replaced with a one-off payment in cash.
The staff representation answered that the “safeguard clause” makes the promise of EZ inflation guarantee void as it seems to be just another “sustainability clause” with a different name bringing about another layer of cut of the adjustments.
Benchmark with civil servants and other International Organisations
The administration stated that ESA and CERN have lower salaries than at the Office, and that the OECD introduced a third pension scheme and third salary grids for its newcomers. They added that not all companies index their salaries with inflation and that national civil servants do not have the “nominal guarantee” clause the EPO has.
The staff representation replied that the new salary adjustment procedure would further widen the gap in terms of salary adjustments with the Coordinated Organisations (COOs) and the European Union (EU) institutions. ESA remains at the higher end of COO levels because it also recruits scientists and engineers. ESA salaries remain comparable to EPO salaries for younger staff but
the ESA does not have a career system blocking advancement and has a proper salary adjustment procedure. CERN is primarily a research centre with mostly temporary staff and does pay slightly lower salaries but it does have a proper salary adjustment procedure. After the last 6-year period 2020–2025, EPO salary adjustments in the Netherlands are now severely lagging behind the evolution of national civil servants2.
The staff representation asked for the salary scales of other International Organisations on which the Office bases its benchmark and their analysis as to how EPO jobs (e.g. in DG1) can be considered to be comparable.
The administration declined to offer any justification of their claims related to salary levels of other organisations, or any mapping of roles and grade ranges, and suggested we search for them ourselves.
Counter-proposal from the staff representation
The staff representation proposed that the Office revert to the historical underlying methodology or adopts the methodology of the EU insofar that the Office could apply a filter over it such as a “moderation clause” acting on the contribution of the specific indicator that under certain circumstances would postpone a part of the adjustment.
The administration considered that such proposals have very low chances to be approved by the Contracting States in the Council.
The staff representation insisted on the fact that the EU methodology has been in place since 2014 and was agreed upon by 27 Contracting States. This demonstrates a guarantee of legal certainty and evidences sustained acceptance at Contracting State level. The EU methodology was even confirmed for a second 10-year term despite Brexit. Brexit put real financial pressure on the EU (and not fictional problems that the EPO supposedly has).
Alleged prudent approach vs excessive savings
The administration recalled that the Office has adopted a policy of lowering the “risk appetite” that was reflected in the Actuarial Study 2025, and this implies limiting risks on salary adjustments.
The staff representation replied that the policy of lowering the risk appetite is reflected already on the decrease of the discount rate (expected returns on RFPSS investments), which causes a historically high increase of pension contributions as of January 20263. The argument of applying a “risk appetite” now on staff adjustments does not hold and staff would be penalized twice.
The staff representation found the administration’s arguments on risks very confusing. Investment risk refers to the exposure to equities of a fund. De-risking refers specifically to moving a strategic asset allocation from relying heavily on equities to less volatile options like bonds. This discussion has nothing to do whatsoever with reducing costs and is absolutely not relevant to discussions on real-term salary cuts.
The staff representation stressed that an additional reform increasing the savings of the Office by a further 1.4B€ might trigger the Contracting States to ask for their share of it by e.g. requesting a change of the distribution key of renewal fees in their favour. Currently, the EPO is in an excellent financial situation. If salary adjustments are not decent in good times, how will they be in bad times?
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2 Comments on GCC/DOC 23/2025, par. 108
3 “Pay cut in Germany –1.0% and Austria –0.6% as of 1 January 2026: Work more for less at the EPO”, CSC paper of 9 October 2025 (sc25060cp)
Mandate given by the President to Compensation and Benefits
The staff representation inquired about the mandate given by the President to Compensation and Benefits.
The administration replied that the mandate includes “financial sustainability” and “maintaining purchasing power as far as possible”.
The staff representation expressed its regrets that the President could give such a mandate. Maintaining purchasing power is an essential principle of remuneration policy. Either it is respected or it is not respected. It is bad for the future of the Office to erode salaries and benefits. The EPO would ultimately lose its competitiveness on the job market.
