02.06.22
Gemini version available ♊︎The EPO’s Overseer/Overseen Collusion — Part XXXXIII: A Legal No-Man’s Land
Series parts:
- The EPO’s Overseer/Overseen Collusion — Part I: Let the Sunshine In!
- The EPO’s Overseer/Overseen Collusion — Part II: A “Unanimous” Endorsement?
- The EPO’s Overseer/Overseen Collusion — Part III: Three Missing Votes
- The EPO’s Overseer/Overseen Collusion — Part IV: The Founding States
- The EPO’s Overseer/Overseen Collusion — Part V: Germany Says “Ja”
- The EPO’s Overseer/Overseen Collusion — Part VI: A Distinct Lack of Dutch Courage
- The EPO’s Overseer/Overseen Collusion — Part VII: Luxembourgish Laxity
- The EPO’s Overseer/Overseen Collusion — Part VIII: Perfidious Albion and Pusillanimous Hibernia
- The EPO’s Overseer/Overseen Collusion — Part IX: More Holes Than Swiss Cheese
- The EPO’s Overseer/Overseen Collusion — Part X: Introducing the Controversial Christian Bock
- The EPO’s Overseer/Overseen Collusion — Part XI: “General Bock” – Battistelli’s Swiss Apprentice?
- The EPO’s Overseer/Overseen Collusion — Part XII: The French Connection
- The EPO’s Overseer/Overseen Collusion — Part XIII: Battistelli’s Iberian Facilitators – Spain
- The EPO’s Overseer/Overseen Collusion — Part XIV: Battistelli’s Iberian Facilitators – Portugal
- The EPO’s Overseer/Overseen Collusion — Part XV: Et Tu Felix Austria…
- The EPO’s Overseer/Overseen Collusion — Part XVI: The Demise of the Austrian Double-Dipper
- The EPO’s Overseer/Overseen Collusion — Part XVII: The Non-Monolithic Nordic Bloc
- The EPO’s Overseer/Overseen Collusion — Part XVIII: Helsinki’s Accord
- The EPO’s Overseer/Overseen Collusion — Part IXX: The Baltic States
- The EPO’s Overseer/Overseen Collusion — Part XX: The Visegrád Group
- The EPO’s Overseer/Overseen Collusion — Part XXI: The Balkan League – The Doyen and His “Protégée”
- The EPO’s Overseer/Overseen Collusion — Part XXII: The Balkan League – North Macedonia and Albania
- The EPO’s Overseer/Overseen Collusion — Part XXIII: The Balkan League – Bulgaria
- The EPO’s Overseer/Overseen Collusion — Part XXIV: The Balkan League – Romania
- The EPO’s Overseer/Overseen Collusion — Part XXV: The Balkan League – Fresh Blood or Same Old, Same Old?
- The EPO’s Overseer/Overseen Collusion — Part XXVI: A Trojan Horse on the Budget and Finance Committee
- The EPO’s Overseer/Overseen Collusion — Part XXVII: Cypriot Complicity
- The EPO’s Overseer/Overseen Collusion — Part XXVIII: Benoît and António’s Loyal “Habibi”
- The EPO’s Overseer/Overseen Collusion — Part IXXX: The EPOnian Micro-States – Monaco and Malta
- The EPO’s Overseer/Overseen Collusion — Part XXX: San Marino and the Perfidious Betrayal of Liberty
- The EPO’s Overseer/Overseen Collusion — Part XXXI: The Abstentionists
- The EPO’s Overseer/Overseen Collusion — Part XXXII: “Plucky Little Belgium”?
- The EPO’s Overseer/Overseen Collusion — Part XXXIII: Swedish Scepticism
- The EPO’s Overseer/Overseen Collusion — Part XXXIV: An “Extremely Dubious” Proposal
- The EPO’s Overseer/Overseen Collusion — Part XXXV: Slovakian Scruples
- The EPO’s Overseer/Overseen Collusion — Part XXXVI: Serbian Sour Grapes
- The EPO’s Overseer/Overseen Collusion — Part XXXVII: Stubbornly Independent Slovenia
- The EPO’s Overseer/Overseen Collusion — Part XXXVIII: Ensnared in the Tentacles of the SAZAS Octopus
- The EPO’s Overseer/Overseen Collusion — Part XXXIX: On the Slippery Slope to Capture
- The EPO’s Overseer/Overseen Collusion — Part XXXX: The Idiosyncratic Italians
- The EPO’s Overseer/Overseen Collusion — Part XXXXI: Public Service or Self-Service?
- The EPO’s Overseer/Overseen Collusion — Part XXXXII: A Parcel of Rogues?
- YOU ARE HERE ☞ A Legal No-Man’s Land
“Of course, one consequence of the ability of the EPO’s management to act with impunity is that there will never be any access to TRUE justice for those whose human rights have been violated.”
Staff of international organisations like the EPO inhabit a legal no-man’s land.
Summary: The EPO‘s immunity has been exploited by Benoît Battistelli and António Campinos, albeit not without much help from the EPO’s Administrative Council
As a general rule, EPO Administrative Council delegates who become implicated in serious “irregularities” in their home countries can expect to face consequences of some kind – even if the “sanction” may ultimately be nothing worse than a small fine or being forced into early retirement.
“For all practical intents and purposes, international organisations conduct their affairs in a legal no-man’s land where there are a number of factors tending to facilitate and even encourage maladministration and abuse of power.”This is because when operating on their home pitches these officials must comply with the codes of conduct governing the activities of national civil servants and, in this regard, they are subject to a certain degree of public scrutiny.
But – most important of all – in their day-jobs as national civil servants they do not enjoy the privilege of “immunity”.
On the contrary, they are subject to the jurisdiction of national administrative and judicial authorities which operate under the framework of domestic law and are subject to parliamentary oversight and some minimum level of accountability.
“The low level of internal and external oversight combine with a remarkable absence of public scrutiny to create an environment in which there is a pervasive lack of transparency and accountability.”However, the rules of the game change significantly different when we shift to the supranational arena in which international organisations like the EPO operate.
For all practical intents and purposes, international organisations conduct their affairs in a legal no-man’s land where there are a number of factors tending to facilitate and even encourage maladministration and abuse of power.
The low level of internal and external oversight combine with a remarkable absence of public scrutiny to create an environment in which there is a pervasive lack of transparency and accountability.
“Question: how many fundamental rights enshrined in the ECHR can the EPO violate without consequence for the individuals responsible?”
This often results in the system being skewed by “perverse incentives” because those who become implicated in serious maladministration or other wrong-doings seldom – if ever – get called to account or suffer any prejudice to their “career”.
In the case of the EPO, more often than not, such individuals end up being rewarded for their misdeeds. Indeed, they often manage to land lucrative post-retirement sinecures thanks to the EPO’s notorious revolving door and the pan-European "good brother" crony network.
Some Council delegates like Christoph Ernst from Germany have managed to land lucrative post-retirement sinecures via the EPO’s notorious revolving door.
Despite his criminal conviction for credit card fraud in Finland, Martti Enäjärvi enjoyed an impressive post-retirement career as a “Special Advisor” to EUIPO director António Campinos.
In the next part we will consider how the rank-and-file staff of international organisations like the EPO are exposed to the abuses of managers and senior executives for whom “immunity” all too often translates into “impunity”. █
“So why do the Member States not only tolerate this situation, but also participate (eg by way of CA/D 2/14) in enabling the abuses of human rights at the EPO? Have they no shame?”
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