Conclusion
In the Communiqué of 16 January 2026, the Office announced its initial orientations for 2027 on the new salary adjustment procedure. The Communiqué tries to shed a positive light on the reform by pretending that the aim is to “prevent salary decrease in times of crises (the so-called nominal guarantee)” and “focus on protecting purchasing power”. Both statements are wrong.
First, the nominal guarantee is not a crisis clause. The nominal guarantee usually arises because of temporary differences in costs of living evolution (i.e. PPPs) between Brussels and the EPO sites. Second, the proposal absolutely does not protect purchasing power. The simulations show a clear loss of purchasing power in double digits across all sites.
The Office communication is misleading and shows a lack of understanding of the historical underlying methodology. The staff representation is very concerned that in this context, the Office would again severely depart from the basic principles of remuneration and attempt to reinvent the wheel with untested vague mechanisms bearing significant legal risks.
The next Technical Meetings on the “future orientations on the salary adjustment procedure” are foreseen to take place on 20 and 28 January 2026.
The Central Staff Committee
This is the third meeting's report:
Zentraler Personalausschuss
Central Staff Committee
Le Comité Central du PersonnelMunich, 27-01-2026
sc26011cpFuture Orientations on the Salary Adjustment Procedure
Report on the Third Technical Meeting of
20 January 2026The simulations of the new salary adjustment procedure over the 12-year period 2014−2025 show a severe loss of purchasing power in two digits for all sites. A third technical meeting took place on 20 January 2026. This time, the staff representation addressed the legal and social risks. This paper reports on the content of discussions.
The EPO departs from basic principles of remuneration
The two basic principles of remuneration policies among International Organisations are:
1) to maintain purchasing power i.e. the value of salaries and benefits, with purchasing power parities (PPPs) measuring the evolution of the prices of goods and services at specific locations relative to a reference (e.g. Brussels indexed on national HICP)
2) to ensure parallelism with wage inflation of civil servants (net of local inflation) via a specific indicator
No other International Organisation uses a “financial sustainability” principle on growth of salary mass with an arbitrary reference.
Legal risks
During the meeting, one of the major topics addressed by staff representation was the legal risks identified on the methodology proposed by the administration:
First, the proposal abolishes the historical principle of parallelism with civil servants (i.e. specific indicator). According to ILOAT jurisprudence, there may be no right to parallelism, however there should be good reasons to diverge from it. The proposal seems to replace it with a 'guarantee', and this guarantee is EZ inflation. This is an inadequate replacement as it is completely unrelated to any wage inflation. In any healthy economy, wage inflation is higher than price inflation (HICP). This is why International Organisations use a separate measure of wage growth as an element in their salary adjustment procedure. In addition, the fees of the EPO are not even adjusted on the basis of EZ inflation but on EU inflation. There is therefore no strict causal link as to why EZ inflation should be used, nor why it is necessary as a strict limit.
Second, “stability” is an essential principle of a salary adjustment procedure. The proposal contains a “review clause” to potentially give even less than EZ inflation in only three years’ time and a “safeguard clause” to further limit the adjustments in case EZ inflation is deemed 'too high'. Both are in contradiction with the principle of stability. The ILOAT jurisprudence indicates that the results of a salary adjustment method are to be stable, foreseeable and clearly understood. A procedure cannot be simply stopped if the results are subjectively considered 'too high'.
Third, the proposal will produce an extra 1.4B€ savings on long-term liabilities on top of the 2B€ already planned with the 2020 reform. There is no financial justification for additional savings. The EPO would breach ILOAT jurisprudence which states that “the goal of achieving savings does not
in itself constitute a valid reason for depriving staff of a salary adjustment to which they are entitled.”1
Fourth, in the proposed adjustment formula the salary scales in Belgium are not linked to anything reflecting the evolution of the prices of goods and services at the reference country such as national inflation (HICP BE). While calculation steps include HICP BE, the latter is neutralized and has no impact on the final result. Only EZ inflation has an impact. However, EZ inflation is calculated on a much broader territory including 20 other countries.
The Office is taking again legal and financial risks to design a salary adjustment procedure with no equivalent in any other International Organisation. Following the unanimous opinion of the Appeals Committee, in favour of staff on the 2020 salary adjustment reform, the Office had to provision 2 B€2 to financially cater for legal risks.
The administration denied any obligation from the Office to provision 2B€ as confirmed by the external auditors and said that it was solely a prudent approach.
The staff representation noted that accounting standards require prudence on legal risks and this is not a choice the Office can make.
The administration considered that this meeting is not the appropriate forum to discuss legal risks but added that the New Career System and the Invalidity Reform were found legal by the Tribunal. They took note that the staff representation disagrees with the proposed reform. However, they claimed that the Council would not consider a return to the historical underlying methodology, even despite the excellent financial situation of the EPO. They suggested that if the staff representation considers EZ inflation to be not the right parameter, then EU inflation (like for the fees) could be an option to find an agreement with staff. They noted the coming industrial actions. They concluded that they would try to shape a salary adjustment procedure which is politically acceptable for the Council and socially acceptable for staff.
Counterproposals from the staff representation
The staff representation recalled that the Council complained the most when the Office proposed high salary adjustments, due to flaws of the current method giving 3 years-worth of adjustments in one year, and the economic situation did not justify it. One way to mitigate the issue is to keep the parallelism with national civil servants. There is a delay of 1,5 years between the date the civil servants receive their adjustment and the date of application of the EPO adjustment taking these into account via the parallelism principle. This delay could be shortened in order to avoid such complaints by the Council. The adjustment of civil servants is the result of the decision of the governments of 8 reference countries represented in the Council. If these governments decide not to adjust the salaries of their civil servants, then the EPO adjustments follow in parallel and vice versa. The sooner such national adjustments are passed on to EPO staff, the easier it should be for the Council to follow.
The staff representation repeated the proposal to revert to the historical underlying methodology and to adopt some elements of the methodology of the EU. A solution could be a “moderation clause” acting on the contribution of the specific indicator that would under certain circumstances postpone a part of the adjustment. Staff representation further stressed the necessity to have legally tested and proven mechanisms in line with other International Organisations, and the principles of stability and foreseeability.
The administration noted that the proposal to moderate the specific indicator was already formulated by the staff representation 6 years ago. They asked whether the proposal would correspond to the moderation clause of the EU. In their view, this might not be accepted by the Council and they already have expectations for which direction some Contracting States might go.
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1 Comments on GCC/DOC 23/2025, par. 63
2 “Salary adjustment method: Opinion of the Appeals Committee and reaction of the Office”, Communiqué of 13 June 2024
The staff representation noted that trying to please the German delegation is not worth the price of social unrest. Upper management already acknowledged that no matter what the Office proposes, Germany would be against it.
The administration asked for a detailed written proposal from the staff representation and to provide it within one week before the technical meeting of 28 January 2026.
The staff representation replied that it already provided skeletons of counterproposals. The Office is the one having all the necessary data for making further simulations. Staff representation could only work on the details with the administration if good faith is shown and cutting is not a prerequisite.
Lack of financial justification
The staff representation repeated that the EPO is in an excellent situation in terms of productivity, production and finances. The EPO achieved better than the best scenarios quoted by the Mercer consultants. Staff cannot accept a further erosion of their salaries.
The administration denied having ever said that the problems identified in the Financial Study 2019 were now solved. While the Office is in a much better position, the Office should remain careful with its liabilities for several reasons:
1) markets returns are not in the hands of the Office,
2) nor is inflation either, and
3) the non-replacement of 500 staff members might have to be reversed in case the Office needs to recruit.
The staff representation disagreed and reminded that the Office already created funds and multiple financial buffers to cover risks. The pension schemes are funded; buffers cover markets crashes and even one buffer allows for the closure of the Office for one year. These buffers will fill up even more. Market returns are currently way above the discount rate. The pension contributions will rise as of January 2026 to the highest level ever seen. The administration’s attempt to link the reform of the salary adjustment procedure to any necessary financial measure is clearly misleading.
The administration replied that adjustments above EZ inflation introduces volatility in the calculation of liabilities. The aim is to put a frame on the evolution of the liabilities so that they remain in a corridor. Otherwise, the Office will have to do a reform to reduce the benefits.
The staff representation pointed out that when inflation rises so do the fees and there is hence no additional risk.
The administration replied that several Contracting States including Germany consider the EPO work package to be too high. While the Office needs such a work package to find examiners working in three languages, Contracting States consider the difference with national civil servants and other International Organisations to be not justified.
The staff representation reminded that the EPO needs examiners from all Contracting States (including those with high cost of living), mastering the three official languages of the EPO, in addition to their native language. The candidates shall preferably hold a PhD and/or have experience in the industry or R&D in all technical fields (including niche fields). 500 more staff members would not just bring costs. They would bring skills and examine patents, and therefore bring income. The liabilities are minimal as they would be NPS members.
The staff representation pointed out that the performance of the RFPSS is not based on EZ inflation but German CPI. The fund has not only achieved its target and the benchmark but even overachieved both of them. The idea to reduce the performance by reducing the risk and buying for example German bonds is a weird one.
The administration explained that the strategic asset allocation of the RFPSS has not changed yet and remains risky for a fund which should cover liabilities. Donald Trump is also a risk as he has an impact on the macroeconomic environment. In 2022, the RFPSS saw a loss of −28%, which is a huge amount. The impact would be even higher should it happen this year.
The staff representation reminded that most staff stay at least 20 years in the Office and remember the past. The losses actually amounted in 2022 to –13.72% only3. The RFPSS has always largely recovered from market crashes and the Office has already set aside a 1 B€ market crash buffer fund.
The administration added that the financial gap identified by Mercer in the Financial Study 2019 was now covered. However, this should be viewed as a snapshot. Over the long-term, the Office needs to be cautious in order to protect the work package. The administration said they try their best but have constraints.
The staff representation repeated that the Financial Study 2019 looked at the long-term. The proposed reform slows down the salary adjustments considerably more than planned and the savings will be much higher. The Financial Study was already prudent and now there will be yet another layer of prudence. By analogy, if a car drives on the highway and decides to slow down to 5 km per hour, this is not a prudent approach, it is reckless. The current proposal does not protect the work package but severely erodes it.
Erosion of salaries and benefits
The staff representation referred to the SUEPO publication4 made in the morning and showing striking comparison histograms. The loss of purchasing power is in two digits among all places of employment. Over the 12-year period 2020−2025, the reference country Belgium remains −10.8 percentage points below national HICP and the difference is then spread via the purchasing power parities to all sites. EPO staff may not be familiar with the principle of parallelism with civil servants, but they understand purchasing power very well. If Compensation and Benefits does not have a mandate from the President to maintain purchasing power, then there is a serious problem. EPO staff have worked hard to significantly increase the productivity of the Office, and in return they have been rewarded with a decrease in purchasing power rather.
The administration replied that they understood that the role of the staff representation is to protect the package of staff. However, they alleged that politically the Office had no control over how productivity increases should benefit staff. In view of the pressure of the Council, they could not propose a method giving results above national inflation (HICP).
The staff representation noted that the proposed methodology causes a long-term and systematic erosion of the salaries and benefits. This is not acceptable for staff especially in the lower grades. They already have less recognition of experience, slower career, are asked to make double-digit increases in productivity in one year. Staff representation noted that the alternatives are then that either the Office erodes the benefits or it will have to cut the benefits. For the staff representation, none of them is justified, legal or acceptable. Staff representation asked again if the administration wants to maintain purchasing power or not.
The administration replied that the question is not about what they want or not.
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3 RFPSS/SB 61/22
4 “Salary Erosion Procedure – More erosion from 20262 onwards”, SUEPO Munich paper of 20 January 2026 (su26002mp)
Conclusion
The third technical meeting showed no progress in the discussions. The mandate given by the President to his services is obviously a major issue.
The administration promised to send minutes of the previous meetings and intends to discuss the “safeguard clause” further limiting the adjustments in case EZ inflation is too high – a red flag for the staff representation.
The next Technical Meeting on the “future orientations on the salary adjustment procedure” is foreseen to take place on 28 January 2026.
The Central Staff Committee
We'll carry on with our series, as usual, tomorrow morning. Notice how (as stated above and with bold letters, too) the administration is aware of industrial actions is also wary of them.
The industrial actions are working already. Participate in them. █
